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Problem Formulation 
This master's thesis assesses ambidextrous organizations, and compares the 
innovation culture of ambidextrous companies to non-ambidextrous companies. 
The paper covers an extensive literature review - ambidexterity and six building 
blocks for an innovative company culture - accompanied by data-analysis from a 
survey sample. 
Our research question is:  
What are the differences in innovative cultures between ambidextrous 
organizations and non-ambidextrous organizations?   
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Abstract 
Companies need to be more innovative in meeting the increasing demands of 
today’s global competitive pressures and rapid market changes. In recent years, 
the need for innovation has made ambidexterity – the ability to achieve 
incremental and radical innovation simultaneously – an appealing concept to 
literature. Further, literature has found organizational culture to be a key for 
managing innovation. However, while it is evident that culture and ambidexterity 
have great relevance for innovation, the number of articles written on the 
intersection between these remain scarce. 
In this master’s thesis, we examine the concept of ambidexterity in relation to a 
comprehensive framework for innovative cultures – comprised of the six building 
blocks: resources, processes, success, values, behaviors, and climate – in order to 
enhance the understanding of how these two concepts are related. To our 
knowledge, a conceptualization of an entire company culture has not previously 
been investigated with a particular focus on ambidexterity. The broad scope of the 
innovative culture framework used means that this paper includes a 
comprehensive literature review, which can be valuable for anyone interested in 
company cultures for innovation. 
Drawing on survey data from SISVI – a Norwegian project set in the cross-section 
between business and research – we propose that ambidexterity and a company’s 
culture for innovation are positively correlated. Findings indicate that all aspects 
of the cultural framework are indeed positively correlated to ambidexterity, 
suggesting that a company can improve its level of ambidexterity by improving 
the company’s culture for innovation. 
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Sammendrag 
Med dagens økende globale konkurranse og raske markedsendringer stilles det 
stadig høyere krav til innovasjon i bedrifter. De senere årene har dette gjort 
konseptet ambidekstri - evnen til å mestre inkrementell og radikal innovasjon 
samtidig – til et attraktivt konsept innen forskning. Videre har litteraturen også 
funnet at organisasjonskultur kan være nøkkelen til å mestre innovasjon. Selv om 
det er tydelig at kultur og ambidekstri har stor relevans innen innovasjon, er 
antallet artikler om skjæringspunktet mellom disse svært begrenset. 
I denne masteroppgaven undersøker vi begrepet ambidekstri i forhold til et 
omfattende rammeverk for innovasjonskulturer - bestående av de seks 
byggeblokkene: ressurser, prosesser, suksess, verdier, atferd og klima - for å øke 
forståelsen av hvordan disse to konseptene er relatert. En omfattende 
konseptualisering av bedriftskultur er, så vidt vi vet, ikke tidligere undersøkt med 
fokus på ambidekstri. Bredden til det brukte rammeverket for innovasjonskultur 
gjør at oppgaven inneholder en omfattende litteraturstudie, noe som kan være 
verdifullt for alle som er interessert i bedriftskulturer for innovasjon. 
Med data fra SISVI - et norsk forskningsinitiativ i skjæringspunktet mellom 
næringsliv og forskning - foreslår vi at ambidekstri og bedrifters 
innovasjonskultur er positivt korrelert. Funn i studien tyder på at alle sider av det 
kulturelle rammeverket er positivt korrelert til ambidekstri, noe som tyder på at 
en bedrift kan forbedre sitt nivå av ambidekstri ved å forbedre bedriftens 
innovasjonskultur. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 Introduction  
In today’s economy, with high global competitive pressures and rapid market 
changes, destructive attitudes like complacency and invulnerability restrict 
innovation and expose companies to the threat of being bypassed by its 
competitors (Nagji & Tuff, 2012; Rao & Weintraub, 2013; Tellis, Prabhu, & 
Chandy, 2009). Thus, the viability of companies depend on their ability to keep 
innovating (Nagji & Tuff, 2012). 
Innovation, however, is a two-edged concept; on the one hand, companies must 
master incremental innovation in order to face day-to-day competition 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010). On the other hand, they must master radical 
innovation to create future sources of revenue. While radical innovations are 
characterized by discontinuity in technology and the market, incremental 
innovations strive to enhance processes, make operations more effective, improve 
quality and decrease costs (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). This often puts companies 
in a dilemma, as radical and incremental innovations require different structures, 
processes, and cultures (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
According to Tellis et al. (2009), successful innovation requires a strong company 
culture. However, how does an innovative company culture simultaneously 
support incremental and radical innovation? We argue that the answer is to 
become ambidextrous. An ambidextrous organization is able to reap the benefits 
of both incremental and radical innovation, through exploration of new business 
opportunities while simultaneously exploiting current capabilities (Birkinshaw & 
Gibson, 2004; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & 
Tushman, 2009). As a result, ambidextrous organizations outperform their 
competitors on innovation (He & Wong, 2004; M. Tushman, Smith, Wood, 
Westerman, & O'Reilly, 2010). However, why are ambidextrous organizations 
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more innovative than their competitors? Moreover, is it possible that the 
differences are rooted in the organizational culture? 
Despite an increasing number of articles on ambidexterity in recent years, articles 
written about innovative cultures in ambidextrous organizations remain scarce. As 
a result, the impact of company cultures on ambidexterity is still unclear. Hence, 
a study of this nature could provide a better understanding of why some companies 
innovate better than others do. More specifically, in this study, we investigate 
ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations to assess which cultural 
differences that are present, and if these differences help explain ambidextrous 
organizations’ superiority on innovation outcomes. From these considerations, we 
arrived at the following research question (RQ) for our master thesis: 
RQ: What are the differences in innovative cultures between ambidextrous 
organizations and non-ambidextrous organizations? 
We attempt to answer this question by performing a study on Norwegian industry 
companies. To achieve this, we are using a framework for innovation culture 
created by Rao and Weintraub (2013), combined with measurements for 
ambidexterity (He & Wong, 2004). The literature review leads us to seven 
working hypotheses, which are tested on Norwegian industry-companies. Our 
goal, then, is to contribute to current research by giving a broader understanding 
of the link between ambidexterity and innovative company cultures. 
1.1 SISVI 
This master’s thesis is a part of the Norwegian project SISVI (Sustainable 
Innovation and Shared Value Creation in Norwegian Industry). SISVI is a four-
year competence project set in the cross-section between business and research, 
and “aims to provide Norwegian industrial firms with four crucial building blocks 
they can use when developing their own unique competitive strategy” ("About 
SISVI," 2014). These blocks are internationalization, innovation, interactions in 
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networks, and integration and implementation. The purpose of SISVI is to develop 
knowledge that will strengthen the long-term competitive capabilities in the 
Norwegian industry, such that it is consistent with the concept of shared value. 
Shared value is value that “is created in a manner that meets both financial and 
societal needs where the latter typically encompasses environmental and societal 
aspects” ("About SISVI," 2014). 
This master’s thesis is part of the innovation-block – work package two – of 
SISVI. This work package aims to understand people’s motives and how 
incentives affect the innovation process, in particular when facing the tensions 
with short-term profit pressures and long-term sustainability issues ("SISVI - WP2 
- Innovation," 2014). The SISVI-project further seeks to better understand how 
companies can create shared value in developing economies through inclusive 
business model development. Moreover, the research in SISVI will “address how 
collaboration through private-public partnerships and the institutionalization of 
learning and adaption processes between actors in the value chain can stimulate 
shared value creation” ("SISVI - WP2 - Innovation," 2014).  
We wish to contribute to the SISVI-project by providing a clearer understanding 
of how certain aspects of the company culture affects the innovativeness of a firm. 
Hopefully, our master’s thesis will provide new and relevant insights about 
innovation culture to the SISVI-project. Finally, we emphasize that our research 
interest is primarily innovation culture in general, and that shared value is not 
directly relevant to the scope of our research. 
1.2 Structure of Master’s Thesis 
In the next section – our theory-chapter – we describe the literature relevant to this 
paper with an emphasis on ambidexterity and the framework for an innovative 
company culture; a framework conceptualized and operationalized by Rao and 
Weintraub (2013). Further, we present our working hypotheses resulting from the 
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literature review, followed by a description of the methodology used and results. 
Finally, we end the thesis with a discussion of our findings and our conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 Theory 
This chapter attempts to give a thorough review of theory that relates to 
ambidexterity and company cultures for innovation, with the aim of discovering 
advantages and restrictions ambidextrous companies have in achieving an 
innovative company culture. The first part of the theory-chapter is an introduction 
to innovation, and it is thus the topic of the next section. After a theoretical outline 
of innovation, culture, and innovation’s relation to culture, we continue by 
describing ambidexterity, followed by a description of an innovative company 
culture. The final part contains six sections, one for each of the six building blocks 
an innovative company culture comprises according to the framework of Rao and 
Weintraub (2013). 
2.1 Innovation 
One definition of innovation is given by Schilling (2013): “The practical 
implementation of an idea into a new device or process” (p. 18). In order to 
innovate, a creative idea must be combined with resources and expertise that make 
it possible to convert the creative ideas into something useful (Schilling, 2013). 
One must notice that innovation is not a single event, but a series of activities 
which are linked to each other. Trott (2012) defines it as a management process: 
“Innovation is the management of all the activities involved in the process of idea 
generation, technology development, manufacturing and marketing of a new (or 
improved) product or manufacturing process or equipment” (p.15), and, as will be 
evident, this has implications for how one can best arrange for innovation. 
When seeking to gain an increased understanding of innovation, it is essential to 
investigate various dimensions of the concept. One dimension represents product 
innovation, which are made in the outputs of an organization; its goods and 
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services. Another is process innovation, which relates to the way an organization 
conducts its business (Schilling, 2013). These types of innovations often come in 
tandem, either because a product innovation enables development of a process 
innovation, or vice versa (Schilling, 2013). Further, innovations are also 
characterized as either radical or incremental, depending on the “newness” of the 
innovation. Radical innovations represent significant leaps in technology 
development (D. J. Kelley, O'Connor, Neck, & Peters, 2011), whereas incremental 
innovations “... makes a relatively minor change from existing practices” 
(Schilling, 2013, p. 46). Therefore, radical innovations require more 
experimenting and iterative problem solving, demanding increased organizational 
flexibility, while incremental innovations require more planning and 
implementation, demanding higher efficiency (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). This 
complexity associated with radical innovation makes this especially difficult to 
handle, and not surprisingly, literature has shown that many companies struggle 
with radical innovation (Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann, 2008). Of the most 
common distinctions made on types of innovation, these are the ones we find most 
relevant to the scope of this paper, particularly the tensions between radical and 
incremental innovation. 
We now know what innovation is, and we are also familiar with different 
dimensions of innovation. However, why is innovation important? 
2.1.1 The Increased Importance of Innovation 
Due to increased competition and globalization, companies are making enhanced 
efforts to improve innovation performance in order to remain competitive (Trott, 
2012). Cooper (1990) states that in the face of “increased competition from home 
and abroad, maturing markets, and the heightened pace of technological change, 
corporations look to new products and new businesses for sustained growth and 
competitive advantage” (p. 44). In order to survive, firms must be able to adapt 
and change, and innovation has long been argued to be the engine of growth (Trott, 
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2012). From a macroeconomic perspective, there are two sources for a country’s 
economic growth: capital accumulation and technological progress (technological 
innovation). Further, capital accumulation cannot by itself sustain growth, and 
sustained growth thus requires sustained technological progress (Blanchard, 
Amighini, & Giavazzi, 2013). 
Notably, how companies do business can be as important, even more so, than what 
they offer to the customer (Amit & Zott, 2012). According to Teece (2010), a 
requisite for success is offering a compelling value proposition in combination 
with a business system that satisfies this with the necessary quality at an 
acceptable price. Even if an innovation is remarkable by itself, and becomes 
widely adopted by society, it will fail without the right business model to 
accompany it (Johnson et al., 2008). 
From this, it is evident that innovation is a broad term, covering several aspects of 
business and everyday life. Today, there are several management tools and best 
practices guidelines available for managers, which aims at assisting organizations 
to succeed in the pursuit of innovation. However, in order to truly understand the 
process of innovation, one must also understand how innovation is related to 
organizational culture. 
2.2 Organizational Culture 
Jay B Barney (1986) emphasizes that organizational culture can be a source of 
sustained competitive advantage. However, he further explains that in order for 
the innovation culture to be a source of sustained competitive advantage, it needs 
to create positive economic consequences, be rare, and be perfectly inimitable. 
When reading literature on innovation, the focus tends to be on technological 
innovation and how to successfully achieve it. Claver, Llopis, Garcia, and Molina 
(1998) emphasize that although there is a great need for technical preparation in 
material, financial, and human resources for successful technological innovation 
to take place, the corporate culture is of great importance, and should not be 
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overlooked by managers. A clear definition of corporate culture is given by Claver 
et al. (1998): 
We define corporate culture as a set of values, symbols and rituals shared by 
the members of a certain firm, describing the way things are done within an 
organization when solving internal managerial problems, together with those 
related to customers, suppliers and environment (p.61). 
2.3 Organizational Culture and Innovation 
Organizational culture is a key to managing innovation (Khazanchi, Lewis, & 
Boyer, 2007): “In other words, the hardware of technological innovation requires 
the software of a corporate culture which is aimed at innovation” (Claver et al., 
1998, p. 64). 
When discussing technological innovation, as an example, the culture can play an 
important role by stimulating the process of generating new ideas and applying 
them. The important role of the human factor in technological innovation is 
especially emphasized, and the need for people’s acceptance of change (Claver et 
al., 1998). Trott (2012) also points out that there is a need for more managers today 
to recognize that change is at the heart of innovation, and that changes occur by 
decisions people make. An innovation-supportive culture is usually thought of as 
fostering team-work, and it includes having creative employees which are not 
afraid of taking risks (Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002). Further, the organizational 
members should be comfortable with admitting mistakes and pursuing their own 
ideas (Edmondson, 2004; Rao & Weintraub, 2013). The importance of 
organizational culture for innovation is growing in awareness among researchers 
(Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002; Rao & Weintraub, 2013), which is why this 
master’s thesis has been undertaken.  
Thus far, we have described what innovation is and its increasing importance. We 
have also outlined the organizational culture and how it is linked to innovation as 
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a potential source of competitive advantage. In the next section, we continue our 
paper by describing ambidexterity, one of the main topics of this master’s thesis. 
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2.4 Ambidexterity 
Throughout history, being able to do things equally good with both hands – in for 
example a swordfight – has proven advantageous, and these individuals have been 
known as ambidextrous. In recent times, this beneficial ability has inspired 
academic researchers, who have adapted the concept in order to describe 
companies’ ability to innovate, known as ambidexterity. 
2.4.1 The Concept of Ambidexterity 
The basic idea of ambidexterity is to simultaneously balance the exploration of 
new opportunities and exploitation of existing capabilities (O'Reilly & Tushman, 
2004; Raisch et al., 2009; Sarkees & Hulland, 2009), which allows development 
of both radical and incremental innovation, respectively. Sarkees and Hulland 
(2009, p. 46) differentiate between innovations that are characterized by “… 
refinement and incremental improvements that allow for enhanced utilization of 
firm resources”, which we refer to as exploitation, and other innovations that are 
characterized by “…radical change, risk, and experimentation which allows for 
new methods, relationships, products, or services to be created”, which we refer 
to as exploration. Although the idea is simple to understand, literature reveals that 
several different interpretations of the concept exist. 
In their literature review on different perspectives on ambidexterity, Raisch et al. 
(2009) argue that successful ambidextrous organizations balance seemingly 
conflicting tensions: differentiation and integration of activities, individual and 
organizational levels, sequential and simultaneous timing, and finally internal and 
external knowledge integration. The first tension – separation or differentiation of 
activities – refers to whether explorative and exploitative activities should be 
separated into distinctive business units, or if the company should adapt 
mechanisms that allow for simultaneous exploration and exploitation. Second, 
while organizational ambidexterity usually refers to formal structures or 
coordination mechanisms, many academic researchers argue that ambidexterity is 
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rooted in individuals’ ability to explore and exploit. The third tension considers 
the perspective of time, whether exploration and exploitation should be sequential 
activities or be performed at the same time. The final tension is about whether 
ambidexterity should be considered from an internal or an external perspective. 
While most literature consider ambidexterity as something each company does, 
research on other topics highly value the importance of external relations, creating 
expectations that ambidexterity can also be considered in a network perspective. 
Although Raisch et al. (2009) present many different perspectives of 
ambidexterity, most literature separates between structural ambidexterity 
(O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004) and contextual ambidexterity (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 
2004). Structural ambidexterity is the most traditional view of ambidexterity, and 
refers to separate structures for exploratory and exploitative activities, while tight 
managerial coordination allows sharing of resources like cash, talents, expertise, 
and customers. Further, it is shown to be a preferred way to organize for 
innovation in several studies (Gilbert, Eyring, & Foster, 2012; Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). The argument for structural 
ambidexterity is that exploration and exploitation are too different to coexist. 
However, strict separation has also resulted in many failed innovation initiatives, 
as the link between R&D and the rest of the company becomes too weak to create 
acceptance for new ideas (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Thus, Gibson and 
Birkinshaw (2004) argue that the exploratory unit must still build on existing 
resources, and the exploitative unit still has to explore some new opportunities. 
This means that one unit cannot only do either exploration or exploitation. In other 
words, each unit has to balance the dilemma of exploration and exploitation; in 
essence transmitting the dilemma all the way down to the individual-level, 
suggesting that individuals end up with a choice of doing explorative or 
exploitative activities (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013). In literature, this individual-
level ambidexterity is commonly referred to as contextual ambidexterity, and 
should serve as a complementary explanation for increased performance 
12 | T h e o r y  
 
 
 
(Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004). To summarize these arguments, structural 
ambidexterity is not necessarily the best way to organize a company, and even if 
it was, the separated units must still confront the exploration/exploitation 
dilemma. From this reasoning, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) suggest that 
ambidexterity should be measured on individuals, before being aggregated in units 
or in the company, leading to the concept of contextual ambidexterity. 
Contextual ambidexterity refers to ambidexterity on an individual level. The idea 
is that managers and employees themselves make decisions of whether to do 
exploitative or explorative activities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Compared to 
companies that solely engage in exploration or exploitation, ambidextrous 
companies need systems and structures that are more flexible, as well as a greater 
emphasis on the human aspects of the company. Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) 
identified four ambidextrous behaviors in individuals. These individuals take 
initiative beyond what is expected of them. They are also cooperative and 
opportunity seeking, in attempting to combine efforts with others. They exhibit 
brokering skills, and they are always looking to build internal linkages. Finally, 
they are good at multitasking, and are comfortable with having different roles in 
different situations. 
2.4.2 Ambidexterity and Performance 
In general, ambidexterity is positively related to performance. M. Tushman et al. 
(2010) found that ambidextrous organizational designs are relatively more 
effective than functional, cross-functional, and spinout designs for innovation 
streams. This is in line with the results from O'Reilly and Tushman (2004), who 
found that ambidextrous organizational design is far superior over other 
organizational designs regarding developing and delivering innovation. 
Additionally, M. Tushman et al. (2010) showed that switching to ambidextrous 
designs improved innovative performance, while shifting away from 
ambidextrous design decreased innovative performance. 
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Furthermore, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) show that performance correlates 
positively to contextual ambidexterity, and that an organizational context with 
social support and performance management only contributes to increased 
performance through ambidexterity. These findings indicate that ambidexterity 
should be the ultimate goal for companies, and that companies must strive to 
create an organizational context where ambidexterity can exist. Another study on 
contextual ambidexterity found that “…interaction between explorative and 
exploitative innovation strategies…” (p. 481) are positively related to sales growth 
rate, while a relative imbalance between exploration and exploration is negatively 
related to sales growth rate (He & Wong, 2004). These findings support the 
ambidexterity hypothesis, and emphasize the importance of relative balance 
between exploration and exploitation. In a similar study on ambidexterity, Sarkees 
and Hulland (2009) found that companies that simultaneously engage in 
exploration and exploitation outperform those that have a strong overweight in 
one of those areas. 
Thus far, we know that ambidexterity can help companies manage innovation 
streams, and succeed with both incremental and radical innovation, but one 
question then arises: How can a company become ambidextrous? 
2.4.3 Becoming Ambidextrous 
Becoming ambidextrous is definitively possible, but literature takes on different 
approaches. Some argue that managers are most important, while other argue that 
culture is most important. O'Reilly and Tushman (2004) argue that ambidextrous 
organizations require managers with special abilities in understanding the 
different needs for exploration and exploitation. Managers must also be 
committed to operating ambidextrously (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004), and have a 
high tolerance of ambiguity (Sætre & Brun, 2013). Among those who focus more 
on culture are Sarkees and Hulland (2009), who take on an external perspective, 
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and Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), who look at ambidexterity in relation to the 
organizational context. 
In their study of ambidexterity, Sarkees and Hulland (2009) provide guidelines 
regarding ambidexterity in companies. They argue that companies should assess 
their level of ambidexterity, figure out whether or not they should be 
ambidextrous, and finally they suggest how companies can become ambidextrous. 
While most studies have measured ambidexterity in companies through an internal 
assessment of exploitation and exploration (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & 
Wong, 2004; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; M. Tushman et al., 2010), Sarkees and 
Hulland (2009) assess ambidexterity by asking relevant stakeholders, including 
management, employees, customers, and alliances about the perception of the 
company. They argue that managers cannot get a true understanding of their 
company without input from key stakeholders. Differences between answers from 
executive management and of key stakeholders may identify issues in the 
company that can benefit from deeper investigation. Sarkees and Hulland (2009) 
recommend questioning these stakeholders to reveal the reasons of these 
differences. Finally, in order for the company to become ambidextrous, Sarkees 
and Hulland (2009) argue that top management needs to meet with those who have 
a different understanding of the company’s exploration and exploitation activities 
to discuss these differences. Discussion about issues is necessary in order to reveal 
weak links and to create a to-do list for the company. 
In their article on “building ambidexterity into an organization”, Birkinshaw and 
Gibson (2004) emphasize that presence of both performance management and 
social support will create a high-performance organizational context that give rise 
to a truly contextual ambidextrous organization. Performance management is a 
factor that includes a combination of stretch and discipline, which when present 
stimulates people to deliver high quality results, while simultaneously making 
people accountable for their actions. Social support is a combination of support 
and trust, which when present provides people with security and the latitude 
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needed for performance behavior. Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) argue that the 
combination of both performance management and social support creates a high 
performance context that “…gives rise to a truly ambidextrous organization” (p. 
51). Their idea is that creating a high performance context enables individuals to 
exhibit initiative, cooperation, brokering skills, and multitasking abilities 
(Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004). 
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) end their paper by providing a guide on how to 
achieve ambidexterity: Companies must diagnose their organizational context by 
measuring their levels of social support and performance management. They 
further need to focus only on a few improvement areas that are consistently 
employed. It is also important that managers build understanding at all levels in 
the company. Moreover, contextual ambidexterity and structural ambidexterity 
should be seen as compliments. While structural separation might sometimes be 
essential, Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) argue that it should be temporary. The 
structural separation is a way to give a new initiative enough resources and space 
to get started, and it should be a goal to eventually reintegrate with the mainstream 
organization. Finally, contextual ambidexterity initiatives should be viewed as 
“driving leadership” rather than “leadership-driven”. In essence, Gibson and 
Birkinshaw (2004) argue that ambidexterity should arise from the context of the 
company, rather than from management decisions, leading us to the next part: 
Ambidexterity and company culture. 
2.4.4 Ambidexterity and Company Culture 
As a concept, ambidexterity is quite versatile. It makes a suitable concept for 
explaining organizational dualities, such as flexibility and efficiency, and the 
number of articles on this topic has grown exponentially the last couple of years 
(Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013). However, only a handful articles have been written 
about culture and ambidexterity. Of  the few empirical-based studies on this 
intersection, both Lin and McDonough Iii (2011) and Wang and Rafiq (2014) find 
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empirical support for organizational culture’s important effects on ambidexterity 
and innovation outcome. 
Lin and McDonough Iii (2011) found that high knowledge-sharing cultures 
positively influences ambidexterity, and that strategic leadership is well suited to 
foster this kind of culture, which in turn means that a knowledge-sharing culture 
mediates between strategic leadership and ambidexterity. Further, they discovered 
that culture is much more important than leadership in facilitating innovation, 
emphasizing the importance of organizational culture for innovation. Lin and 
McDonough Iii (2011) argue that leaders do not “…institute exploitative and 
explorative activities to achieve ambidexterity” (p. 504), but they integrate these 
activities by creating a culture that promotes sharing of knowledge and ideas. 
In their article on ambidextrous organizational culture, contextual ambidexterity, 
and new product innovation, Wang and Rafiq (2014) find close relationships 
between culture, ambidexterity, and innovation. Further, they found that 
ambidexterity mediates between culture and innovation. The authors 
conceptualize ambidextrous culture as a construct consisting of organizational 
diversity and a shared vision. In this context, organizational diversity encourages 
creativity, while the shared vision provides a few simple, formal rules to the 
company. Through their study, Wang and Rafiq (2014) show that companies that 
combine these mechanisms can integrate both exploration and exploitation in 
business units. Further, this integration allows companies to balance new product 
innovation with regard to speed to market. These findings indicate that “… it is 
through developing a distinctive capability of contextual ambidexterity that 
ambidextrous organizational culture as a causally ambiguous resource creates new 
product innovation outcomes” (p. 71).  These findings are consistent with those 
of Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), who found that an appropriate organizational 
context gives rise to ambidexterity. Finally, Wang and Rafiq (2014) show that 
these findings are consistent across 2 different industries in British and Chinese 
companies, indicating that ambidexterity is a function of heterogeneous resources 
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and capabilities, rather than industry and cross-cultural differences. Summarizing 
their arguments, ambidexterity is created through organizational culture, meaning 
that culture is the root of both ambidexterity and innovation outcomes. 
This concludes the theoretical part on ambidexterity and why it is important for 
radical and incremental innovation. We now move on to elaborate the innovative 
company culture framework of Rao and Weintraub (2013), which, together with 
this part on ambidexterity, forms the basis for our research hypotheses.  
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2.5 Framework for an Innovative Culture 
 
Figure 1 - Six building blocks for an innovative company culture. 
With the importance of organizational culture in mind, our project thesis is built 
around a framework describing six building blocks for an innovative culture, as 
conceptualized and operationalized by Rao and Weintraub (2013). Measuring 
innovation is difficult, but Rao and Weintraub (2013) have created a framework 
which is supposed to capture the culture for innovation in an organization. They 
present six building blocks, which they claim are the essence of an innovative 
culture. These building blocks cover different aspects on an organizational culture 
for innovation and are dynamically linked: resources; processes; values; climate; 
behavior; and success (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). The six building blocks are 
further composed of three factors (18 in all), and each of those factors consist of 
three underlying elements (54 in all) (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). The building 
blocks are presented with the tools-oriented building blocks (resources, processes, 
and success) first, followed by the people-oriented determinants (values, 
behaviors, and climate). In the sections that follow, we describe and guide the 
reader through the theory behind each building block, factor, and element in the 
framework. We begin with resources.  
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2.6 Resources 
 
Figure 2 - The resources building block. 
This section describes resources for innovation. We describe the resources in 
general first, before continuing with reviewing each factor and each element in 
the Rao and Weintraub (2013) framework. Finally, we provide a summary and 
relate the theory to ambidexterity. 
A firm’s resources and capabilities can be viewed as bundles of tangible and 
intangible assets that are heterogenic to competitors, and it may help explain a 
firm’s performance in a changing competitive environment (Barney, 1991; J. 
Barney, Wright, & Ketchen Jr, 2001; J. B. Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011; D. 
J. Collis & Montgomery, 2008). A firm’s tangible assets comprises physical assets 
and financial assets. Physical assets can be a firm’s technology, plants and 
equipment, geographical location, and raw material access (Barney, 1991). 
Financial assets can either be internal funds – such as liquidity at hand and unused 
debt – or external funds – such as new equity and high risk debt (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991). Intangible assets, on the other hand, are made up of knowledge 
assets - what the organization knows - and behavioral patterns - the way the 
organization organize and operate (Bessant, Caffyn, & Gallagher, 2001). 
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Grimaldi, Cricelli, and Rogo (2012) further divide intangible assets into three 
main components: human capital (the company’s people); structural capital (the 
organizational structure and internal relations); and relational capital (external 
relations). 
The resources and capabilities of a firm – bundles of tangible and intangible assets 
– can help generate a value-creating strategy, enabling the firm to perform better 
and more efficient than competitors; thereby being a source to competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; D. J. Collis & Montgomery, 2008). In order to obtain a 
sustainable competitive advantage, Barney (1991) presented a framework in 
which these assets need to fulfill four characteristics: being valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and  non-substitutable. 
Competitive advantage is usually the result of a combination of different assets (J. 
F. Christensen, 1995; Hadjimanolis, 2000). If tangible assets are viewed as inputs, 
intangible assets become the capacity to process, coordinate, and shape inputs 
towards given strategic objects (J. F. Christensen, 1995; David J. Collis, 1994). 
David J. Collis (1994) argues that intangible assets are directly related to the 
efficiency and effectiveness to which a company implements and chooses 
activities that adds value to their products and services. He further argues that 
intangible assets therefore can be a determinant of efficiency in the process of 
making inputs into outputs. Although tangible assets are important and 
fundamental as inputs for achieving competitive advantage, intangible assets are 
often seen as crucial factors for obtaining a sustained competitive advantage 
(Grimaldi et al., 2012). This is because intangible assets often are both firm- and 
path specific, and additionally developed over time (D. J. Collis & Montgomery, 
2008; Hadjimanolis, 2000). Thus, more so than tangible assets, intangible assets 
have the potential of being valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
(Barney, 1991).  
R e s o u r c e s  | 21 
 
 
The viability of companies depend on their ability to continue innovating (Nagji 
& Tuff, 2012). Research has shown that there is a clear connection between a 
firm’s tangible and intangible assets and its innovation performance (J. F. 
Christensen, 1995; Hadjimanolis, 2000). Intangible resources in particular are 
found to be closely tied to a firm’s ability to innovate (Grimaldi et al., 2012; 
Hadjimanolis, 2000). Grimaldi et al. (2012) argue that innovation is the main 
catalyst of intangible assets components, competitive advantage, and value 
creation in firms. In other words, as a firm generates innovative outputs, the firm 
will acquire a stream of new knowledge and skills that adds to the firm’s portfolio 
of intangible assets. These assets accumulates over time as the firm learns more 
about the given innovation. The assets are thus both firm- and path specific since 
the learning process will vary among firms. Innovation will therefore generate 
intangible assets that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable; a source 
to sustainable competitive advantage (Grimaldi et al., 2012). However, due to the 
nature of changing markets, assets are just temporarily a source of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; D. J. Collis & Montgomery, 2008). Firms therefore 
need to continuously innovate to ensure a stream of new tangible and intangible 
assets in the future, so that they are able to sustain their competitive advantage 
(Grimaldi et al., 2012; Hadjimanolis, 2000). 
Thus far, we have described resources – both tangible and intangible – as an 
introduction to resources, and outlined their importance to innovation. Following 
this, we review literature on projects, people, and systems for innovation, as these 
three factors are what comprises resources according the framework used (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013). 
2.6.1 People 
A firm’s innovation performance is dependent on its human capital (T. M. 
Amabile, 1998; T. Brown, 2008; Hadjimanolis, 2000; Kanter, 2006; D. Kelley & 
Lee, 2010; D. J. Kelley et al., 2011; Miller, 2006). Each individual contributes to 
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the firm’s collective knowledge (David J. Collis, 1994; D. Kelley & Lee, 2010; 
D. J. Kelley et al., 2011; Miller, 2006), effectively making each individual a part 
of the firm’s intangible assets. 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), people – viewed as a resource – consists 
of: champions of innovation who can act as committed innovation leaders, experts 
of innovation that can support projects, and the internal talent making it possible 
to succeed with innovation projects. These types of people are labeled champions, 
experts, and talent, and are the elements that comprise people (Rao & Weintraub, 
2013). 
According to Smith and Tushman (2005), “… exploring and exploiting require 
fundamentally different and inconsistent organizational architectures and 
competencies” (p. 525). In order to address the issue of exploring in large 
companies, J. B. Quinn (1985) claims that innovative enterprises attempt to model 
the practices of small companies with the use of groups functioning in a skunk-
works style. This way, people with different competences work without 
intervention from organizational or physical barriers to the development of an 
idea. In other words, this style permits teams to explore new ideas without the 
interrupting pressure of exploiting current operations. One should expect the 
teams to be composed by a careful balancing of engineering, production, and 
marketing talents, but J. B. Quinn (1985) claims that few groups use this classic 
form. Instead, he uses the analogy of raising a child to explain the introduction of 
new products and processes to the world: The “mother” is the champion of the 
idea, while the “father” is the authority figure that supports the idea – the 
innovation expert. Finally, the “pediatricians” – the specialists or talent in the 
organization – are the ones that get the product or process through the difficult 
times. We begin this section by looking at the first element, champions, before we 
move on to experts and talent. 
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Champions 
Individuals labeled as innovation champions are critical for success in innovation 
(D. Kelley & Lee, 2010; D. J. Kelley et al., 2011; Miller, 2006; Shane, 1994). 
Shane (1994) defines innovation champions as individuals “who takes a personal 
risk to overcome organizational obstacles to innovation” (p. 397). He further 
argues that they are valuable for an innovation process since they have the 
possibility to hinder distraction from the established business. In some respects, 
innovation champions drive an organization to look beyond its current businesses 
and incremental innovations (D. Kelley & Lee, 2010). However, literature 
suggests that innovation champions are not just involved in radical innovations, 
but innovations on multiple levels (D. Kelley & Lee, 2010). This means that 
innovation champions can facilitate both radical and incremental innovations. 
Innovation champions behave by showing a compelling interest to innovation in 
such a way that they engage others and create lasting support for the given 
innovation (Howell & Shea, 2001). An innovation champion thus needs to master 
a variety of skills. Especially collaborative skills are crucial for an innovation 
champion; these help keeping the innovation teams intact, create common goals, 
and share knowledge (Kanter, 2006). This skill is highly related to what Shane 
(1994) identify as equality: the role of including as many members as possible 
from an organization into the innovation process. To do this, the innovation 
champions need to relate to people from different areas of the organization, such 
as different divisions and across the organizational hierarchy. Thus, collaborative 
skills play an important role in order to create efficient cross-functional ties. 
Innovation champions, then, need to engage the entire organization into an 
innovation, which is not necessarily easy to accomplish. 
Financial tools are often used to measure whether or not an innovation project is 
desirable (C. M. Christensen, Kaufman, & Shih, 2008; Shane, 1994). Further, 
people often use these tools to persuade other members of the organization into 
supporting a given project. Innovation champions need to possess persuasion 
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skills, but not persuasion based on financial tools. Rather, Howell and Higgins 
(1990) claim that “by appealing to larger principles or unassailable values about 
the potential of the innovation for fulfilling the organization’s dream of what it 
can be” (as cited in Shane, 1994, p. 336). However, if the organization rejects an 
innovation project, Howell and Shea (2001) argue that an innovation champion 
needs to persist under adversity, and never give up. Thus, an innovation champion 
will always act as a fuel for innovation. In accordance with the abovementioned 
analogy, we have now given a description of the “mother” in an innovation 
project. The next topic is the “father” in the project, or the innovation expert. 
Experts 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), “a cadre of innovation experts who 
know, teach and implement innovative practices is one of the most important 
innovation resources a company can have” (p. 31). Further, J. B. Quinn (1985) 
claims that effective management of innovation is independent of scale of 
operations or cultural differences. 
Among the critical factors for successful innovation in small companies, J. B. 
Quinn (1985) uses “experts and fanatics” as a label. These people are usually 
founders of a company that tend to be pioneers in their technological field, and 
fanatics regarding solving problems. Being both experts and fanatics, these people 
perceive the probability of success to be higher than others do. Moreover, this 
commitment allows these people to carry on in spite of frustrations, ambiguity, 
and setbacks that follows large innovations (J. B. Quinn, 1985). 
J. B. Quinn (1985) claims that the visions of an innovative company are tied to 
the realities of the marketplace in which they are present. Although each company 
adapts its techniques to their own style and strategy, two elements are always 
present. Innovative companies always have a strong market orientation at the top 
of the company, and they also have mechanisms that ensures interaction between 
technical people and marketing people at the lower levels (J. B. Quinn, 1985). The 
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experts of innovation, then, need to implement and maintain these mechanisms in 
addition to the maintenance of a strong top-level market orientation. 
It is normal for managers to feed resources to the most promising options while at 
the same time keeping other options open (J. B. Quinn, 1985). Early on in a 
project, managers allow chaos and replication, but they demand more formal 
planning and control when the project scales up and development becomes more 
expensive. At these late stages, however, innovation experts maintain flexibility 
and avoid being too dependent on the original plan. By seeking inputs from 
manufacturing, marketing, and customer groups at an early stage, managers can 
prepare to modify their plans as the project progresses (J. B. Quinn, 1985). 
According to J. B. Quinn (1985), innovative companies maintain a flexibility to 
their programs for as long as possible, and their plans are frozen only for strategic 
purposes (e.g. timing). 
Smith and Tushman (2005) claim that top management teams balance 
performance in the short-term and adaptability in the long-term through trade-offs 
in allocation of resources and decisions about organizational designs. This in turn 
requires balanced strategic decisions, in which top management teams confront 
and overcome barriers that can result in tendencies for both consistency and inertia 
(Smith & Tushman, 2005). This means that top management teams should support 
innovation, in spite of tendencies for inertia, and ensure a coexistence of agendas 
that are inconsistent, in spite of forces for consistency. 
Talent 
Talents are important in order to develop business opportunities and release the 
potential of growth (Nagji & Tuff, 2012; Ready & Conger, 2007). This is because 
in evolving businesses talents can use their skills to fill key positions, which are 
crucial for success. The main reason for lack of internal talent is that talent 
practices mismatch the company’s needs. In other words, the lack of talent is a 
result of insufficient pipelines. According to Ready and Conger (2007), successful 
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companies manage to adapt a talent process that is highly rooted in the company’s 
strategic and cultural objectives. This makes them able to not only produce talents, 
but also the right type of talents. So, how could companies become better at 
producing talents? 
Toterhi and Recardo (2013) suggest a method they call the “talent funnel”.  The 
first step is to create a talent strategy and align it with the organizational strategy. 
This supports Ready and Conger’s (2007) view of matching talent processes to 
company requirements. When done, the next step is talent acquisition. The focus, 
they argue, is to define needs and the set of skills required to fill these needs. This 
is because the set of skills required for one innovation could differ completely for 
another (Nagji & Tuff, 2012). The third step is talent development – the process 
of guiding the talents through the “funnel”. The outcome of this process depends 
on how well the organization integrates its acquired talents, and how well it further 
motivates and creates clearness to the work. Finally, the last step relates to how 
the organization can retain talents. “If you have highly creative and ambitious 
people who feel trapped in moribund businesses, they are going to leave” (Hamel, 
1999, p. 82). The key is therefore to continuously challenge and give the talents 
freedom to reach their potential. In the end, organizations must realize that people 
are the most important assets (Toterhi & Recardo, 2013). 
The first of the resource-factors are thus people. We have described the mother, 
the father, and the pediatricians, all three critical in bringing up the child that 
innovation is in this analogy. The second factor of resources, and the next topic, 
is systems. 
2.6.2 Systems 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013, p. 35), systems for innovation require 
appropriate “recruiting and hiring systems in place to support” innovation, 
collaboration tools that support innovation initiatives, and that companies must be 
good at leveraging “… relationships with suppliers and vendors” in order to 
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pursue innovation. These statements culminate in three elements that make up 
systems for innovation, namely selection, communication, and ecosystem (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013). In what follows, we review each of the three elements in 
chronological order. 
Selection 
When hiring and assigning personnel to tasks it is important to look for intrinsic 
motivation in addition to skills, as qualified people who are personally intrigued 
and challenged by the task is more likely to produce creative work than 
unmotivated people (T. M. Amabile, 1988). Clayton M Christensen and Overdorf 
(2000) argue that managers must carefully consider what kind of team that should 
work on a project, and which organizational structure that team needs to work 
within. Thus, the tools and systems that allow a company to put the right people 
with the right skills in the right place at the right time are key components of an 
organization’s talent management (Ready & Conger, 2007). This is achievable 
through good design, technical excellence, and with clear links between processes 
and the company’s objectives. If these systems are combined with vitality, talent 
management may be a “secret weapon” in a competitive environment (Ready & 
Conger, 2007). 
In order to optimize the talent management system, Toterhi and Recardo (2013) 
suggest applying the previously mentioned talent funnel, which is an adapted form 
of the sales funnel. They argue that the talent funnel can support corporate strategy 
by creating a talent strategy, define and fill the needs, develop the talents, and 
embed discipline. The talent funnel is a cultural overhaul of the talent management 
program meant to acquire highly talented people. Organizational leaders who wish 
to identify, attract, and retain top-notch talent should therefore use the talent 
funnel approach to manage their human capital portfolio, where the ultimate goal 
is an employee for life (Toterhi & Recardo, 2013). 
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Communication 
Gilbert et al. (2012) argue that firms need to organize incremental and disruptive 
innovations into two separate businesses. Only then, firms can simultaneously 
reposition their core business while building a future. However, the key to success 
in both types of innovation lies in the communication and coordination between 
business units, where coordination ensures that each unit gets what it needs, while 
being protected from interference from other business units (Gilbert et al., 2012; 
Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010). Still, firms cannot undermine the importance of 
promoting mutual learning and innovation through cross-sectional collaboration 
and communication, as failing to do this kills innovation efforts (Kanter, 2006). 
Therefore, the question is how to coordinate the separate businesses so that they 
create synergies over chaos. 
Swink (2006) argue that the issues of innovation are that firms often lack 
supporting infrastructure and processes, and on a higher level have technical and 
organizational barriers. Moreover, he states that the key to innovate successfully 
is to integrate new product development and supply chain innovation, which he 
defines as collaborative innovation. Collaborative innovation can be organized as 
a structured process; where guidelines are set and the focus lies on efficiency. 
Alternatively, it is organized as an unstructured process; no guidelines in which 
the focus lies on creativity. Swink (2006) suggests using a combination, using an 
unstructured approach in the early phase of new product development when the 
demand for creativity are higher, and then slowly shift towards a structured 
process to ensure efficiency.  
Eventually, however, there will be conflicts between businesses potentially 
weakening coordination and communication. Firms therefore need a strategy to 
mitigate these conflicts as they arise. Govindarajan and Trimble (2010) suggest 
three types of actions, or tools, that firms can apply in order to achieve this. First, 
divide responsibilities between labors. Second, the new disruptive business must 
be built from scratch, so that it could be customized to do what it is supposed to 
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do. Finally, mangers must reduce the tension between the units by creating a 
feeling of interdependence, and constantly motivate collaboration.   
Ecosystem 
Ecosystem – in the context of cultures for innovation – means the relationships an 
organization have to its suppliers and vendors (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). While 
some companies innovate internally, use their suppliers to produce according to 
specifications, and believe that the customer does not yet know what he wants, 
others leverage their relationships to tap all available sources of information. 
Suppliers, for instance, can provide ideas for improvements on product design or 
even impact the efficiency of the entire manufacturing process (Ittner & Larcker, 
1997). Similarly, customer feedback can influence what features to add or remove 
to an offering, and more broadly, what parts of the product- or service design that 
brings value, and consequently what parts that are redundant. 
Ittner and Larcker (1997) investigated companies in the automotive and computer 
industry to measure performance effects of different management techniques. 
While different techniques yielded different results in terms of performance, both 
industries appeared to improve performance with the establishment long-term 
partnerships with suppliers and customers. Normann and Ramírez (1993) claim 
that successful companies reinvent value, as opposed to just adding it. Moreover, 
they do this by focusing their strategic analysis not on the company or industry, 
but the value-creating system itself. In this system, different economic actors – 
like customers and suppliers – collaborate to co-produce value (Normann & 
Ramírez, 1993). 
In today’s global markets, establishing and maintaining an ecosystem that 
includes external actors – both upstream and downstream – becomes more and 
more important. One reason, according to Normann and Ramírez (1993), is that 
value has become more dense. They explain density as being the amount of 
information and other resources economic actors can utilize to leverage their own 
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value creation. Thus, the increased density of value means that increasingly more 
opportunities for creating value are packed into an offering. For instance, going to 
IKEA is not just shopping but also entertainment, which among others includes 
daycare for kids and restaurants. 
Strategy is about creating value, and the increased density of value has three 
strategic implications (Normann & Ramírez, 1993). First, a company’s goal is less 
about doing something of value for the customer, and more about having the 
customer take advantage of the increased density and create value for themselves. 
To some extent, companies are not really in competition with one another 
anymore; it is the offerings that compete for the customer’s time and money 
(Normann & Ramírez, 1993). Second, as offerings become more complex, so do 
the relationships needed to make them. Thus, an important strategic task is 
reconfiguring a company’s relationships and business systems. Finally, “… if the 
key to creating value is to co-produce offerings that mobilize customers, then the 
only true source of competitive advantage is the ability to conceive the entire 
value-creating system and make it work” (Normann & Ramírez, 1993, p. 69). 
With this, we leave the description of systems for innovation, and introduce 
projects as the final resource-factor for an innovative company culture (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013). 
2.6.3 Projects 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), projects demand dedicated time, 
finances, and physical and/or virtual space to pursue new opportunities. Hence, 
time, money, and space are the elements that projects comprises. As before, we 
begin this section by looking at the first element, time, before we move on to 
money and space. 
Time 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize the importance of giving people enough 
time to pursue opportunities. Indeed, time is a necessity for innovation to succeed. 
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Kanter (2013) emphasizes time as one of the nine most important factors for 
innovation, stating that managers wanting to see innovation in their company 
should leave slack for experimentation – both in terms of time and money – 
otherwise ideas will never be developed. 
Several innovative companies schedules time exclusively for innovation, like 
Google’s ”20% time” and W.L. Gore’s “10% time” (Rao, 2012; Schrage, 2013). 
This extra free time for innovation initiatives allows employees to work on any 
project they like, and has resulted in dozens of significant projects for the 
mentioned companies. Innovation programs like these can create numerous 
successful innovations in a company that values innovation. However, keep in 
mind that this is no quick fix for innovation, and that these kinds of programs do 
not work for all companies. Failure is always an option; most innovations never 
make it, are put on hold, or the market doesn’t exist (Cooper, 1990). Moreover, 
innovation will not flourish unless managers are supportive of new ideas. In order 
for innovation programs like these to work, Kanter (2013) argues that there must 
be a high tolerance for failure, and that managers must let go of their conservative 
attitudes and be supportive of new ideas. If these two work-environmental aspects 
are present, special devoted time to pursue innovative projects can create fruitful 
opportunities for companies. 
Money 
Innovation projects are highly constrained by its money, or financial assets (T. 
Brown, 2008). Not devoting an adequate amount of financial resources to 
innovations will eventually strangle them (Kanter, 2006). Firms that have a 
portfolio of innovation projects therefore face a dilemma regarding the funding of 
projects. Which innovation projects should be funded and which should not? One 
solution is to use financial calculations such as NPV. The main problem, however, 
is that the future earnings are not necessarily possible to calculate for radical 
innovations (C. M. Christensen et al., 2008). This is because radical innovations 
are exploring new market opportunities, which have an unknown potential for the 
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future. Incremental innovations, on the other hand, relate to firm’s daily activity 
and are therefore easier to quantify both regarding risk and financial contributions. 
The result is often that firms prefer to fund incremental innovations over radical 
innovations since they have lower risk and give quicker results (C. M. Christensen 
et al., 2008).  In practice, firms are choosing short-term income over long-term. 
Markets can suddenly change, creating an urgent need for innovations. This 
implies that a need for the financial assets funding these innovations can also 
occur quickly, making the availability of financial assets important (T. Brown, 
2008; Kanter, 2006). T. Brown (2008) argues that to be able to respond to these 
rapid market changes, firms need to make budgets that take into account changes, 
so that money is available when there is need for innovation. Furthermore, lacking 
financial assets results in individuals channeling their creativity towards finding 
additional resources (T. M. Amabile, 1998), which disrupts the focus needed to 
innovate successfully (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Thus, lack of financial assets 
will inhibit a firm’s ability to respond to market changes, and at the same time 
reduce the likelihood of innovating successfully. 
Space 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) define space as the virtual or physical space firms have 
to pursue new opportunities or innovation. Moultrie et al. (2007) claims that a 
firm’s physical environment – including both virtual and physical space – is 
connected to two types of processes: the process of aligning the physical 
environment and the firm’s strategic goals, and the process of using the physical 
environment in order to achieve the strategic goals. Thus, as long as innovation is 
a strategic goal, the physical environment affects and contributes to innovation. 
Moultrie et al. (2007) argue that physical environment might contribute to 
innovation by enhancing the innovation productivity and effectiveness, and that it 
affects how fast a firm is able to reconfigure its assets to meet changing demands. 
However, just dedicating space to innovation is not enough; the innovation space 
needs to match the innovation strategy. Therefore, firms continuously need to 
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evaluate their available space in order to ensure that strategic and realized intent 
are the same, and align them if necessary (Moultrie et al., 2007). 
Oksanen and Ståhle (2013) argue that the link between innovation and space is a 
social and human-centered process. By creating favorable conditions for creativity 
and learning among individuals, physical environment can contribute to enhance 
innovation (Oksanen & Ståhle, 2013). Since space requires that individuals be 
physically in attendance, the experience and knowledge gained are specific to each 
individual and therefore firm specific. Thus, space can indeed contribute to firms’ 
competitive advantages. Finally, Oksanen and Ståhle (2013) found that spaces that 
contributes to innovation hold five characteristics: they enhance communication, 
are easy to modify, act as a socio-technical ecosystems, are value reflecting, and 
attract creative talents. 
2.6.4 Summing Up 
This part of the theory-chapter has described resources according to the Rao and 
Weintraub’s (2013) framework. Resources – as a bundle of intangible and tangible 
assets – are inarguable essential for succeeding in innovation. However, literature 
considers intangible assets as more crucial than tangible assets, as they reflect 
company capabilities. People – as a resource – are of great importance for a 
company’s innovation performance. This, however, should be intuitive as people 
are the main components of any firm. Further, managers face a challenge when 
acquiring and developing resources in order to create fit between resource and 
company goals. Thus, determining how assets complement an innovation is 
therefore essential for succeeding with innovation. 
The literature on the resource building block has revealed that some requirements 
of radical and incremental innovations – such as funding criteria – are 
incompatible with one another. As ambidextrous organizations combine radical 
and incremental innovation, these findings indicate that ambidextrous 
organizations successfully combine seemingly incompatible resources. This, 
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however, would require the organization to have processes that support this 
combination of “incompatible” resources. Thus, processes is the next topic we 
address.  
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2.7 Processes 
 
Figure 3 - The processes building block. 
This section covers processes for innovation, and represents the second building 
block for an innovative company’s culture (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). We adopt 
the definition of innovation processes from Kline and Rosenberg (1986): “The 
process perspective of innovation considers innovation as a series of interrelated 
activities, where new knowledge is created and used through these activities” (as 
cited in Grimaldi et al., 2012, p. 306). This building block comprises the factors 
ideate, shape, and capture, which are further broken down into nine distinct 
elements in accordance to the figure above (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). 
Theory tends to simplify the innovation process by splitting it into smaller stages 
of activities in order to guide and focus these activities (Du Preez & Louw, 2008). 
Examples of such stages are information generation and information collection. 
Du Preez and Louw (2008) argue that the innovation process itself is important, 
as the quality of the innovation – whether it be a physical product or a process – 
strongly depends upon the quality of the process used to develop and implement 
the innovation. 
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When discussing new product development processes, several models today have 
been created as a response to the increased pressure to reduce the cycle time and 
product “hit rate”. Some models tend to view an innovation process as being 
sequential and linear, while others tend to take a more dynamic and iterative 
approach. Du Preez and Louw (2008) illustrate this by showing that new product 
development-theory has been developed through six generations: ranging from 
simple market push- or pull-strategies, to iterative and dynamic processes where 
all stages are linked to the external environment as the most advanced generations. 
Cooper (1990) argues that a sequential and linear model – a stage-gate model – 
gives a better overview and adds discipline to the innovation process. Stage-gate 
systems have previously worked best with incremental innovations, where one of 
the characteristics is relatively low levels of ambiguity compared to radical 
innovation. It has been argued, however, that stage-gate models do not handle 
ambiguity very well, and the role of ambiguity in the new product development 
process (Brun, Saetre, & Gjelsvik, 2009), thereby limiting their applicability. 
Moreover, inflexible processes are likely to have a negative influence on 
innovation (Kanter, 2006) as tight discipline and control undermine creativity (T. 
M. Amabile, 1998).  
In order to enhance creativity, a company can take on an iterative and dynamic 
approach (T. Brown, 2008). Miller (2006) and Brun et al. (2009) argue that 
dynamic and iterative models are more suited when dealing with radical 
innovations. This means that companies can deliberately choose to implement an 
innovation processes best suited for their innovations, whether they focus on 
incremental or radical innovations. Additionally, organizations can deploy 
different processes for different units, depending on the radicalness of innovations 
in the unit, effectively creating a structural ambidextrous organization (O'Reilly 
& Tushman, 2004). The following section describes ideate, the first of three 
factors that processes comprises. 
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2.7.1 Ideate 
We understand the process factor “ideate” as the idea generation and idea selection 
part of the innovation process. Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize that the 
ideation process should generate ideas in a systematic way, and that those ideas 
should come from “… a vast and diverse set of sources” (p. 35). Further, ideation 
includes a filtering and refinement of ideas used to identify promising 
opportunities. Finally, ideation includes selection of ideas based on a clearly 
voiced risk portfolio. These three statements make up the elements of ideation: 
generate, filter, and prioritize (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). We begin this section by 
looking at the first element, generate, followed by filter, and finally prioritize. 
Generate 
Successful implementation of new processes or products depends on a person or 
team having a good idea that is developed beyond its initial state. Thus, every 
innovation begins with creative ideas (T. M. Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & 
Herron, 1996). These ideas are closely tied to the creativity of individuals (T. M. 
Amabile, 1988; T. M. Amabile et al., 1996). T. M. Amabile et al. (1996) argue 
that creativity – as the basis for all ideas – sow the seeds for successful innovation. 
Creativity is found to be dependent upon three factors; employee’s expertise, 
creative-thinking skills, and intrinsic task motivation (T. M. Amabile, 1988, 
1998). Expertise covers the knowledge and skills individuals in the company 
possesses, while creative-thinking skills refers to how individuals approach 
problems and solutions, with emphasis on how they connect existing ideas into 
new combinations. Intrinsic motivation emerges from the work itself and 
encourages individuals to work for the challenge, interest, enjoyment and 
satisfaction of doing a task. While individuals’ expertise and creative-thinking 
skills determine what individuals are capable of doing, intrinsic motivation will 
determine what the individual actually does  (T. M. Amabile, 1988). Although all 
three factors can be developed and influenced, intrinsic motivation is by far the 
factor most easily influenced. T. M. Amabile (1998) found that managers can 
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increase intrinsic motivation – and thus indirectly creativity and innovation – in a 
work environment that includes challenges, freedom, resources, suitable work-
group features, supervisory encouragement, and organizational support. The other 
two factors require large efforts over extended time. 
Many ideas develop internally within a unit of a company, but the “biggest sparks” 
are often created when fragments of ideas come together (T. Brown, 2008; M. T. 
Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). Related to this, Holmes and Glass (2004) argue that 
a company’s researchers must be encouraged to interact with other researchers, 
customers and cross-discipline experts in order to increase a company’s 
innovative performance. Further, M. T. Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) claim that 
ideas can come from three sources: from within a unit in the company; from 
collaboration across units; or through collaboration with parties outside the 
company. They further emphasize the importance of having diverse sets of sources 
for information and ideas, as opposed to a large number of similar sources.  H. W. 
Chesbrough (2003) argues that successful firms manage to exploit outside ideas 
to advance their own business while leveraging their internal ideas outside their 
current operations. To succeed in innovation, then, firms need to take on both an 
internal and external approach; they have to focus on creativity, collaboration and 
diversity at the same time (T. M. Amabile & Khaire, 2008). These elements are 
all parts of the Rao and Weintraub (2013) questionnaire, and are thus discussed in 
their respective sections. 
Ideas that originate from outside the company let companies exploit new insights 
and knowledge and help them advance their own business (M. T. Hansen & 
Birkinshaw, 2007; Holmes & Glass, 2004). H. W. Chesbrough (2003) suggests 
that companies use open innovation to achieve this. Open innovation is a concept 
where the boundaries between firms have become more porous, and ideas shuffle 
in and out (H. W. Chesbrough, 2003).  Examples of companies with an “open 
innovation”-strategy are companies that focus their activities on either funding, 
generating or commercializing innovation. H. W. Chesbrough (2003) argue that 
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the role of R&D needs to extend beyond the boundaries of the firm, and that 
innovators must integrate their ideas, expertise, and skills with external 
organizations in order to deliver results to the marketplace in the most effective 
way. Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux (2011), however, argue that while open 
innovation is advantageous for solving a narrow technological problem, internal 
innovation forums have a higher understanding of context. Open innovation 
therefore provides a broad range of expertise, but internal innovation forums have 
an understanding of context that sometimes outweigh their lower breadth. 
Filter 
Companies must filter and refine their ideas in order to follow the best 
opportunities (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). Companies should therefore develop 
suitable filtering processes and criteria, and filter ideas according to their overall 
strategy (Du Preez & Louw, 2008). The challenge is to filter out bad ideas, while 
keeping the risk of stopping good ideas as low as possible.  
Kock, Heising, and Gemünden (2014) find in their study that creative 
encouragement, process formalization, and ideation strategy all positively relate 
to successful idea generation. Creative encouragement is an open action strategy 
where the number and variety of ideas increases, whereas process formalization 
is a closed action strategy that focus, integrate, and select ideas. Further, ideation 
strategy is aligning idea generation and idea selection activities to the company’s 
overall innovation strategy. Kock et al. (2014) suggest viewing the ideation phase 
from a portfolio perspective, which influences front-end success and indirectly 
project portfolio success. The front-end of innovation is in this context defined as 
the process from the beginning of idea exploration until the project requires 
significant investments. Kock et al. (2014) conclude that managers should balance 
process formalization and creative encouragement simultaneously as they have 
complementary effects on front-end innovation success. 
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Nagji and Tuff (2012) argue that innovation may be a reliable driver for growth if 
the filtering mechanism balances a firm’s portfolio of innovations. This implies 
using different filters for different types of innovation, where the goal is to achieve 
an optimal balance in a company’s portfolio. Similarly, Kanter (2006) argues that 
managers should categorize ideas based on financial size, and apply different 
filtering criteria for big, medium and small ideas. This approach may enhance the 
development of small ideas, as these often get a low priority if all projects have 
the same evaluation criteria. 
Veryzer Jr (1998) argue that radical and incremental innovations follow different 
paths before the filtering stage. While incremental innovations usually begin with 
market research and business analysis before the product is developed, radical 
innovations go through phases of exploration, convergence, formation, and 
preliminary design before evaluated by the management team. The radical 
innovation process is therefore a more dynamic approach with overlapping 
phases, while linear processes are better suited for incremental innovation (Miller, 
2006). Even though there is still great uncertainty at this phase in the innovation 
process – especially for radical innovations – analyses can give management an 
idea of what potential the innovation has, and if it qualifies for significantly 
increased funding and resource allocation (Veryzer Jr, 1998). 
Prioritize 
Companies have to prioritize ideas in order to succeed with innovation. Small 
budgets, too strict funding criteria and conventional thinking can restrict 
innovation initiatives and cause them to remain undeveloped (M. T. Hansen & 
Birkinshaw, 2007). Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize the importance of 
prioritizing projects “… based on a clearly articulated risk portfolio” (p. 35). Nagji 
and Tuff (2012) have developed the innovation ambition matrix to enable 
companies to categorize their opportunities in relation to risk and reward. The goal 
is after all to achieve the highest overall return given the company’s tolerance for 
risk. The innovation ambition matrix divides innovations into core innovations, 
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adjacent innovations, and transformational innovations (Nagji & Tuff, 2012). 
Core innovations use existing products and assets to serve existing markets and 
customers, while transformational innovations is development of new products 
and assets to create new markets and target new customer needs. Adjacent 
innovation is a middle point of these two types, with incremental improvements 
to products and assets to enter adjacent markets and customers. The innovation 
ambition matrix can help managers prioritize innovation initiatives in two ways: 
First, it gives an overview of the innovation initiatives in the company, showing 
how many innovations that are developed, and how much money that is spent on 
each innovation. Second, it is a starting point for managers to discuss the 
ambitions for the company’s innovation strategy; they can decide how they want 
the distribution of innovations to look like. 
Generate, filter, and prioritize have over the last three sections been explained in 
accordance to the conceptualization given by Rao and Weintraub (2013). With 
this, we wrap up the first factor of processes, and move on from ideation to explain 
the theory behind shaping innovations. 
2.7.2 Shape 
We understand the processes factor shape as the stage between idea and first 
result. In the shaping part of the innovation process, Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
emphasize quickly prototyping promising opportunities, having well-functioning 
feedback loops between the company and its customers, and using predefined 
failure criteria to quickly stop projects. Together, these make up the elements of 
shape: prototype, iterate and fail smart, respectively (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). 
The shaping process requires proper management, because it is important to give 
new ideas sufficient resources for the development to go somewhere (M. T. 
Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007).  Moreover, many projects die in the shaping process 
due to lack of resources (T. M. Amabile, 1988). It is therefore considered crucial 
to allocate sufficient resources when developing a new idea (Kanter, 2006). 
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Prototype 
Prototyping is an important part of innovation, as physical prototypes can 
persuade decision-makers far better than charts and drawings (T. Kelley, 2001). 
T. Kelley (2001) states that anything – like products, services, and promotions – 
can be prototyped, and that no innovation is too complex to be prototyped. In fact, 
he argues that when facing especially complex tasks, prototyping can help 
progress by showing what can and cannot be accomplished. In the end, the 
prototypes will reveal what benefits customers are able to see in the innovations. 
This view is largely supported by T. Brown (2008), who argues that prototypes 
are not meant to be finished solutions, but only as evolved as they need to be in 
order to generate useful feedback. The goal of a prototype is to explore the 
innovation’s strengths and weaknesses, and to identify the future development of 
the idea. Because of the high value of this early feedback, T. Brown (2008) 
emphasizes prototyping all the way from the first few weeks until the late stages 
of innovation, as it should be part of an iterative process towards the final product. 
Veryzer Jr (1998) divides the prototype phase of radical innovations into three 
parts: formative prototyping, testing and design modifications, and prototyping 
and commercialization. These phases all overlap, as is characteristic for radical 
innovations. The formative prototype focuses on market and commercialization 
issues, which often results in a need for customer feedback, and moves the 
processes into the testing and design modification phase. In the final phase, 
prototype and commercialization, focus is more on customer benefits of the 
product, use issues, interface development, and creating marketing plans. In these 
final stages, the innovation process aligns with those of incremental innovation. 
Concerning prototyping speed, Thomke (1998) finds that rapid prototyping, which 
is characterized as both fast and inexpensive, is a preferred way to build physical 
or virtual objects for experimentation with new innovations. Thomke (1998) finds 
that companies with a two-step experimentation approach – i.e. simulation 
followed by prototyping – can greatly reduce the time to market for innovations 
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by using low-cost technology prototyping. This will help reduce the time required 
to develop new prototypes, as well as allowing projects to move earlier into 
prototyping, which greatly reduces innovations’ time to market. This also means 
that companies might need to alter their strategy for knowledge management 
between simulation and prototype department, and may also require changes in 
the company’s capabilities (Thomke, 1998). 
Iterate 
Following the development of the innovation value chain models, the most 
modern models include considerable emphasis on iterative processes (Du Preez & 
Louw, 2008). Du Preez and Louw (2008) present a model in which the innovation 
process has distinguishable stages, but these stages can both overlap and include 
iterative loops, where these loops can be both within and across stages. Hence, 
their model combines linear- and spiral innovation processes. 
According to T. Brown (2008), design thinking is a concept that especially values 
iterative processes. He argues that “… innovation is powered by a thorough 
understanding, through direct observation, of what people want and need in their 
lives and what they like or dislike about the way particular products are made, 
packaged, marketed, sold, and supported” (T. Brown, 2008, p. 86). T. Brown 
(2008)  further argues that design thinking embodies three spaces that projects 
need to pass: inspiration, ideation, and implementation. The first space, 
inspiration, is the “circumstances … that motivate the search for solutions” (p. 
88). Second, ideation is the process where generation, development, and testing 
of ideas occur. This is the space where the organization create solutions for the 
current problem. Finally, implementation is the space in which the organization 
creates a path to market. T. Brown (2008) emphasizes that projects loop back 
through these spaces, and that the first two spaces are particularly the ones where 
iteration occurs.  
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As previously mentioned, innovation is an uncertain process that more often than 
not leads to failure. In order to succeed, then, one must generate many ideas, 
iterate back and forth, and move on with the best ideas. A key to this notion is the 
implication made in continuing with only the best ideas; going with the best ideas 
implies scrapping the worst. Thus, the theme of the next section is discovering 
and terminating bad ideas. 
Fail smart 
While killing the wrong ideas can be dangerous to an organization, not stopping 
bad ideas might be equally dangerous (Daly, Sætre, & Brun, 2012). Cooper (1990) 
argues that increasing demands of launching the right products faster force 
companies to create a more effective innovation process. The result is that 
companies often focus less on quality in their innovation development programs. 
Cooper (1990) further presents the stage-gate system for managing innovation. 
The system divides the innovation process into a set of stages, where the entrance 
to each stage is a gate where products may pass through, or are terminated. The 
gates serve as quality controls, easing mangers’ task of choosing which projects 
to proceed with, and which ones to terminate. A stage-gate system can, if 
employed correctly, increase both efficiency and effectiveness of the innovation 
process. 
When termination of a project is a fact, Daly et al. (2012) argue that termination 
needs to be combined with accommodation in order to appreciate the human side 
of innovation. This minimizes the negative effects termination have on creativity 
in companies, like de-motivating the employees who came up with the idea and 
those who worked on the terminated project (Kanter, 2013). 
When evaluating if projects should continue or not, there are two possible errors: 
false positives or false negatives (H. Chesbrough, 2004). False positives are 
promising projects that eventually fail, while false negatives are projects with 
unsatisfying forecasts that in fact become successful. Most companies limit false 
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positives by assessing projects’ commercial potential, but fewer companies focus 
on limiting false negatives. H. Chesbrough (2004) suggests monitoring projects 
even after termination, and suggest doing so either by tracking projects after 
termination, release the failures to an outsider, out-license the project, or creating 
an external spin-off venture. If companies follow one of these suggestions, they 
can notice when a project exceeds expectations, and are able to reassess the 
commercial potential of the project. Interest from a large customer or the ability 
to raise significant capital could indicate a false negative. 
Thus far, we have described ideation and shaping as two process-factors. 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), capture is the final factor that describes 
the processes of an innovative company culture. In the next section, we therefore 
describe the meaning of capture, and the three elements that make up this factor. 
2.7.3 Capture 
We understand the process-factor capture as the stages from first result until full 
production. After ideation and shape, an organization has an innovation that is 
almost ready for the market, but how does this organization capture the potential 
benefits of the innovation? Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize flexible and 
context-based processes, as opposed to control- and bureaucracy-based processes. 
Further, they emphasize going quickly to market with the opportunities showing 
most promise, and finally, rapid allocation of resources to scale up initiatives that 
show promise. These statements are the elements of capture: flexibility, launch 
and scale (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). As before, we describe the elements in 
chronological order. 
Flexibility 
Successful innovation requires a certain degree of flexibility in the company’s 
innovation processes (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). While daily operations can 
benefit from tight planning, budgeting, reviews, and managers with incentives to 
continue to do what they do, these processes are often too inflexible for innovation 
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(Kanter, 2006). The nature of innovation is unexpected turns and sidetracks. Thus, 
Kanter (2006) argues that innovations require more flexible planning and control 
systems. She further suggests that innovative projects should not have to wait for 
the next budgeting cycle, for instance by creating an innovation fund. Moreover, 
Kanter (2006) suggests rewarding people for exploiting unexpected opportunities. 
In order to deal with the flexibility issue, O'Reilly and Tushman (2004) test the 
ambidexterity hypothesis, and find that ambidextrous organizations are better able 
to simultaneously exploit and explore; these companies have the necessary 
flexibility to succeed with both incremental- and radical innovation at the same 
time. We described this theory in detail and more broadly in the earlier section on 
ambidexterity, and we therefore leave ambidexterity to continue describing launch 
as the second element of capture. 
Launch 
Launching products quickly to the market is important, but companies must try to 
avoid that too strict time schedules negatively affects their innovativeness (T. M. 
Amabile, 1998; Kanter, 2006; Rao & Weintraub, 2013). H. Chesbrough (2004) 
emphasizes the importance of speed in innovation processes, and argues that 
management should focus on shortening time-to-market, both for internally 
developed and externally licensed products. This is to increase the rate of learning 
from R&D for the company and the overall performance of R&D. Kessler and 
Chakrabarti (1999) found several elements that can influence innovation speed, 
for example clear schedules and time goals, individual experience, and 
overlapping stages. Particularly interesting are their findings that suggest a 
contingency approach to innovation, because certain elements are conflicting for 
incremental and radical innovation. The speed of radical innovations can benefit 
from clear product concepts, more low-level innovation champions, a higher-level 
project leader, co-locating, and frequent testing. Incremental innovations, on the 
other hand, can benefit from vague product concepts, fewer champions, a lower-
level project leader, decentralized teams, and frequent testing. These findings 
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indicate that managers should apply a contingency approach to adapt methods 
according to the type of innovation at hand (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). 
However, trying to speed up innovation is not without dangers; tight planning and 
control creates a risk of killing creativity, and thus innovation at the same time (T. 
M. Amabile, 1998; Kanter, 2006). Several academic researchers, then, argue that 
in order to improve innovation performance companies should focus on 
developing a business model that makes the innovation profitable, rather than 
getting to market first (Johnson et al., 2008). 
Thölke, Jan Hultink, and Robben (2001) investigated different launch strategies 
for new product features. They found that four different launch strategies were in 
use among the sample companies: dictatorship, pioneering, establishing, and 
following. Dictators create new product features that give them a substantial 
competitive advantage, and thus sets a new standard in the market that the 
competitors has to follow. Competitors must either develop the feature themselves 
or buy it from the dictator. Pioneers develop new features with low technological 
effort to achieve an effective sales argument. The aim is to make the new features 
too important to be optional. An establishing strategy involves either small 
improvements of existing features to enter mass markets, or introducing an 
existing feature into new mass markets. Finally, a following strategy means 
launching an existing feature in an existing market; these features are necessary 
for a products success, but does not generate extra profit. 
Scale 
According to Klingebiel and Rammer (2014), managing innovation portfolios 
with a combination of early broad funding and late selection relates positively to 
the portfolio’s performance. Moreover, this effect is stronger for more radical 
product innovations. This breadth-selectiveness strategy enables companies to 
take advantage of the breadth in resource allocation, while selectiveness 
outmaneuvers some of the disadvantages of breadth. The greatest benefit of broad 
funding is that companies can develop several projects, including projects that 
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might prove to be successful despite not qualifying for funds in an early selection 
strategy. Further, later selectiveness makes it possible to avoid the escalating costs 
of broad funding. Klingebiel and Rammer (2014) also found that companies with 
this breadth-selectiveness strategy are better able to respond to new information, 
which is particularly important for portfolios that include radical innovations. 
When selection is made, however, initiatives are scaled and demands for resources 
increase rapidly. According to Clayton M Christensen and Overdorf (2000), just 
providing resources to an innovation initiative is not enough. As a company’s 
resources can be appropriate in certain situations, while inappropriate in other 
situations, each innovation must match its resources in order to be successfully 
developed.  
We end the description of processes at this juncture, but not before providing a 
summary, which includes lines to ambidexterity relating to innovative processes. 
2.7.4 Summing Up 
Our literature review suggests that good ideas may originate from a vast and 
diverse set of sources that are both internal and external to the firm. Further, as 
ideas move through the “innovation value chain”, the process becomes a balancing 
act between terminating ideas – to ensure efficient processes – and fertilize ideas 
– so they can flourish. Thus, on the one hand, there is a constant tension between 
flexibility and capturing, and on the other hand, discipline and prioritizing. Several 
systems – like the stage-gate system – means to solve process-related problems. 
No system is perfect, however, and there are consequently pros and cons to all 
systems. 
We identified that that some of the requirements of processes – such as process 
flow and time – are incompatible for incremental and radical innovation. 
Literature revealed that radical innovation benefits from increased flexibility, 
external knowledge sourcing, and a dynamic process flow, while incremental 
innovation benefits from internal knowledge sourcing and a linear process flow. 
P r o c e s s e s  | 49 
 
 
These findings suggest that ambidextrous organizations must be able to handle all 
these seemingly incompatible processes simultaneously. The final tools-oriented 
building block of and innovative company culture – success – is the topic to 
address in the next section.  
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2.8 Success 
 
Figure 4 - The success building block. 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize that success reinforces companies’ values, 
behaviors and processes. These will again affect actions and decisions, for 
instance: whom do we reward, whom do we hire, and which projects do we fund? 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) argue that success in companies is apparent at three 
levels: external, enterprise and individual.  
Having deep pockets - made from past success- ultimately allows a firm to pursue 
new innovative opportunities and invest in areas necessary for its continued 
success. However, a central question would be whether success in fact is good for 
innovation. According to Clayton M Christensen and Overdorf (2000), industry 
leaders rarely introduce radical innovations, and innovation in general tends to be 
more difficult for established firms. Levinthal and March (1993) argue that if an 
organization has achieved improved performance by developing capabilities and 
knowledge in one area, the organization’s incentive for learning new technologies 
is actually reduced. It might be, then, that success actually reduces the capability 
organizations have to innovate, but is that the case for all levels? 
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In the remainder of this part, we dive deeper into the three levels of success – 
beginning with external – before ending the section with a summary, as we did 
with the previous two building blocks. 
2.8.1 External 
We understand this first innovation success factor, external, as whether external 
stakeholders consider a company as being innovative. For an organization to be 
successful on an external level, Rao and Weintraub (2013, p. 35) emphasize that 
customers think of the organization as innovative. Further, the firm’s innovation 
performance is beyond that of others in the industry, and the organization has the 
best financial performance in the industry. Taken together, these three criteria 
make up external success, and the element’s labels are customers, competitors, 
and finances, respectively (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). As in the previous sections, 
we review the elements in chronological order. 
Customers 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), customers perception of a company as 
innovative is important. To some extent, this is self-explanatory: a company that 
is seen as innovative, will have hordes of customers ready to buy “the next big 
thing”, even if the product is actually inferior to one offered by a competitor. 
Conversely, a company not seen as innovative might struggle to get attention to 
their new and groundbreaking offering, even if the offering technically 
outperforms every competitor.  
In a purchasing decision context, Puncheva-Michelotti and Michelotti (2010) 
found that while customers consider companies’ ability to deliver value, they also 
consider corporate social responsibility, emotional appeal, credibility, and 
patriotic appeal in their evaluation of companies’ reputation. Many companies are 
famous for having a high regard for innovation, and they keep striving to create 
or maintain an innovative reputation. Henard and Dacin (2010) researched this 
phenomenon in search for competitive advantages due to intangible assets that 
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emerge from this strategy. Indeed, they found that a company’s reputation for 
product innovation positively influences customers’ behavior. They found that a 
company’s reputation directly and positively influence customer involvement in 
four ways: by increased excitement about the company, enhancing the image of 
the company, increasing tolerance for failure, and increasing loyalty to the 
company. However, their findings indicated that reputation for product innovation 
does not affect customer price elasticity. In another study that investigated product 
reputation and market performance, Fuertes-Callén and Cuéllar-Fernández (2014) 
found that product innovation increases the degree of commercialization and 
product reputation, which in turn increases market performance. They conclude 
that this meditating effect of product reputation and commercialization on market 
performance is an important success factor for innovations, and that companies 
therefore should integrate innovation and marketing activities. These studies 
demonstrate the importance of customers’ perception of companies’ 
innovativeness for market performance. 
While innovation mostly seems to have positive consequences, not all innovations 
contribute to a better reputation from the customer’s perspective. Stock and 
Zacharias (2013) researched customer loyalty in business-to-business markets in 
relation to innovation, and used two dimensions for innovation: innovation 
newness and innovation meaningfulness. In this context, newness and 
meaningfulness relates to the customer’s perception of the innovation. If the 
newness is high, it means that the customer has to learn much about the offering 
before benefitting from what is new. With the same reasoning, meaningfulness is 
whether customers considers an innovation as meaningful for them. Innovation 
newness is often associated with negative associations, like increased uncertainty 
or greater learning effort. Innovation meaningfulness, on the other hand, has 
mostly positive associations, like cost savings or better solutions for customers. 
Thus, managers must consider both positive and negative customer responses on 
innovation. From this, managers should not only produce many innovations, but 
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also make sure that customers consider them meaningful. Finally, Stock and 
Zacharias (2013) found that the negative effects of newness are lower in 
companies that have a strong innovative brand. Moreover, the positive effects of 
meaningfulness can increase through customer involvement and interaction in the 
value-creating process. 
Competitors 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) consider competitors’ assessment of a company’s 
innovation performance as an important measure for external success. A 
commonly used benchmark for reputation among competitors and industry 
specialists is Fortune’s list “America’s Most Admired Companies” (Iyengar, 
Kargar, & Sundararajan, 2011), and it is considered important to be on this list in 
order to succeed in competitive markets. In fact, being on such a list may give 
economic benefits such as better rent premiums (Iyengar et al., 2011). The “Most 
Admired” list is based on survey answers from business leaders (executives, 
directors) and analysts to determine companies’ reputation. Iyengar et al. (2011) 
find that companies “… with a large size, prior ranking and high growth in market-
to-book value” (p. 217) are more likely to be on the list, while e.g. profitability 
and return on assets did not predict reputation. Moreover, executive entrenchment 
negatively affects reputation. Their conclusion is that companies wanting to be 
admired should perform better in the market and have a democratic form of 
corporate governance. This might seem obvious, especially that increased 
performance correlates positively to reputation, but it not as obvious that 
competitors admire a company for more than performance. For instance, while 
prior ranking and company size – neither of them displaying current performance 
– are important for competitors’ opinions, return on assets – which is a measure 
of financial performance – is apparently not important to gain competitors’ 
admiration. In their study of innovation and reputation using the “Most Admired” 
list, Safón (2009) targeted the effects on reputation from innovation and product 
quality in industries with different technological levels, but their findings 
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indicated no significant differences between high-tech, medium-tech and low-tech 
industries. However, their findings imply that companies can profit relatively 
more from focusing on product quality, than on being the most innovative 
company with regard to the company’s reputation. Thus, while being innovative 
enough to be on the list is a good thing, striving only to increase reputation might 
not be beneficial. 
Financial 
Several studies have shown that innovation correlates positively to financial 
performance. In a large study of more than 19 000 service companies, Cainelli, 
Evangelista, and Savona (2006) found that innovating companies have been found 
to out-perform non-innovating companies, both regarding productivity and 
economic growth. However, their findings indicate a cumulative and self-
reinforcing relationship between innovation and companies’ productivity; well 
performing companies are better at innovation and put more resources into 
innovation. In their study on commercialization and reputation in product 
innovation success, Fuertes-Callén and Cuéllar-Fernández (2014) found that 
innovation in general gives companies a competitive advantage by positively 
affecting market performance, which was measured in sales and new customers.  
Research has also found that companies that combine exploration and exploitation 
performs better than their competitors in terms sales performance, while an 
imbalance between exploration and exploitation negatively affects sales growth 
rate (He & Wong, 2004). Regarding radical innovations, Xin, Yeung, and Cheng 
(2009) found that these innovations only help maintaining strong sales growth and 
return on sales, while return on assets was not significantly improved, as 
development of radical innovations actually decrease profitability for companies 
(Cainelli et al., 2006). Therefore, as radical innovations are often expensive, the 
short-term effects tend to be reduced performance. On a long-term perspective, 
the once radical innovation is integrated in the company portfolio and contributes 
to performance, while new, costly, and radical innovations are developed. 
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Conversely, incremental innovations give short-term gains, and finding a balance 
between the two ensures that companies can both exploit the current, while still 
being able to explore for future viability (Levinthal & March, 1993). At this point, 
we end the theoretical outline of external success, and move on to the second 
success factor of an innovative company culture: enterprise. 
2.8.2 Enterprise 
The second success factor is enterprise, and is about the role innovation has in the 
company. Enterprise, according to Rao and Weintraub (2013), comprises the 
elements purpose, discipline, and capabilities. Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
emphasize that innovation is treated as a long-term strategy, as opposed to a short-
term fix. Further, the given organization should have a “… deliberate, 
comprehensive and disciplined approach to innovation” (p. 35). Finally, the 
innovation projects in the company should contribute to development of new 
capabilities. The next paragraph introduces the first element: purpose. 
Purpose 
Purpose, as described in Rao and Weintraub (2013), is about treating “… 
innovation as a long-term strategy rather than a short-term fix” (p. 35). Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt (1995) identified “a clear and well communicated new product 
strategy for the company” (p. 384) as an important performance driver that 
separate solid performers from other companies. An organization’s new product 
program should have a long-term focus, and it should include some long-term 
projects as well. 
Levinthal and March (1993) argue that organizational learning has a tendency to 
sacrifice the long run for the short run. As organizations develop distinctive 
competencies and niches, they also compromise their ability to learn outside those 
competencies and niches. Moreover, surviving in the long run obviously requires 
survival in each of the short runs along the way, and a strategy for short-term 
survival is likely to increase long-term vulnerability (Levinthal & March, 1993). 
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Hence, an organization’s strategy must include a plan for the long run, as well as 
ensuring short-term survival. Once an organization has a strategy that includes 
both long-term viability and short-term success, all they have to do is execute the 
given strategy. 
According to M. L. Tushman (1997), most companies today have well-articulated 
strategies and visions, but few are able to execute them well. The degree to which 
managers are able to execute a company’s strategies and visions “… depends upon 
how managers use the organization’s processes, structures, rewards, systems, 
roles, competencies, and culture” (M. L. Tushman, 1997, p. 16). Further, 
managing streams of innovation – processes for incremental and radical 
innovation – would require an ambidextrous organization. “It calls for managers 
who can maintain consistency and encourage continuous improvement in current 
offerings, while at the same time allowing the flexibility and experimentation that 
help the firm create or respond to radical shifts in the environment” (M. L. 
Tushman, 1997, p. 17). Moreover, according to M. L. Tushman (1997), the 
strategy, structure, people, and processes required for incremental innovation is 
fundamentally different from that of radical innovation. Thus, managers must 
ensure that there is several different structures and cultures in the organization, all 
held together by a single vision and management team. Achieving this, however, 
would require both managers and employees to think about their actions and 
decisions; they need to have discipline in their work. 
Discipline 
As one of three elements describing the factor enterprise, discipline means having 
“… a deliberate, comprehensive and disciplined approach to innovation” (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013, p. 35). Having a disciplined approach to innovation is obviously 
an advantage for an organization. However, which decisions do one make when 
faced with a particular innovation? Moreover, is there a difference in discipline 
for radical and incremental innovations? 
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As mentioned, a stage-gate system will for many companies be the answer to a 
disciplined approach to innovation (Cooper, 1990). No system is perfect, 
however. While being suitable for stable industries and incremental innovations, 
Brun et al. (2009) argue that stage-gate systems are less fitting for innovation in 
dynamic environments and management of radical innovation processes. Radical 
innovations like new product development are characterized by considerate 
ambiguity, and Brun et al. (2009) and Miller (2006) suggest that new product 
development should be approached non-linearly with an emphasis on iterations 
and flexibility. It is therefore implied that the use of stage-gate systems is effective 
only when dealing with incremental innovations. 
However important it is to have a disciplined approach to innovation, it is equally 
important to separate between types of innovation and understanding that different 
types requires different approaches. Thus, it is necessary to have disciplined 
approaches to innovation, but also to vary the approach according to which type 
of innovation the organization want to pursue. For an ambidextrous organization, 
this means separating between incremental and radical projects, in which 
discipline will vary according to type. As the paragraph above emphasized, 
exploring activities have an approach that is much more flexible than that of 
exploiting activities. For a radical project, then, discipline might mean considering 
several ideas before selection, remembering to iterate between phases, and 
maintaining flexibility despite organizational tendencies for stability. Conversely, 
incremental projects are likely to have a more classical approach to discipline, 
where rules and predefined stages and deliverables might be beneficial. 
Capabilities 
Capabilities, as the final element that comprise the enterprise-factor of success, is 
by Rao and Weintraub (2013) described as follows: “Our innovation projects have 
helped our organization develop new capabilities that we did not have three years 
ago” (p. 35). An organization that excels at developing new capabilities has what 
the innovation literature refer to as dynamic capabilities. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 
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(1997) defined dynamic capabilities as “… the firm’s ability to integrate, build, 
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (p. 516). 
The importance of developing dynamic capabilities in an organization would 
depend, at least to some degree, on the industry to which the organization 
competes. For instance, a company that competes in the computing industry must 
at all times adapt to changing environments, and constantly be on the lookout for 
new and disrupting technologies that could potentially render entire companies 
obsolete in very short time (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). At the 
other side of the spectrum, however, automobile makers are known for their 
conservatism. In this industry, entry barriers are high, and the organizations 
generally do not introduce disrupting technologies in favor of continuous 
improvements. Thus, even if all industries can benefit from developing new 
capabilities, the pace at which it has to be done differ from industry to industry, at 
least when considering the short-term consequences. 
According to Atuahene-Gima (2005), “… market orientation can prevent a firm 
from being operationally efficient but strategically inefficient by enhancing both 
product innovation competence exploitation and exploration” (p. 81). By 
competence exploitation, it is meant investments that refine and extend the 
existing innovation knowledge, skills, and processes. Competence exploration, on 
the other hand, means a firms tendency to “… invest resources to acquire entirely 
new knowledge, skills, and processes” (Atuahene-Gima, 2005, p. 62). In fact, in 
addition to affecting an organization’s innovation performance, the 
interrelationship between the two forms of competence enhancements is in itself 
a source of competitive advantage. Though it might be counterintuitive, high 
levels of both competence exploration and exploitation seems to be less effective 
than a high/low combination. Therefore, a company that excels at exploiting its 
current competencies is most likely to succeed with radical innovation when a 
high level of competence exploitation is combined with a low level of competence 
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exploration. Conversely, when the tables are turned, so should the distribution of 
high and low be. In sum, Atuahene-Gima (2005) suggest that radical innovations 
are most successful when companies use a high (low) level of competence 
exploration and a low (high) level of competence exploitation. We note that all 
radical innovations require some exploration of competences, even if it is at a low 
level. As this concludes our theoretical outline of success at the enterprise level, 
we move on to describe how success is captured at an individual level. 
2.8.3 Individual 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), individual-level success means that 
employees are satisfied with their participation in innovation projects, that they 
develop competences by participating in new initiatives, and finally rewarding 
people for their participation risky projects, regardless of the outcome. These 
statements make up the three elements of individual success: satisfaction, growth, 
and reward. We begin with the first element: satisfaction. 
Satisfaction 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize the importance of keeping employees 
satisfied through participation in innovation initiatives. Companies can initiate 
innovations in two ways: bottom-up or top-down (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). The 
main idea behind the bottom-up approach is that managers are not nearly as much 
involved in action as other employees, making it easier for those at the frontline 
to come up with relevant ideas. At the same time, bottom-up innovation efforts 
benefit from high levels of employee engagement and satisfaction. On the other 
hand, a top-down approach can be more efficient, and benefits from direct 
alignment with the company’s goals. However, smart companies use both 
approaches, using a bottom-up approach to increase participation in innovation 
projects, while using a top-down approach to give the projects the sponsorship 
they need to survive (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). 
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Organizations often fail in innovation because they divide employees into two 
units; those who innovate, and those who continue doing what they already do (J. 
S. Brown & Duguid, 2000; Kanter, 2006). The reason why this affects innovation 
negatively is that you create one group associated with fun (feed up on creativity 
and free from rules and rigid systems), and one associated with more boring and 
straightforward activities (surrounded by rigid systems thriving for efficiency). As 
a result, the innovators are satisfied with their degree of involvement in innovation 
initiatives, while the other group is not. The main issue, however, is not the 
separation itself, but rather that separation often fosters envy, which further fosters 
unsatisfied employees. In order to overcome the tension between the two groups, 
Kanter (2006) suggest the following: the company needs to facilitate 
communication between the innovation group and its core business, while creating 
a flexible organizational structure that allows employees to cooperate on 
innovation projects.  
In order to increase participation among employees and strengthen overall 
innovativeness, Buech, Michel, and Sonntag (2010) propose using a suggestion 
system. The authors found that suggestion systems is positively related to internal 
justice and employee’s motivation to come up with suggestions. A suggestion 
system also relates to innovation satisfaction as it enhances the individuals 
possibility to partake in innovation. The authors further argue that there are mainly 
two reasons for organizations to use suggestion systems: first, using suggestion 
systems will reduce expenses related to communication and ideation. Second, 
suggestion systems will make it possible to direct the innovative efforts made by 
employees toward company goals.     
Growth 
According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), participation in new initiatives will 
stretch and build people’s competencies, thereby ensuring future growth. In 
today’s shifting markets, assets are just temporarily a source of competitive 
advantage (D. J. Collis & Montgomery, 2008). Still, most companies choose not 
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to include all their employees in innovation initiatives, and therefore loose 
initiative that could have resulted in new and valuable assets. Instead, they divide 
the labor into innovators and those who do the routine-based work (J. S. Brown & 
Duguid, 2000; Kanter, 2006). J. S. Brown and Duguid (2000) argue that all 
employees should ideally participate in innovation initiatives, as it will contribute 
to the firm’s collective pool of knowledge. In addition, they argue, all employees 
need to be innovative in order to react and adapt their working processes to a 
sudden change in the environment. 
In order to bump up the pool of knowledge, Wenger and Snyder (2000) suggest 
applying what they call a community of practice: “groups of people informally 
bound together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” (p. 139). 
Communities of practice give people the opportunity to learn from other and more 
experienced workers, and at the same time transferring best practices across 
borders of the firm. This ability to generate and spread new knowledge enables 
communities of practice to generate knowledge about how they are best organized, 
making them able to renew themselves. Thus, communities of practices as an 
organizational form gives firms the advantage of constantly developing the way 
they build and exchange knowledge (Wenger & Snyder, 2000). 
Reward  
Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize reward as a tool to increase innovation 
participation among employees. However, reward is a double-edged sword firms 
have to swing carefully in order to ensure that it cuts the right way. Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan (1999) found that tangible assets as a reward correlated negatively to 
motivation, as tangible assets tend to undermine the intrinsic motivation among 
people. Thus, a common mistake is that firms use money as a reward for people 
who participate and show good results in innovation initiatives (Birkinshaw et al., 
2011). However, the key to facilitate a desired innovative behavior among 
employees is to use rewards that target the intrinsic motivation (Birkinshaw et al., 
62 | T h e o r y  
 
 
 
2011), as it has shown to be extremely powerful in affecting the way people get 
motivated (Deci et al., 1999). 
To increase intrinsic motivation among employees, firms need to focus on social 
and personal drivers (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). Kanter (2013) suggest three things 
that can motivate and target the intrinsic motivation. First, an important factor is 
helping people develop skills, as it motivates people to shape their future. It will 
also make people able to do things faster and smarter than before, and fill up the 
firm’s collective pool of knowledge (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 2000). Second, firms 
need to establish a culture that honors individuals that innovate. In practice, firms 
need to create reward systems that acknowledge people’s work (Wenger & 
Snyder, 2000), for example through publicity or other forms of honoring, giving 
people recognition for what they have done (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 2000).  
Finally, Kanter (2013) suggests giving people a wider view of why what they are 
doing are crucial to the company, guiding the behaviors of employees toward 
long-term goals.  
2.8.4 Summing Up 
We have seen that the external reputation of companies’ innovativeness affects 
both customer and competitor behavior, as well as financial performance. 
Furthermore, companies must be aware of how success in innovation affects 
themselves as well as their individuals, as there are several  aspects that are found 
to influence organizational values, behaviors, and processes, in line with the 
argumentation of Rao and Weintraub (2013). 
We also see that some elements are relevant to consider when investigating 
ambidextrous companies. For instance, radical innovations do not only benefit 
companies; they might actually decrease profitability. Concerning the company, 
the link between long-term versus short-term orientation seems to have strong 
links to the exploration – exploitation dilemma, indicating that ambidextrous 
companies can be expected to have especially clear purposes. Literature also 
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indicates that radical and incremental innovation require different innovation 
processes. Regarding individuals, we have seen that a strict separation between an 
innovative team and the rest of the company – i.e. structural ambidexterity – is a 
bad approach, as it might decrease satisfaction among employees, and that 
involvement of all employees should be prioritized as one way to increase intrinsic 
motivation. 
This concludes the tools-oriented building blocks of an innovative company 
culture (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). The next section introduces the first of the three 
people-oriented determinants of an innovative company culture. We begin with 
values.  
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2.9  Values 
 
Figure 5 - The values building block. 
A company’s values are important to the innovative behavior of the organization, 
and should be supported in tangible ways, as this reflects the company’s priorities. 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) link innovative organizational values to factors such 
as entrepreneurial-spirit, creativity, and learning behavior, and emphasize that 
time and money spent by the company’s management should show that the 
company value innovative behavior and creativity. It is not enough that the values 
are simply communicated by senior management; they need to be demonstrated 
by driving decisions made by the managers (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). 
A technical innovation will not develop as desired unless all members of the 
organization share clear and consistent values (Claver et al., 1998). The values of 
a company are demonstrated by the way organizational members behave, and 
therefore also affect what an organization can and cannot do, as the values have 
implications for the standards by which employees set their prioritizations 
(Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). Prioritization of decisions in a 
company are made by employees at every level, and employees throughout the 
organization should therefore be trained to make independent decisions about 
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priorities which are consistent with the strategic direction and business model of 
the company (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). Clayton M Christensen 
and Overdorf (2000) argue that a key metric of good management is whether or 
not such clear, consistent values have permeated the organization. 
According to Khazanchi et al. (2007), value profiles is a dimension of values 
which may influence innovation. Value profiles can be understood as a cohesive 
set of organizational values which orient its members and guide their expectations, 
decisions and actions. On the one side, a company can have a flexibility profile 
where creativity, change, and empowerment are likely to be focused on by all its 
members. On the other side, a company might also have a control value profile, 
encouraging efficiency, productivity, and stability. Therefore, the value profile a 
company chooses will affect its innovative capabilities. Further, if a company 
seeks a flexibility value profile in order to increase the creative behavior of their 
members and enhance the innovation capability of their firm, management needs 
to provide sufficient resources for people to engage in creative behavior (T. M. 
Amabile et al., 1996). 
As noted, value profiles can be understood as the gathered set of organizational 
values which members base their decisions and actions on, and its importance for 
an organization is also highlighted by R. E. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983). They 
worked out a framework for organizational analysis, creating a model for 
organizational effectiveness. Three value dimensions are presented – control-
flexibility; internal-external; and means-ends – and R. E. Quinn and Rohrbaugh 
(1983) argue that these dimensions can be used to judge whether an organization 
is effective or not. 
Below, we will present different theories and perspectives from the literature on 
dimensions of organizational values and their impact on innovation.  
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2.9.1 Entrepreneurial 
The entrepreneurial factor presented by Rao and Weintraub (2013) is further 
broken down into the following elements: hungry, ambiguity, and action-oriented. 
Hungry can be understood as the desire in an organization for exploring new 
opportunities and creating new things (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). In the literature, 
the importance of having organizational values which supports and motivates 
employees to come up with new ideas and products is emphasized by several 
authors (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Khazanchi et al., 2007; Rao 
& Weintraub, 2013). Ambiguity is the second element of the entrepreneurial 
block, and is explained by Rao and Weintraub (2013) to affect the innovation 
culture in an organization. The reason, they argue, is that embracing and tolerating 
ambiguity is necessary in the pursuit of new opportunities. The last element of the 
entrepreneurial-spirit factor is action-oriented. Rao and Weintraub (2013) have 
the view that an innovative culture exhibits a bias towards action in order to avoid 
analysis paralysis when pursuing new opportunities. 
Hungry 
Having a clear and well-communicated new product strategy, where the role of 
new products are communicated as important to reach the company’s goals, have 
proven to be important in new product development processes (Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995). Senior management can show that they are committed to the 
development of new products by, for example, clearly communicating a new 
product strategy for the company (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995). The process of 
generating new ideas must be stimulated by the culture in an innovative 
organization (Claver et al., 1998). Similar to Rao and Weintraub (2013), 
Khazanchi et al. (2007) also emphasize that having values which underbuilds an 
organizational desire to explore opportunities is essential for an innovative 
organizational culture. This desire for innovation and change, however, may be 
difficult to sustain. 
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An organization faces several challenges when trying to stay hungry. Levinthal 
and March (1993) call this ‘the success trap’, and argue that as an organization 
develops great competence in an area, they will ultimately increase the 
engagement in that activity, thereby preferring not to explore new activities. W. 
M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that firms become more insensitive to 
opportunities in the external environment if engaging in little innovation activity. 
This can lead to a low aspiration level regarding opportunities in the external 
environment, creating a self-reinforcing cycle as this leads the company to devote 
little effort to innovation. 
The issues organizational values can create for staying hungry and innovating is 
also discussed by Clayton M Christensen and Overdorf (2000). The authors argue 
that values ultimately define what an organization is incapable of accomplishing, 
and further claim that few established companies innovate successfully. Clayton 
M Christensen and Overdorf (2000) explain this by highlighting that as a company 
grows its cost structure and values change, making the company less capable of 
pursuing opportunities with lower gross margins. The second issue they present 
relates to what the necessary size of the business opportunity has to be in order for 
the company to pursue the opportunity. Opportunities that small businesses find 
attractive may not be of interest for larger companies. It is possible, then, that 
values can make large established companies seem less entrepreneurial and less 
hungry to pursue new opportunities. 
Ambiguity 
In order to get a clearer understanding of how the tolerance of ambiguity is related 
to the innovation culture of an organization, understanding ambiguity in new 
product development projects is a good starting point. In new product 
development the innovation process is characterized by considerable amounts of 
uncertainty and ambiguity throughout the development of the project (Brun et al., 
2009). Sætre and Brun (2013) emphasize the link between ambiguity and 
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entrepreneurial spirit by stating that the shaping of opportunities starts with an 
embracing of ambiguity.  
Brun et al. (2009) create an understanding of how ambiguity in new product 
development projects can be classified and understood.  The authors highlight that 
ambiguity is present throughout the new product development process, and 
present a model which classifies ambiguity along two dimensions: subject and 
source. The subjects of ambiguity include product, market, process, and 
organizational resources, while the sources of ambiguity include multiplicity, 
novelty, validity, and reliability. 
Ambiguity in a new product development process cannot be completely removed, 
and consistently trying to minimize all ambiguity can be detrimental to innovation 
(Brun et al., 2009). This is simply because innovation without newness is not 
innovation. This highlights that understanding ambiguity and managing it is 
essential for innovation.  The innovation process is characterized by cycles 
of explorative and  exploitative activities, and in order to manage exploitation and 
exploration, creativity and constraint must be successfully balanced (Sætre & 
Brun, 2013). This can be understood as being an ambidextrous organization 
(O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004), and Sætre and Brun (2013) argue that a manager 
must successfully manage ambiguity in order for an organization to be truly 
ambidextrous and innovate well. Moreover, exploitation has a tendency to drive 
out exploration, as the economic returns for exploitation are closer in time and 
less uncertain (Levinthal & March, 1993). Also, well performing project leaders 
have the ability to work under conditions of high ambiguity (D. J. Kelley et al., 
2011), and are thus better at balancing exploration and exploitation. 
Tolerance for ambiguity in the innovation process itself, however, is just one 
dimension of the ambiguity term. Eisenberg (1984) describes ambiguity in 
communication as a means of encouraging creativity, thereby stimulating 
innovation. As an example, the values of an organization tend to be communicated 
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ambiguously; “organizational values are often implicit in myths, sagas, and stories 
... because their equivocal expression allows for multiple interpretations while at 
the same time promoting a sense of unity” (Eisenberg, 1984, p. 231). Thus, instead 
of drawing people towards the same views, ambiguity in communicating core 
values allows for both individual interpretations and a high level of agreement 
simultaneously. 
Action-oriented 
Action-oriented is the last element of the entrepreneurial-spirit factor. Rao & 
Weintraub’s (2013) framework implies that exhibiting a bias towards action is 
good for an innovative company culture. 
When investigating the question of how companies can capture new opportunities 
more effectively, Bingham, Furr, and Eisenhardt (2014) emphasize that there are 
two components to capturing a new business opportunity: opportunity selection 
and opportunity execution. They interviewed more than 150 executives from 
various companies in Asia, Europe and North America, and found that leaders 
who acted more flexibly during opportunity selection tended to be less flexible 
during opportunity execution. Conversely, leaders who were more focused during 
opportunity selection tended to be more flexible in executing those opportunities. 
Further, their analysis showed that overall focused selection and flexible 
execution lead to better outcomes than flexible selection and inflexible execution. 
The reason for this was that when companies were more focused in their 
opportunity selection, those initial opportunities could provide the foundation for 
subsequent opportunities. Moreover, the companies who pursued this strategy 
tended to be more flexible in how they executed the opportunities. Detailed 
planning decreased the need to justify choices at later stages, and the leaders 
tended to improvise and experiment more during the execution phase. Bingham 
et al. (2014) therefore argued in their article that although the given new 
competitive environment promotes change and flexibility, the old strategic 
emphasis on focus is still relevant. Thus, on the one hand, being flexible and 
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opportunistic can lead to great new businesses for a company, as time and effort 
is not wasted developing detailed plans which one may risk are out of date or even 
flawed when they are finally done. On the other hand, being more disciplined and 
creating focused plans when deciding which opportunities to pursue, could 
ultimately lead to the possibility to capture several opportunities in a row 
compared to just one (Bingham et al., 2014). This concludes the entrepreneurial 
factor under values, and we now move on to creativity. 
2.9.2 Creativity  
T. M. Amabile et al. (1996) define creativity as “… the production of novel and 
useful ideas in any domain” (p. 1155), and further state that all innovations begins 
with creative ideas. Although similar concepts, creativity is not to be confused 
with innovation. A distinction is given by Scott and Bruce (1994), who emphasize 
that while creativity is related to the production of novel and useful ideas, 
innovation relates to the adoption and implementation of these ideas.  
The creativity factor consists of three distinct elements: imagination, autonomy 
and playful. Imagination refers to encouraging new ways of thinking and seeking 
solutions to organizational issues from different perspectives, while autonomy 
refers to the level of freedom the workplace provides the employees to  pursue 
new opportunities (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). Playful on the other hand, describes 
whether employees are afraid to laugh at themselves and their delight for being 
spontaneous in their everyday work. 
Today, organizations are placing a greater emphasis on promoting creativity and 
innovation, as the markets are more turbulent and the future environment is more 
uncertain (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). Claver et al. (1998) also emphasize the 
importance of creativity for innovation, and Jassawalla and Sashittal (2002) claim 
that creative behaviors among organizational members is one of the most 
important values in innovation supportive cultures. 
V a l u e s  | 71 
 
 
Imagination 
According to Kanter (1988), creativity is composed of two elements: awareness 
of need and ability to construct new ways to address the need. She states that 
“often, creativity consists of rearranging already existing pieces to create a new 
possibility” (p. 175), which implies that one can be creative without having to 
invent something completely new. Kanter (1988) also argues that in order to see 
the world differently, it is a logical prerequisite to interact with people who see 
the world from a different perspective than we do. Having contact with those who 
take new angles on problems facilitates innovation; “... the most productive and 
creative ones were those who had more contacts outside their fields, who spent 
more time with others who did not share their values or beliefs” (p.176). This 
statement implies that creativity suffers when organizational members are 
separated in departments without communicating with members in other 
departments. People too close to a situation often become hopeless about change 
and blind to the possibilities (Kanter, 1988).  
Autonomy 
Having autonomy implies that a person or group of people is left alone, allowed 
to focus on their work and have a right to make decisions regarding their work 
(Kanter, 1988). An innovative culture allows for autonomy for the organizational 
members (Claver et al., 1998), and autonomy of freedom has also been proven to 
contribute in stimulating creative behavior (T. M. Amabile et al., 1996). Further, 
some argue that greater autonomy should be given to teams when there is a high 
level of uncertainty and innovativeness related to the project (D. Kelley & Lee, 
2010). However, why is autonomy good for an innovative culture? Kanter (1988) 
state that “the more routinized and rules-bound a job is, the more it is likely to 
focus its performers on a few already-known variables and to inhibit attention to 
new factors” (p. 180). Employees have less incentive to engage in innovation 
activities when jobs are narrowly, and rigidly, defined. 
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However, should autonomy always be given to project teams? According to D. 
Kelley and Lee (2010), different contexts call for different management styles. 
They argue that the specific innovation project characteristics affect the direct 
managerial role, and complete autonomy might not always be best. If a project is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty and ambiguity, a certain level of 
managerial involvement and guidance might be positively related to innovation 
project outcomes (D. Kelley & Lee, 2010). Further, allowing for empowerment of 
the innovation project leader while still overviewing the project process in order 
to provide the necessary discipline might be favorable. Research has indicated that 
autonomy in innovation projects should be balanced with a certain level of 
accountability (D. J. Kelley et al., 2011). Usage of formal reviews, tools for 
measuring project progress and having frequent discussions with project leaders 
are examples of how managers can allow for autonomy while still maintaining 
overview.  
Kanter (1988) claims that the autonomy in an innovation project needs to be 
balanced with accountability. According to her, although a group of organizational 
members should follow bureaucratic rules to some extent, the emphasis on seeking 
constant approvals should not be too strong as this is time consuming, 
demotivating and inefficient. On the other hand, a lack of control might ultimately 
lead to overfunded projects with poor results, which is why she emphasizes the 
need for a balance between these two extremes. Kanter (1988) argues that “the 
ideal structural context surrounding an innovation project, then, should offer 
procedural autonomy coupled with multiple milestones that must be reached in 
order for the project to continue” (p. 198). This implies that there needs to be a 
balance between accountability and autonomy. 
Playful 
Being playful can be defined as being eager to play (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). 
“Play is defined as a free activity in a state of mind conducive to learning through 
exploration” (Bogers & Sproedt, 2012, p. 79). According to Bogers and Sproedt 
V a l u e s  | 73 
 
 
(2012), there are three main directions of play research. First, the cognitive value 
of play is skills, such as learning. Second, the emotional value of play is how we 
deal with conflicts and stress. Finally, the social value of play is skills such as 
collaborating. Further, Bogers and Sproedt (2012) argue that playful behavior 
needs a ludic place in order to thrive, which is a space that is psychologically safe; 
a place where play can happen. Also, Kanter (1988) claims that feeling valued and 
secure make people more relaxed and thereby more creative. 
Work environment perceptions can influence the level of creative behavior in an 
organization, and characteristics of the organizational context can both support 
and impede generation of creative ideas (T. M. Amabile et al., 1996). Playing can 
be a source of creativity, a trigger for innovation, and a support for developing 
social competence (Bogers & Sproedt, 2012). In addition to being a potential 
source of imagination and fun, playing can be a facilitator to deep learning. 
Therefore, if innovation managers are interested in increasing the organization’s 
level of creativity and develop employees’ social competences, they should focus 
on creating a social environment that encourages playful behavior. 
In their study, Bogers and Sproedt (2012) observed students participating in a 
playful game, partly because “games give play a direction, and feed into the 
general theory of learning …” (p. 76). The authors found that playful games 
“allow us to get a more holistic understanding of the complex social dynamics that 
emerge when people have to deal with novelty” (p. 93). Further, the study implied 
that planning can destroy playfulness, and with it, exploration as well. Related to 
this, it was also implied that creativity can be hampered by too much strategy. 
Another implication of this study is that novelty in a dynamic context is easier 
grasped through physical interaction. Thus, when interacting with others, being 
playful facilitates learning and improves the understanding of complex situations. 
Bogers and Sproedt (2012) conclude by stating that “a more playful approach to 
innovation can provide great opportunities as well as challenges” (p. 94). This 
leads us to the final factor of values: Learning. 
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2.9.3 Learning 
Values which emphasize learning are according to Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
essential for the innovation culture in an organization. In order to measure the 
level of learning, the factor has been further broken down into the three elements: 
curiosity, experiment, and failure OK. The ability to learn can be a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage, and capabilities for learning are found in 
several successful organizations. However, how can ‘learning’ best be 
understood? 
“An entity learns if, through its processing of information, the range of its 
potential behaviors is changed” (Huber, 1991, p. 89). According to Huber (1991), 
one way of better understanding organizational learning is by characterizing it in 
terms of attributes. In his article, he presents four attributes that characterizes 
organizational learning: existence, breadth, elaborateness and thoroughness. In 
explaining the existence of organizational learning, Huber (1991) assumes that an 
organization learns if any of the units obtain new knowledge which can be useful 
for the organization. When further outlining the meaning of breadth, Huber (1991) 
argues that if the new knowledge is spread to other components of the 
organization, and these components recognize it as potentially useful, more 
organizational learning occurs. Elaborateness affects organizational learning in 
that organizational learning increases when the number of varied interpretations 
increases. Finally, Huber (1991) argues that more organizational learning increase 
when the comprehensions of the different interpretations become uniform in more 
organizational units.  
Furthermore, Huber (1991) argues that organizational learning consists of four 
distinct processes. The first stage in the process is to obtain knowledge. Secondly, 
information needs to be shared within the organization among its members, as this 
will ultimately lead to the existence of new information. Thirdly, Huber (1991) 
emphasizes that information distribution leads to more broadly based 
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organizational learning.  Finally, a common interpretation must be developed 
before this knowledge can be stored in the organization’s memory for future use. 
However, learning processes are subject to some important limitations, and those 
need to be understood correctly by managers, as these limitations affect an 
organization’s ability to successfully innovate (Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Levinthal and March (1993) claim that many of the same limits that constrain 
rationality also constrain learning, and they hereby argue that human beings have 
cognitive limits which constrain them from learning optimally. In their article, 
they present temporal myopia as a distinct problem of myopia. Temporal myopia 
is defined by Levinthal and March (1993) as the organizational tendency to ignore 
the long run. The favoring of short-term profitability can potentially lead to a 
decrease in an organization’s ability to adapt to fast changing environments 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). Organizations are too often bound to the past and 
favor activities that more easily lead to incremental gains. Further, specialization 
and traps of competence can have the unfavorable effect of creating organizations 
that are unable to create adaptive competences and to engage in new learning 
activities (Levinthal & March, 1993). Problems with learning how to analyze and 
handle difficulties and challenges is also addressed as a part of temporal myopia; 
organizations tend to assume that today’s challenges are identical to those in the 
past, thereby using the same solutions as earlier to solve problems instead of 
seeking new ways of viewing the problems (Levinthal & March, 1993). One can 
only hope to have employees that are truly interested in the challenges that are 
present, and curious to find answers to familiar and unfamiliar problems. 
Curiosity 
Asking questions in the pursuit of the unknown is important in an innovating 
culture (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). One of the interesting questions regarding 
curiosity is why some companies are stuck in old patterns and not reinventing 
themselves. Levinthal and March (1993) claim that the search for new knowledge 
and information is decreased by organizational success and increased when the 
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organization is underperforming. They further argue that preferences are affected 
by experience. This argument is based on their statement that as a competence in 
a certain activity increases; preferences for those activities will be further 
strengthened. Ultimately, this increased preference for a certain activity will act 
as a substitute for search for change in that particular activity, and in the searching 
for new activities.  
Experiment 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize that “constantly experimenting in our 
innovation efforts” (p.34) is important for innovation. Reviewing existing 
literature on the field has left us with the impression that experimentation in 
innovation efforts is essential in a culture which values innovation. 
Experimentation has been acknowledged as an important contributor to learning 
processes by Huber (1991), who argues that experimenting contributes to 
knowledge acquisition in organizations. Further, when proposing conditions for 
the generation of a corporate culture based on technological innovation, Claver et 
al. (1998) claim that the existence of research and development values in an 
organization is one of the main contributors to successful innovation. However, 
how exactly does experimentation contribute to innovation?  
According to Levinthal and March (1993), research generates new knowledge and 
increases an organization’s ability to absorb new knowledge generated by others. 
Further, outside knowledge can be critical to the innovation process, and W. M. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) introduce a term: absorptive capacity. They define 
absorptive capacity as “… the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, 
external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends …” (p. 128), 
and argue that it is critical to the innovative capabilities of an organization. They 
further argue that the level of prior related knowledge in an organization affects 
the ability of an organization to utilize and evaluate external knowledge. 
According to W. M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990), learning is cumulative and its 
performance is greatest when the object of learning is related to what is already 
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known. By arguing that prior knowledge underlies absorptive capacity, having 
already accumulated a certain amount of knowledge in an area will thus allow 
for more efficient accumulation in the next period. 
Experimentation is important for innovation as it increases learning in an 
organization and its ability to take advantage of external knowledge. But 
experimentation often produce failures, highlighting the fact that learning from 
failure is important in order to fully exploit the positive effects experimentation 
can have on the innovation capabilities in an organization. 
Failure OK 
The final element under the learning factor, as well as the building block of 
organizational values, is failure OK. This element emphasizes the importance of 
having employees that are comfortable with failing, and that failure should be 
treated as an opportunity to learn. 
As already noted, one will not always succeed when experimenting. Failures are 
likely to occur and organizations should thus focus on learning from them. 
Edmondson (2011) goes as far as arguing that generating failures for the purpose 
of learning and innovation is what describes an exceptional organization. 
Edmondson (2011) emphasizes that the attitude many managers today have 
towards failure, namely that all failures are bad, is the main reason preventing 
organizations to learn from them. She states few managers succeed in learning 
from failure, partly because they fail in their responsibility to create a culture 
which makes it safe for organizational members to admit mistakes. Organizations 
learn from failure from the essential activities of: detection, analysis and 
experimentation. Having a culture where employees are blamed for every mistake 
they do has the unfortunate consequence that several failures will end up being 
unreported, meaning there will be no opportunity to ever learn from them for the 
organization (Edmondson, 2011). Edmondson (2011) further present a spectrum 
of reasons for failure, from blameworthy to praiseworthy, and that leaders today 
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think of failure the wrong way and must be aware of the fact that failure occurs 
on the entire spectrum. 
By investigating patient care groups in two different hospitals, Edmondson (1996) 
found that the perceptions among employees of what the consequences would be 
of making mistakes influenced the frequency of reporting them. Edmondson 
(1996) investigated eight different units, and she found that the nurse manager’s 
behavior was of great importance to the extent to which unit members reported 
failures. From these findings one could argue that leaders are in a unique position 
to affect the rate at which organizational members admits failure, and that 
employees notice the way past errors have been handled and are particularly aware 
of the behavior of the leader. Although the research was made on a group level, 
Edmondson (1996) suggest that the findings could offer a useful  perspective for 
investigating errors and the handling thereof in organizations. 
Having presented these positive consequences of admitting failure, it should be 
mentioned that analysis of failure, however, is not an activity without challenges. 
Levinthal and March (1993) introduce the concept of failure myopia, referring to 
the impact a biased representation of the past reality can have on learning. The 
general idea is that if an individual or organization has had success they are more 
likely to think that they will experience success, and if they have experienced a 
great amount of failure, they are more likely to think they will fail in the future. 
This has implications for the way we learn from failure, as successful people will 
tend to explain that their success is caused by ability and their failure with bad 
luck. 
This part of the paper has described organizational values, which we systematized 
according to Rao & Weintraub’s (2013) framework. The next paragraph gives a 
brief summary, and draws lines to ambidexterity. 
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2.9.4 Summing Up 
Reviewing literature, it is evident that values can be essential for innovation 
performance. We have stated that people’s behaviors at all levels reflect an 
organization’s true values, but also that allocation of resources in addition to past 
success can reinforce the values of an organization. Moreover, creativity is one of 
the most important values in a culture that supports innovation. Finally, in order 
to achieve a source of sustainable competitive advantage, an organization must 
have an ability to learn continuously. 
We also see that values are important for ambidextrous companies. Moreover, the 
right values can reinforce and facilitate an ambidextrous organization. In 
particular, there are many commonalities between ambidexterity and the 
entrepreneurial-factor. As an example, the handling of ambiguity – which includes 
a successful balancing of exploration- and exploitation activities – is much easier 
to succeed with for an ambidextrous organization. Finally, we note that one needs 
to have the right values in order to properly explore and exploit simultaneously. 
We will now dive deeper into the literature on the behavior dimension of 
innovation culture and seek to discover how this block complements 
organizational values.  
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2.10 Behaviors 
 
Figure 6 - The behaviors building block. 
Behaviors is one of the six building blocks in Rao and Weintraub’s (2013) 
framework, and it is comprised of the three factors energize, engage and enable. 
Behaviors, in general, can be understood as the way one conducts oneself, and in 
the context of our master’s thesis it is understood as the way people act in the 
cause of innovation (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). 
Behavioral patterns among employees has been suggested to be closely related to 
implementation challenges or new suggestions in organizations (Bessant et al., 
2001). After investigating  how high involvement continuous improvement can 
be built and sustained as an organizational capability, Bessant et al. (2001) argue 
that achieving continuous improvement as an organizational capability should be 
seen as achieving a cluster of behavioral changes among employees. They call 
these clusters of behaviors ‘routines’, and argue that building and embedding such 
routines in an organization is a result of extended learning processes. Hence, when 
seeking continuous improvement and incremental innovation, learning behaviors 
among employees is argued to play a significant role. 
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As will become evident, the elements – which build up the three factors of the 
behavior building block – are mostly related to the behaviors of leaders. One can 
thereby conclude that having the right leadership and management styles for 
innovation is seen as essential in an innovation culture. Leadership can be 
understood as “the process of influencing others towards achieving some kind of 
desired outcome” (De Jong & Den Hartog, 2007, p. 44), and is important when 
engaging in innovative activities. In current research there are several perspectives 
on leadership, such as leader traits and behaviors (De Jong & Den Hartog, 2007), 
but we will mostly focus on the behavioral aspect. Leader behaviors are intended 
to result in desired behaviors from subordinates in the organization and research 
has shown that the way leaders behave can greatly affect the employee’s 
individual innovative behavior (De Jong & Den Hartog, 2007).  Edmondson 
(2004) states: “In short, leader behavior sets a salient example of how to behave 
…” (p. 249), implying that members on different levels in an organization might 
copy the behaviors of their leaders as they set the standards. Hence, if leaders are 
continuously looking for ways to do things better and improve results, employees 
will do the same. 
The various elements we will present are intended to represent different aspects 
of innovative behavior (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). The elements in the framework 
– as stated – mostly capture leader behaviors, but this should not be understood as 
if leaders are the only ones who are desired to, or responsible of, displaying 
innovative behaviors. Edmondson (2004) define innovative behavior as “doing 
novel or different things intelligently, to produce final outcomes” (p.259), and as 
the definition implies, innovative behavior is not something reserved only for 
senior of middle managers. Thus, one can assume that everyone in an organization 
is capable of showing innovative behavior. Therefore, although we touch upon 
some aspects of employee innovative behavior in other building blocks, we will 
use this section to both investigate the given elements for leader behaviors as 
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presented by Rao and Weintraub (2013) , as well as outlining certain aspects of 
innovative behaviors of organizational members on all levels. 
2.10.1 Energize 
We understand the behavioral factor energize as leader-behavior which causes 
enthusiasm and vitality to subordinates in the pursuit of innovation. According to 
Rao and Weintraub (2013), energize can be described with the elements inspire, 
challenge, and model. These elements are explained as leaders who: inspire 
employees “with a vision of the future and articulation of opportunities for the 
organization”; challenge employees “to think and act entrepreneurially”; and 
“model the right innovation behaviors for others to follow” (p. 34). How an 
innovation culture benefits from leaders focusing on inspiring employees, and 
how it can be accomplished, is the topic of the next section. 
Inspire 
One way leaders can inspire employees to engage in innovative activities is 
through inspirational statements. Inspirational statements from leaders have the 
purpose of creating unity in a group (Eisenberg, 1984), and one such statement 
could be leaders articulating the company’s vision for the future. The goal is to 
create a collective vision for the future which is agreed upon by all or most 
employees, thereby creating a sense of direction and purpose. Such statements do 
not necessarily need to be very precise and concrete in order to have an effect on 
employee innovative behavior. In fact, as there will always be multiple 
interpretations in social systems, having a certain level of abstraction and 
ambiguity in leaders’ statements “allows for both agreement in the abstract and 
the preservation of diverse viewpoints” (Eisenberg, 1984, p. 232). Eisenberg 
(1984) thereby argues that the process of making meanings for followers, and 
infusing employees with values and purpose, is a leader responsibility that is less 
one of consensus-making and more one of expressing values at a level of 
abstraction at which agreement can occur. 
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Inspirational statements can provide a vision for the future, which is one of the 
leader behaviors identified by De Jong and Den Hartog (2007), which were 
connected to innovative behavior of individual employees. According to De Jong 
and Den Hartog (2007), such leader behavior consists of “communicating an 
explicit vision on the role and referred types of innovation providing directions 
for future activities” (p. 49), and, based on their research, was suggested to be both 
related to idea generation behavior and application behavior among employees. 
Another way it has been argued that employees can be inspired in their innovation 
efforts, is if there exists a company culture where all employees are known with 
the potential of innovative activities, and where communication and sharing of 
knowledge is well-established. According to Claver et al. (1998), as technological 
innovation can be a resource for competitive advantage, staff should be trained in 
becoming aware of which competitive advantage lie precisely in technological 
innovation. If such knowledge is shared by all the members of the firm, it can 
create a self-reinforcing cycle where a strong company culture facilitates sharing 
of this knowledge, which again inspire employees and further strengthen the 
culture.  
Hence, we can see that inspiration does not necessarily require a manager or leader 
providing thorough and visionary statements for the future, as colleagues and 
well-established work processes can be argued to play just as an important role. 
However, the manager plays an essential role. One way to inspire is to challenge 
employees, which is the topic of the next section. 
Challenge 
A key problem in managing innovation lies in how to get people to pay attention, 
or how to trigger people to appreciate and pay attention to new ideas, needs and 
opportunities (Kanter, 1988). In an innovative company culture, Rao and 
Weintraub (2013) suggest that leaders ought to challenge employees to think and 
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act entrepreneurially. Thus, a question quickly rises: how does one best challenge 
employees? 
One way for leaders to do this is by communicating expectations. Scott and Bruce 
(1994) argue that “the degree to which a supervisor expects a subordinate to be 
innovative is positively related to the subordinate's innovative behavior” (p. 585). 
Thus, according to them, the manager’s expectation of a subordinate to be 
innovative is perceived as facilitating the subordinate’s innovative efforts. To put 
it in another way: by expecting an employee to think and act entrepreneurially, the 
manager implicitly challenges this person to behave in such a way, which again 
enhances the employee’s innovation effort. Further, Kanter (1988) states that 
whether the organization’s culture pushes “tradition” or “change” can in itself be 
seen as a general source of expectations for innovation. Hence, it is likely that 
leaders in organizations that push “change” will challenge their employees to 
think and act entrepreneurially to a higher degree than leaders in an organization 
that pushes “tradition”. 
Another way leaders can challenge employees is identified by De Jong and Den 
Hartog (2007). One of the leader behaviors they found influencing individual 
innovation – which they labelled intellectual stimulation – consisted of “teasing 
subordinates directly to come up with ideas and to evaluate current practices” (p. 
49). According to some of the leaders they interviewed, such behavior was 
believed to be related to idea generation behaviors among their employees. 
T. M. Amabile et al. (1996) identified challenge as a source for creativity. They 
identified two different forms of workload pressures, which they named excessive 
workload pressure and challenge. While the first is expected to undermine 
creativity, the second “may add to the perception of challenge in the work that 
positively correlates with intrinsic motivation and creativity” (T. M. Amabile et 
al., 1996, p. 1162). Hence, a sufficient amount of pressure is challenging and 
motivating, while too much pressure can ultimately undermine creativity. This 
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implies that managers wishing to challenge their employees to reach higher levels 
of creativity must balance the workload pressure imposed on their employees. 
The third element that energize people, according to Rao and Weintraub (2013), 
is model, and is addressed in the following section. 
Model 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) also include an element in their framework that is 
aimed to capture whether or not leaders model the desired behaviors necessary for 
innovation. One may thus wonder why this is so important in order to succeed 
with innovative activities. Should it not be enough for leaders to simply 
communicate which behaviors and activities they want organizational member to 
engage in, and expect subordinates to display behaviors thereafter? Unfortunately, 
it is unlikely to be that easy. 
As noted, Edmondson (2004) claims that leaders set examples of how to behave, 
in which employees tend to follow. Her view is supported by the results of De 
Jong and Den Hartog (2007), who found that innovative role modelling is one of 
the leader behaviors connected to individual innovative behavior. According to 
them, innovative role-modelling behavior is understood as “being an example of 
innovative behavior, exploring opportunities, generating ideas, championing and 
putting efforts in development” (De Jong & Den Hartog, 2007, p. 49), and, based 
on their research, is suggested to both being related to idea generation and 
application behaviors among employees. Of course, employees’ behaviors also 
may be quite affected by the behaviors of other people they engage in activities 
with. However, Tyler and Lind (1992) state that although team members are likely 
to attend to each other’s actions and responses, the members are particularly aware 
of the leader’s behavior (as cited in Edmondson, 1999, p. 356). When looking at 
research done on climates for specific strategic outcomes, one can see that the 
organization’s climate for a specific outcome will impact the employees’ 
behaviors regarding that outcome (Klein & Sorra, 1996). For instance, Zohar 
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(1980) found that climate for safety is related to factory safety (as cited in Klein 
& Sorra, 1996), achieved both by how leaders inspire and also in how they model 
innovation behaviors related to these climates. Thus, if it is likely that people will 
behave in ways similar to their leaders, it is important that leaders display and 
model the right behaviors for others to follow. 
2.10.2 Engage 
Like all other factors describing a building block, engage has three elements that 
describe its composition (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). To engage means to 
participate or become involved in something, and related to innovation culture, 
one can understand the term as meant to describe behaviors among leaders that 
help foster a motivated and productive workforce. The first element, coach, 
describes behaviors where leaders spend time to coach and provide feedback on 
employees’ innovation efforts. The second element, initiative, describes behaviors 
where people at all levels take initiative to innovate. Finally, support describes 
leaders’ ability to provide support to project team members, both during successes 
and failures. It should be noted that although coach and support are similar 
concepts – as both constructs include the aspect of providing feedback and helping 
employees – they are distinct. In this paper, as it is in Rao and Weintraub’s (2013) 
paper, the concepts are distinguished the following way: coaching is interpreted 
as improving the skills of the employee, while support is more about providing 
emotional support; e.g. maintaining a team member’s motivation in a particular 
situation. In addition, support can also imply someone with power endorsing a 
project, meaning support is more ambiguous than coach is. However, as the terms 
are highly interconnected, many behavioral patterns in organizations are 
simultaneously related to both concepts. 
Coach 
It is a leader responsibility to provide sufficient support and coaching to 
employees, but it is also a responsibility of the employees to be willing to make 
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themselves vulnerable to feedback from others (Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002). In 
order to ease the process of providing useful coaching, Jassawalla and Sashittal 
(2002) found in their study of new-product development processes that employees 
in those cultures which were found to be highly innovation-supportive often 
voiced the sense of control they felt about their own involvement in the 
development process. By communicating to their leaders how they found the work 
tasks and own achievements, leaders could thus provide the necessary coaching. 
It should be emphasized, though, that coaching is by no means an easy leader 
responsibility. Communicative misunderstandings and different interpretations 
stand in the way between the intended outcome of such a process and the actual 
result. Often, when a leader coach an employee, or provides support to project 
team members, the employee will project the meaning of the message in way that 
is consistent with his or her own beliefs (Eisenberg, 1984). Building on this, as 
the objective of the coaching should be to maintain the employee’s creativity one 
could argue that the coaching should focus on challenging and inspiring the 
employee, as opposed to direct instructions on how to solve problems. 
Edmondson (1999) describes what she calls learning behavior as “activities 
carried out by team members through which a team obtains and processes data 
that allow it to adapt and improve” (p. 351). If a team is to discover gaps in its 
plans and to make the correct adjustments, the members must test assumptions 
and discuss their differences openly, as opposed to privately or outside the group. 
For managers, this implies facilitating a psychologically safe environment through 
coaching and support of team members. By doing this, leaders can facilitate a 
climate in which people at all levels engage in learning activities and take 
initiative; the topic of our next section. 
Initiative 
The second element of the engage factor is initiative. All members in an 
organization should take initiative to innovative. Jassawalla and Sashittal (2002) 
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argue that taking initiative, in addition to exhibiting creativity and taking risks, is 
both important and expected from participants in innovation-supportive cultures. 
If people in an organization generally take initiative, the organization has what 
Baer and Frese (2003) refer to as a ‘climate for initiative’. They argue that the 
“organizational environment has to be supportive of an active approach toward 
work” (p. 46), and that proactively switching between dual work roles (e.g. 
striving toward continuous improvements and standardized production work) 
requires an environment at work in which such behaviors are expected, valued, 
and frequently displayed. Baer and Frese (2003) further found that “companies 
with a high degree of process innovativeness but with low levels of climates for 
initiative and psychological safety were actually worse off than if they had not 
innovated at all” (p.61). Thus, it seems that a climate for initiative combined with 
a climate for psychological safety is a natural prerequisite for successfully 
implementing a process innovation. 
There are several possible positive outcomes from having individuals displaying 
initiative in an organization; “evidence suggests that individual-level initiative is 
related to better performance” (Baer & Frese, 2003, p. 49). In the long run, 
personal initiative may lead to new ideas, smoother production and service 
processes, increased quality and ease of implementation, and finally better 
performance (Baer & Frese, 2003). 
However, as taking initiative interrupts routines, it may not be welcome to an 
organization in the short run. This limitation can be elaborated further by 
connecting it to what Levinthal and March (1993) define as traps of distinctive 
competence. Organizations will more frequently engage in activities in which they 
are more competent, as opposed to activities in which they are less competent. As 
a result, the organization accentuates distinctive competence, and becomes 
specialized to niches that will yield immediate advantage. It can therefore become 
more difficult for people to take initiative in an organization on endeavors that are 
less related to current competences. It is important that managers are aware of this, 
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and treat ideas and other outcomes from employees’ personal initiatives in a 
thorough way. Otherwise one may risk missing out on great opportunities, as well 
as employees that might stop proposing new ideas if they do not feel their 
suggestions are taken seriously. 
Support 
As previously described, we consider support and coaching to be concepts of 
similar meaning, but distinguished from one another, as support focus more on 
emotions of individuals, while coach focus more on task-related guidance.  
According to De Jong and Den Hartog (2007), providing support for innovation 
consists of “acting friendly to innovative employees, being patient and helpful, 
listening, looking out for someone’s interests if problems arise” (p. 49), and is 
suggested to be both related to idea generation behavior and application behavior 
among employees. One concrete way leaders can behave supportive towards 
subordinates engaging in innovation efforts is to make sure people see their own 
progress. This way, leaders’ support may increase their employees’ motivation 
and productivity. Seeing progress in meaningful work is one of the most important 
boosts of emotions, motivation, and perceptions during a workday, as emphasized 
by Teresa M Amabile and Kramer (2011), who state that progress is the single 
most important boost during a workday. 
The discussion of support is further expanded by adding the meaning of 
endorsement to the concept, and linking it to realization of objectives. When an 
innovator has generated an idea with potential for organizational implementation, 
he or she needs to build a coalition, which is to acquire power by selling the project 
to potential allies (Kanter, 1988). According to Kanter (1988), support – 
endorsement, backing, approval, and legitimacy – is an organizational power tool 
that can be invested in action. Someone initiating innovation must often compete 
in a “political market” in order to gain support or legitimacy for his or her idea. 
Thus, just as the leaders have a responsibility to provide support to their co-
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workers, the ones taking initiative must equally seek to acquire support for their 
ideas. Support is thus needed from co-workers – as well as leaders – for the 
innovators to succeed.  
In order to provide support for innovative behaviors, managers need to be 
involved in innovation activities, and are often required to monitor projects. D. 
Kelley and Lee (2010) found that manager involvement in innovation activities is 
not just a matter of the amount of involvement, but also the type of involvement. 
When projects exhibit high levels of innovativeness and are strategically related 
to the organization, the manager tend to empower the project leader and act more 
like a sponsor that provides support to the project leader. On the other hand, when 
projects diverge strategically from the organization and require large amounts of 
resources, the manager may assume more directive control. 
However, support is not only needed to triumph ideas through the innovation 
process, it is also needed when ideas are killed. Innovation is risky, and most 
innovation projects get terminated at some point (Cooper, 1990; Levinthal & 
March, 1993). Termination of such ideas runs the risk of innovators to both lose 
face and risk appearing less than competent (Daly et al., 2012). Thus, managers 
discussing failing projects with innovators must let the innovators maintain their 
positive face – maintaining their positive self-image and acceptance among others 
– while, at the same time, convincing them to surrender autonomy – reducing 
negative face – when projects are terminated (Daly et al., 2012). When projects 
fail, it is important to get something positive out of the experience. Hence, support 
is needed to maintain a stream of creative ideas and individual initiatives. This 
was also emphasized by De Jong and Den Hartog (2007), who stated that, 
according to their interviewees, the way leaders dealt with mistakes seemed to be 
a key driver in the implementation stage of the innovation process. 
This section shows the importance of support from leaders, even during failures, 
and concludes the section of behaviors that engage. The final factor of the 
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behavior-block is ‘enable’ and it shows the importance of “getting things done”, 
or, more precisely, enabling people to “get things done”. 
2.10.3 Enable  
Someone who enables gives means or authority to someone else to do something. 
The three elements which, according to Rao and Weintraub (2013), describe 
enabling behaviors are influence, adapt, and grit. They are further explained as: 
leaders that use the right influence strategies to overcome organizational 
obstacles; leaders that “modify and change course of action when needed”; and 
leaders that persist in following opportunities even in hardship, respectively (Rao 
& Weintraub, 2013, p. 34). 
Influence 
Because of their legitimate authority, leaders are in position to create strategies 
for coping with obstacles. One particular example would be to always make sure 
they have allocated enough resources to the innovation activities. De Jong and 
Den Hartog (2007) list “providing resources” as one of the leader behaviors that 
affect individual innovative behavior among employees. According to them, such 
leader behavior is related to the application stage of the innovation process, as 
implementing innovative ideas takes time and often requires a great amount of 
financial resources. However, allocating large amounts of resources does not 
come without side-effects: D. Kelley and Lee (2010) state that managers are likely 
to exert control when projects have high resource requirements and are 
strategically unrelated. One of the reasons for this is that the high resource 
requirements demand someone with proper influence and access to sufficient 
funds. 
Leaders might also expect having to use their position and formal power to 
persuade others in order to be able to go forward with a project (Kanter, 1988). 
Especially strategically unrelated projects can be subjects of resistance from top 
management, and the novelty – at least as perceived by the firm – might call for 
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several changes along the way (D. Kelley & Lee, 2010). Thus, managers 
supporting these kinds of projects need grit to overcome resistance in the 
organization, adapt as new knowledge emerge, and have enough influence to 
make sure the project progress as intended.  
Consulting employees and asking subordinates for their opinion before initiating 
change is also a strategy leaders might use. This strategy is aimed at increasing 
the motivation among subordinates to engage in change activities, which 
innovation might require, as employees are likely to feel increased ownership to 
an activity if they have been involved in shaping it (De Jong & Den Hartog, 2007). 
To enable means more than simply using influence in the organization. It is also 
about adapting to changes in the environment, which is the topic of the next 
section. 
Adapt 
As already emphasized, environments are always changing. In order to survive, 
firms must constantly struggle to keep their alignment with changing external 
conditions. In almost every organization, there is a constant tension between the 
need for stability to accomplish daily tasks efficiently, and a need for creativity 
and exploration in order to make improvements to products and manufacturing 
processes as environments change. The problem for organizations, therefore, is to 
make sure they engage in sufficient exploitation and exploration. In order to do 
that, the firm needs dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities are at the heart of 
the ability of a business to be ambidextrous – to explore and exploit (Trott, 2012) 
– and can be defined as “a set of abilities that make a firm more agile and 
responsive to change” (Schilling, 2013, p. 120). Leaders should thus focus 
attention towards developing the company towards becoming an organization 
capable of handling changes, and they must be capable of making decisions 
themselves, which enables the company to keep its alignment to the external 
surroundings. 
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The requirements for the leader to adapt to new circumstances also go for internal 
situations. Kanter (1988) states that flexibility is a requirement for idea realization, 
as innovations often encounter unexpected obstacles that require re-planning and 
redirection. If someone detects and reports critical flaws with a project, the leader 
has a responsibility to adapt to the new circumstances. However, for the manager 
to be able to adapt to new internal circumstances, he or she needs to know about 
the errors that has been made; the errors must be reported by the employees.  
At first, one may think of this element as meant mostly to capture the decisions 
made by a leader on which direction to take, but being adaptable would in many 
cases include allowing subordinates to make decisions to which they consider 
best. This aspect of being adaptable can be connected to the behavior of 
delegating, as described by De Jong and Den Hartog (2007): “Giving subordinates 
sufficient autonomy to determine relatively independently how to do a job” (p. 
49). 
Grit 
Leaders persisting in following opportunities can be thought of as especially 
important in innovative projects due to the often high levels of ambiguity present. 
A leader facing adversity on an innovation project may consider reducing the 
novelty of the job at hand. By reducing the novelty, the ambiguity is also reduced, 
making it easier to exploit the present opportunity. However, if too much 
ambiguity is removed, there is hardly any innovativeness left. After all, 
“innovation without newness is self-contradictory” (Brun et al., 2009, p. 81). 
According to Brun et al. (2009), it is preferred to accept ambiguity and cope with 
it. Coping can sometimes mean reducing ambiguity to keep the project alive, and 
other times it means sustaining ambiguity in order to maintain innovativeness in 
the project. Therefore, regardless of the decision made by the leader on how to 
cope with ambiguity, there is a need for grit. Without it, the company risks 
terminating projects far too soon, with nobody to defend the idea. 
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2.10.4 Summing Up 
It is evident that leader behavior has the potential to affect the innovation culture 
in a company in several ways. Besides having potential direct effects on the 
innovativeness of a company culture by removing organizational obstacles, 
inspiring and challenging employees, the leaders’ behaviors has also been found 
to affect people positively by providing support, coaching and modelling 
behaviors of openness.  
These behaviors are important in facilitating an environment in which it is possible 
to be ambidextrous. How the leader behaves can affect the degree of difficulty as 
perceived by the employees. For instance, through coaching accompanied by 
support, a leader can teach an employee to be ambidextrous in his work. Finally, 
we see that adapt is an element to which ambidexterity is particularly relevant, 
and it is one of the few elements of behaviors that are directly connected to the 
theory of ambidexterity. 
Thus far, we have described the literature on values and behaviors, and how they 
relate to the framework conceptualized by Rao and Weintraub (2013). We have 
found similarities and differences across building blocks, factors, and elements, 
but we also need to address climate – the last people-oriented determinant of an 
innovative company culture (Rao & Weintraub, 2013).  
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2.11 Climate 
 
Figure 7 - The climate building block. 
 Climate is one of the main building blocks of an innovative company culture, and 
it is comprised of the three factors: collaboration, safety, and simplicity (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013). The climate of an organization is argued to greatly affect its 
innovative capabilities. According to Rao and Weintraub (2013), “an innovative 
climate cultivates engagement and enthusiasm, challenges people to take risks 
within a safe environment, fosters learning and encourages independent thinking” 
(p. 30). 
According to Reichers and Schneider (1990), it is important that culture is not 
confused with climate; “... culture constitutes a ‘deeper, less consciously held set 
of meanings than most of what has been called organizational climate’” (as cited 
in Baer & Frese, 2003, p. 48). Further, Baer and Frese (2003) explain that “… 
culture can most accurately be understood as existing at a higher level of 
abstraction than climate” (p. 48), as climate is often linked to the activities that 
produce visible and tangible outcomes. 
Baer and Frese (2003) argue that there are two conflicting views of organizational 
climate. The first is an aggregated psychological climate, where the organizational 
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climate is the property of individuals and describes how individuals generally 
perceive the organization. As a contrast, Glick (1985) defines organizational 
climate as “a broad class of organizational, rather than psychological, variables 
that describe the organizational context for individuals’ actions” (as cited in Baer 
& Frese, 2003, p. 48). Whether climate is a shared perception or a shared set of 
conditions is still subject to controversy. However, many authors have 
emphasized the importance of the climate for innovation.  
Having the right climate for innovation is seen as one of the most important 
elements for successful new product development (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1995). It is not hard to see why the climate plays a key role when participating in 
innovative activities, as employees need to: feel safe enough to speak their minds 
and offering different points of view; engage in debates without feeling threatened 
or insecure; and trust their colleagues enough take risks and daring to participate 
actively when working in teams. If a team wish to discover gaps in its plans and 
make the changes that is needed, team members must test assumptions and discuss 
openly rather than privately or outside the group. This set of activities is what 
Edmondson (1999) refer to as learning behavior, and it is not possible to achieve 
without a certain amount of trust. Trust is an essential part of work climate, and, 
as with psychological safety, also involve perceptions of risk or vulnerability 
(Edmondson, 2004), thereby greatly affecting the risks employees are willing to 
take when engaging in work activities.  
However, achieving an innovative climate where creative ideas flourish and 
people actually engage in risk-taking is not possible without motivated people. 
Creativity will be optimized when people are primarily intrinsically motivated, 
which means they are motivated by the interest, enjoyment, satisfaction, and 
challenge of the work itself (T. M. Amabile et al., 1996). Focusing on creating a 
desirable climate for innovation can therefore be seen as a critical management 
task. At this juncture, we introduce the first climate factor, which is collaboration. 
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2.11.1 Collaboration 
The collaboration factor is by Rao and Weintraub (2013) further broken down into 
the three elements community, diversity, and teamwork. Community is understood 
as the uniformity of the perceptions the organizational members have of how 
innovation is and should be conducted in their workplace. As the level of diversity 
can greatly affect the work outcome in an organization (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; 
Kanter, 1988; Rao & Weintraub, 2013), Rao and Weintraub (2013) suggest in 
their framework that having appreciation and respect for the differences that exist 
in the organization positively affects the innovation culture. However, of course 
appreciation and respect alone is not enough; one must leverage on these 
differences and use them to create competitive advantage (Rao & Weintraub, 
2013). Further, teamwork is implied to be important for an innovative culture, as 
a well-functioning team will more easily be able to capture opportunities (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013). The three elements and their potential effect on innovation 
culture will now be further investigated. 
Community 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) find the uniformity of the perceptions the 
organizational members have of what innovation is, and how it should be 
conducted, as important in an innovative culture. This raise the questions of why 
it is essential to speak a common language of innovation, and further, what does 
it actually means to speak a common language about innovation? Literature has 
given us insight to this area, and we understand it to both cover the aspect of which 
innovation projects to pursue, as well as how the innovation process is to be 
conducted. 
In order to speak a common language about innovation, individuals must 
understand the company’s strategic intent, which is “a long-term goal that is 
ambitious, builds upon and stretches the firm’s existing core competencies, and 
draws from all levels of the organization” (Schilling, 2013, p. 121). In some 
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respect, deciding the company’s strategic intent can be paradoxical. On the one 
side, the company must ensure that new initiatives leverage existing core 
competencies, while on the other side, as environments constantly change, new 
initiatives should be differentiated from what already exists. By having a common 
view within the organization where all employees know and understand the 
company’s strategic intent, people know which innovation projects will be 
supported, and to what extent ideas would have to be related to current operations 
in order to be approved. 
However, how is it possible to attain a community when every individual interpret 
and compare messages to their own values, which, at least to some extent, must 
differ between individuals? According to Eisenberg (1984), central metaphors 
have the strength of, through the use of strategic ambiguity, promoting unified 
diversity. By this, it is meant that individuals believe they agree on the meaning 
of being part of a community, while their actual interpretations can continue to be 
somewhat different. When communicating, people can use strategic ambiguity to 
allow for projection, such that those attending to the message can fill in a meaning 
that is consistent with their own beliefs (Eisenberg, 1984). The result is that people 
perceive greater similarities between one another, further strengthening the 
community within the organization. 
Speaking a common language of innovation would imply having organizational 
members that trust each other’s suggestions and ideas. Trusting colleagues and 
their ideas for projects could both be beneficial and devastating to innovation in 
an organization. Knowledge transfer from a trusted colleague may change the 
cognitive map of the receiver, and ultimately direct attention and search towards 
the area of the knowledge transferred (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003). This 
may be positive for innovation, as pointed out by McEvily et al. (2003): “Such 
shortcuts in knowledge acquisition can speed organizational learning, alertness 
and responsiveness” (p. 97). 
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However, always agreeing on decisions and moving quickly in the terrain is not 
necessarily always beneficial. W. M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) emphasize that 
effective communication could in fact end up decreasing an 
organizational  member’s ability to exploit information originating from diverse 
external knowledge sources, possibly leading to “... the not-invented-here 
syndrome, in which ideas, knowledge and inventions developed outside their own 
group are rejected” (Morten T Hansen & Nohria, 2004, p. 24). 
Diversity 
Is diversity within the organization good or bad for innovation? When 
investigating the effect member diversity in an organization or group may have 
on innovation outcomes, certain questions quickly rise, such as: which type of 
diversity; professional or demographic? How does diversity affect innovation? 
Moreover, can there be too much diversity? Trying to answer these questions, as 
teams tend to be the most common organizational structure for carrying out 
innovation projects (D. J. Kelley et al., 2011), one can start by investigating the 
relationship between team diversity and team outcomes. 
Proponents of heterogeneous teams argue that having cognitive diversity within a 
group promotes creativity, innovation and problem solving. The opponents, 
however, argue that homogenous teams is better, as they have shared 
characteristics that positively affects their team cohesion and performance 
(Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). By quantitatively reviewing earlier work in the 
literature on this specific topic, Horwitz and Horwitz (2007) found support for 
their hypothesis that task-related diversity of team members was positively related 
to team performance, while bio-demographic diversity did not seem have any 
significant effects on team performance outcomes. Their findings are important 
because they imply that authors must specify which type of diversity they are 
referring to when researching the relationship between team member diversity and 
innovative performance. 
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When investigating how diversity possibly affects innovation outcomes, the 
positive effect of having diverse professional backgrounds for innovation has been 
emphasized by W. M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990). Notably, possessing 
exceptional problem-solving skills is good for innovation, and if good problem-
solving is what one seeks to achieve, W. M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) state that 
absorptive capacity and the problem-solving skills of the individuals within a 
group will increase if the individuals have different educational backgrounds, as 
this affects the knowledge structures of the individuals. Further, we have 
presented creativity as important for innovativeness, and T. M. Amabile et al. 
(1996) emphasize that team member diversity combined with mutual openness to 
ideas will ultimately expose members of the group to new ideas, thereby affecting 
creative thinking positively. This view is shared by Kanter (1988) who argues that 
diversity and breadth of experience facilitates the generation of new ideas and 
brings new perspectives to the table, thereby stimulating creativity. 
Evidently, diversity within a group or organization is beneficial to the 
innovativeness of the culture, but is diversity always good? Which challenges does 
diversity bring about?  Though emphasizing the importance of having diverse 
educational backgrounds, W. M. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) also state: 
Assuming a sufficient level of knowledge overlap to ensure effective 
communication, interactions across individuals who each possess diverse 
and different knowledge structures will augment the organization’s 
capacity for making novel linkages and associations - innovating - beyond 
what any one individual can achieve (p. 133). 
Thus, one could argue that although innovation may benefit from professional 
diversity, some degree of knowledge overlap is needed, as this ultimately will 
affect the communication within a group or organization. Moreover, Kanter 
(1988) emphasizes that though diversity in an organization gives an individual 
more discovery, member diversity also can make it difficult to later agree on 
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which innovation projects to implement on a larger scale. Horwitz and Horwitz 
(2007) further explain that if a person is more knowledgeable in an area, good 
communication and exchange of knowledge can be negatively affected by using 
specialized language when discussing an issue or opportunity, thereby illustrating 
the possible hinder diversity can be to effective communication. 
We see that there are conflicting views in the literature of whether diversity has 
positive or negative effects on team outcomes, and thus on innovation. As a last 
point to this, diversity might also be thought of as covering the aspect of 
hierarchical position within the company. Evidently, mutual respect for one 
another in an organization despite diverse demographical background and formal 
position is essential for a good organizational climate. Mutual respect across 
hierarchical boundaries is important for participation among employees, and 
employee participation is claimed to both enhance learning, reduce resistance to 
organizational change and increase the ability to continuously improve processes 
within an organization (Klev & Levin, 2012). We therefore see respect for 
diversity as a very important element of the innovation culture, linked to 
organizational climate, learning, change, and well-performing teamwork. The 
latter is the next topic we address. 
Teamwork 
Well-functioning teams are seen as an important element for innovation, partly 
because, as already mentioned, innovation projects are usually carried out in teams 
(D. J. Kelley et al., 2011). Teamwork can stimulate creative project outcomes and 
innovation (Kanter, 1988), and, as we will further discuss later, some systems for 
new product innovation efforts actually require a project team approach as an 
organizational structure to organize successfully for the new product projects 
(Cooper, 1990). With this in mind, the reason for why Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
include working “well together in teams to capture opportunities” (p. 34) as an 
element of an innovative culture should be evident. However, what kinds of teams 
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are most effective for innovation? What characterizes a well-performing 
innovative team? 
Cross-functional teams are often mentioned in the literature as enhancing the 
innovativeness of teams, and Kanter (1988) argues that innovation in general is 
increased by encouraging structural integration across fields in an organization. 
The importance of having established cross-functional teams was emphasized by 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1995), who, after analyzing the new product 
development successes in 135 companies in north America and Europe, concluded 
that one of the company-level  drivers for achieving desired results were 
utilization of cross-functional teams in the product development process. Their 
findings could be seen in comparison to our previous discussion of diversity in 
teams, emphasizing the likely importance professional backgrounds can have on 
team outcomes. Further, continuing on what characterizes a well-performing team 
for innovation, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1995) identified that having a dedicated 
leader, frequent communications and having developed effective methods for 
making decisions was beneficial for innovation. 
However, based on what we have presented of literature so far, it should be 
obvious that having a dedicated leader or effective methods for decision-making 
is alone not enough to ensure good teamwork for innovation. Teamwork involves 
social and psychological processes ultimately affecting a team’s ability to 
innovate. As Baer and Frese (2003) state: “Successful cooperation requires the 
existence of a climate in which employees feel safe in displaying proactive 
behavior in a social context, or a climate of psychological safety” (p. 
47).  Edmondson (2004) supports this view of focusing on establishing the right 
climate within a team by claiming that the level of psychological safety in a team 
is likely to affect the way members interact with each other. The team climate is 
therefore argued to greatly affect the overall performance of a team. If innovation 
is one of the criteria by which performance is judged, climate may also affect 
innovation. However, teams in different organizations have different scopes for 
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innovation, and would not this affect the degree to which team climate actually 
affects team innovation? 
Bain, Mann, and Pirola-Merlo (2001) found evidence supporting their hypothesis 
that one needs to distinguish between various types of teams when investigating 
the relationship between team climate and team innovation. They investigated the 
relationship between team climate with team innovation and team performance of 
38 teams in two different types of organizations: one research organization and 
one development organization. According to them, the distinction between 
research teams and development teams corresponds to teams on the one side, 
which create new knowledge, and teams one the other side, which develop useful 
products and processes. It was not surprising to Bain et al. (2001) when they  found 
a stronger pattern of relationships between team climate factors and indicators of 
team innovation in research teams than in the development teams. This could be 
explained by the kind of work performed by research teams, which involved a 
higher degree of uncertainty and creativity (Bain et al., 2001). We have seen that 
good collaboration requires a diverse, but coherent community in order to make 
teamwork effective. However, teams will not be able to collaborate effectively 
unless there is a safe work climate, which is the next factor we describe. 
2.11.2 Safety 
Safety is the second factor of the climate building block, and consists of three 
distinct elements: trust, integrity and openness. The level of trust is characterized 
as the members in the organization  “actually doing the things we say we value” 
(Rao & Weintraub, 2013, p. 34). Integrity is linked to the question of reacting 
when actions are inconsistent with organizational values, while openness 
describes whether organizational members freely voice their opinions and  dare to 
present unusual, new ideas (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). 
As noted, innovation is a high-risk endeavor, often requiring employees to 
challenge themselves and respond quickly to incidents under ambiguous 
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conditions. Many technologically driven implementation attempts fail, and one 
reason is suggested to be that leaders neglect the development of organizational 
climates in which the participating people in a change process should feel safe in 
taking interpersonal risks, discuss problems openly, approach work proactively, 
and are encouraged to propose new ideas (Baer & Frese, 2003). The importance 
of having a safe environment where people are not afraid to admit mistakes in 
order to learn from failure, be creative, and feeling comfortable with taking 
initiatives will be elaborated on in this factor. 
Trust 
McEvily et al. (2003) define trust as a “willingness to accept vulnerability based 
on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviors” (p. 92). McEvily 
et al. (2003) understand ‘trust’ as an expectation about others intentions or 
behaviors, and therefore separate the term into a distinction between “actual 
versus perceived intentions, motives, and competencies of a trustee …” (p. 93). 
Further, McEvily et al. (2003) claim that as trust simplifies both the acquisition 
and the interpretation of information, it also makes decision making more 
efficient. They also claim that trust generates benefits for organizations and their 
members through direct effects or through enabling effects. The former points to 
direct effects that trust has on organizational phenomena, such as: communication, 
conflict management, a negotiation, and company performance. With enabling 
effects, trust creates or enhances the conditions that are beneficial to obtaining 
organizational outcomes, such as cooperation and better performance. 
There are two main causal pathways in which trust influence organizing: 
structuring and mobilizing (McEvily et al., 2003). Structuring is understood as the 
development, maintenance, and modification of a system, which consists of 
relative positions and links between people in a social space. Resulting from 
structuring is a network of ongoing and stable patterns of interaction, both formal, 
like routines, and informal, like cliques (McEvily et al., 2003). Viewing trust from 
a structural perspective, McEvily et al. (2003) claim that “trust shapes the 
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relatively stable and enduring interaction patterns in and between organizations” 
(p. 93). Mobilizing, on the other hand, is understood as “the process of converting 
resources into finalized activities performed by interdependent actors” (p. 97). It 
involves motivating people to share their resources, and to combine, coordinate, 
and use them in joint activities. Also, these resources should be directed towards 
achieving organizational goals (McEvily et al., 2003). Thus, from this perspective 
trust motivates people “to contribute, combine, and coordinate resources toward 
collective endeavors” (pp. 93-94). Moreover, it can generate efficiencies, as trust 
conserves cognitive resources, lowers transaction costs, and simplify decision-
making. If there is uncertainty about other people’s intentions, motives, and 
competencies, it is also difficult to rely on these people. Organizational members 
actively review their counterparts in order to see if their level of trust can be 
maintained or increased, and according to McEvily et al. (2003), “it is this fragility 
of trust that lends it its heuristic quality, rather than being something that can be 
decided with precision, once and for all” (p. 99). 
Integrity 
Organizational members with personal integrity can be one of the antecedents of 
a safe work environment. Psychological safety can be important in order to 
maintain a behavioral integrity, which ensures that people can actually do what 
they deem important in a consistent manner, whether it is displaying controversial 
beliefs or actually following safety procedures. Edmondson and Lei (2014) 
discuss a research undertaken by Leroy and colleagues (2012) on leaders 
“enforcing safety protocols while encouraging employee error reporting” (p. 35), 
where “... a team priority of safety and team psychological safety both mediated 
the relationship between reported treatment errors and leader behavioral integrity 
related to safety” (as cited in Edmondson & Lei, 2014, p. 35).  Further, according 
to Jassawalla and Sashittal (2002), “... effective leaders foster a social 
environment of integrity and trust in which participants feel comfortable seeking 
clarifications, testing their understanding, proposing risky ideas, offering 
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dissenting opinions, and making themselves vulnerable to feedback from others” 
(p. 51). 
Openness 
Voicing opinions and contributing with unconventional ideas is suggested to 
positively contribute to an innovative culture (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). As noted, 
Edmondson (2004) emphasizes that by modeling openness and fallibility, leaders 
can improve the atmosphere of psychological safety in the workplace. This 
implies that if leaders model behaviors in which certain matters are better left 
unspoken, employees will follow this example. Overall, if a leader is coaching-
oriented and invites for questions and feedback, there is a great chance that the 
team members will feel safe in their workplace. 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) emphasize that the value of their survey increases as 
the number of respondents increase, and in particular, when the respondents come 
from different hierarchical corporate levels. Employees on all hierarchical levels 
might be carrying new, controversial ideas, and these ideas should be heard. As 
already mentioned, members in an organization have different skills,  knowledge, 
and access to information, which ultimately affects their views on which changes 
an organization should make or opportunities the organization should pursue 
(Klev & Levin, 2012). Encouraging employees to voice their opinions on 
organizational matters and actively participate in a safe environment should thus 
be seen as an important focus for management. 
Jassawalla and Sashittal (2002) highlight the fact that having organizational 
members who show willingness to make themselves vulnerable to feedback from 
others is essential in an innovative culture. Negative feedback also includes the 
possible termination of an innovation project, which an employee might find 
demotivating, or perhaps even embarrassing. However, as Daly et al. (2012) state: 
“Decision-makers’ perceived accessibility and openness, according to informants, 
makes termination decisions more palatable to innovators” (p. 22), implying that 
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a decision-maker’s perceived openness might enhance the tolerability of having a 
project killed. Finally, considering the competence trap introduced by Levinthal 
and March (1993), one could argue that the more an organization becomes 
specialized within a niche, the more important the need for new, unconventional 
ideas and an open environment might become. As this concludes the safety factor, 
we now move on to the last factor under climate: simplicity. 
2.11.3 Simplicity 
The last factor of the climate building block is simplicity, which is broken down 
into the three distinct elements: no bureaucracy, accountability and decision-
making. The first of these elements, no bureaucracy, refers to procedures, rules, 
and rigidity within an organization. Rao and Weintraub (2013) imply in their 
framework that a minimization of rules, policies, and rigidity simplifies the 
workplace. An interesting question to ask in relation to innovation and 
bureaucracy is whether bureaucracy merely acts as a limitation for innovation. 
What are the consequences, if any, for a company’s innovation efforts if there is 
not enough bureaucracy? The second element, accountability, addresses the issue 
of people in an organization not taking responsibility for their own actions, and 
blames others instead. As we have already emphasized, innovation is not a 
straightforward process, and many innovation projects become failures (e.g. 
Cooper, 1990). In order to learn from failures and secure future successful 
teamwork, admitting mistakes and avoiding blaming others is essential. The 
importance of the third element, decision-making, have been touched upon earlier 
as it relates to the question of who has the necessary authority to make decisions 
in innovation projects in an organization, as well as it relates to the ease of moving 
initiatives forward. Rao and Weintraub (2013) suggest that having a well-known 
“route” for initiatives in an organization positively affects the innovation culture. 
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No bureaucracy 
One strategic tension for managers lies between knowing when to exert control 
over the development of the organization and when to let go (de Wit & Meyer, 
2010). According to de Wit and Meyer (2010), the strategic paradox arises from 
the need of both having a demand for top management control, as well as having 
a demand for what they refer to as organizational chaos. 
Control is defined as “the power to direct and impose order” (de Wit & Meyer, 
2010, p. 486), and proponents of tight top management control has a view that it 
is top management’s responsibility to ensure that the organization always is 
aligned with the environment (de Wit & Meyer, 2010). de Wit and Meyer (2010) 
further define chaos as “disorder or the lack of fixed organization”(p. 486), and 
explain that the demand for organizational chaos is often desirable as 
experimentation, skunk works, pilot projects and new initiatives could eventually 
pay off in terms of organizational innovations. This perspective also argues that 
having too much management control can potentially end up destroying an 
organization’s ability to learn and innovate (de Wit & Meyer, 2010). With these 
two conflicting views, how should leaders arrange for innovation? 
Kanter (1988) claims that flexibility and little rigidity within an organization is 
one of the requirements for successful idea realization. She emphasizes that as 
many innovation efforts encounter unforeseen obstacles, re-planning and 
redirection is often necessary. Evidently, this uncertainty and ambiguity in the 
development process calls for a need for greater flexibility in innovation projects. 
Further, earlier we emphasized the important role trust plays for the innovative 
capabilities of an organization, and adopting bureaucratic procedures and control 
has been argued to stand in the way of efforts to achieve congruence of values, 
which is a foundation of trust (McEvily et al., 2003). Moreover, proponents for 
the organizational chaos and flexibility perspective argue that as innovation and 
learning in an organization is largely initiated by the organization’s members, 
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giving them a certain amount of freedom is essential for learning and innovation 
to be properly integrated in the organization (de Wit & Meyer, 2010). 
However, then there is the question: can there be too much freedom? If so, what 
are the potential hazards of having too little bureaucracy for innovation efforts in 
the organization? de Wit and Meyer (2010) highlight the fact that a lack of existing 
structures, processes and routines could end up making people in the organization 
uncomfortable. This view is shared by McEvily et al. (2003), who claim that 
adopting bureaucratic procedures and control does create a sense of reliability in 
an organization. Further, as innovation projects often are characterized by cost 
overruns and missed deadlines (Daly et al., 2012). Although pursuing 
opportunities as they reveal themselves is an important aspect, an issue to consider 
is the possibility of draining the organization for valuable resources if projects are 
allowed to continue to prosper without being killed. Clearly, well-understood 
rules and procedures could play an important role preventing this. 
Evidently, when trying to innovate successfully, there is no recipe for what level 
of bureaucracy in an organization is most appropriate. Poor innovation projects 
should not be left to themselves and drain the organization for valuable resources 
(Daly et al., 2012). However, opportunities need to be pursued in time, employees 
must be motivated to participate (Klev & Levin, 2012), and managers should 
design the organization flexible enough in order to provoke creativity and new 
ways of doing things (Kanter, 1988). 
One possible solution is to separate units. O'Reilly and Tushman (2004) found that 
firms that had been successful at both exploiting the present business 
opportunities, and, at the same time innovating for the future, in fact had separated 
their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones. As 
exploitation and exploration calls for different strategies, structures, processes, 
and cultures, this arrangement allowed both innovation-types to exist within the 
same organization at the same time. The exploitative businesses had a strategic 
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focus on cost and profit, a culture for efficiency and low risk, and a formal and 
mechanistic organizational structure to achieve their goals. The explorative 
businesses, on the other hand, had a strategic focus on innovation and growth, a 
culture for speed, flexibility, and risk-taking, and a loose and adaptive 
organizational structure as a backbone. The findings of O'Reilly and Tushman 
(2004) do imply that an ambidextrous organizational design allowing for two 
different cultures, two different levels of bureaucracy, and two different guidelines 
for  leadership roles can be argued as being an effective solution in arranging for 
innovation. 
Accountability 
Accountability is by Rao and Weintraub (2013) understood as the degree to which 
the employees take responsibility for their actions and avoid blaming others. It 
might seem trivial at first; of course, one should avoid blaming others for your 
own mistakes. However, why is this particularly important for the innovation 
culture? Firstly, there is a connection between accountability and learning from 
failure. Organizations learn from failure through three activities: detection, 
analysis, and experimentation (Edmondson, 2011). Obviously, in order to analyze 
failures, they must first be detected. As small mistakes are often hidden when 
possible (Edmondson, 2011), analyzing them, and thus learning from them, will 
ultimately be impossible. Admitting failures, even small ones, and taking 
responsibility for them thus increases the organization’s ability to learn from 
failure. 
Secondly, as innovation requires resources, admitting failures and taking 
responsibility for poor results might end up saving large amounts of capital for the 
company. This is either done by surfacing failures in innovation projects early, so 
that mistakes can be addressed before expanding into expensive disasters 
(Edmondson, 2011), or projects can be stopped at an early stage, thereby freeing 
resources for other potentially successful innovation projects (Daly et al., 2012). 
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Accountability can therefore be seen as contributing to overall company success, 
saving valuable resources from being wasted. 
Thirdly, trust among employees can be negatively affected if members blame each 
other for their own mistakes. If a leader wants employees to take responsibility 
for their own mistakes, and develop consistent and early reporting behaviors - as 
he or she should – it is a natural prerequisite that the mindset is attuned to solving 
the problem, as opposed to wasting energy on the less productive ‘blame game’ 
(Edmondson, 2011). Thus, the trust among employees is something that develops 
over time, and requires a consistency in how leaders handle mistakes so that there 
is a consistency to the perceived consequences of being accountable. 
Evidently, taking responsibility for your own actions is beneficial for the work 
climate. However, admitting failures leads to a potential analysis of your mistake, 
and analyzing mistakes is emotionally unpleasant for the particular person 
admitting it (Edmondson, 2011). Thus, taking responsible for your actions 
requires an environment where it is safe to do so, and management can play an 
important role in establishing such a climate where accountability plays a key role. 
Firstly, as emphasized, employees notice the everyday behavior of middle-
leaders, putting middle-leaders in a unique position to contribute positively to 
desirable behaviors of accountability by admitting their own mistakes. Further, 
senior management can also contribute to such a climate by being formally held 
accountable for particular company results. As an example, this can be done by 
linking senior management compensation (bonuses) to innovation performance 
(such as hit rate for new product development) of the company (Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995). Establishing such criteria formally communicates that top 
management are also held accountable for their areas of responsibility. 
Decision-making 
Actually knowing how to get started, and how to move initiatives for innovation 
through an organization, is proposed by Rao and Weintraub (2013) to increase the 
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simplicity of innovating. Several studies on new product development address the 
process of moving innovation initiatives through the organization (Brun et al., 
2009; Cooper, 1990; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995). Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
(1995) argue that the quality of execution of the activities associated with a new 
product process has a major impact on project outcome. After having investigated 
new product development successes on company levels, Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
(1995) claim that focusing on predevelopment activities and having well-
established procedures for formal new product processes is important to 
successfully innovate. Based on their findings after having studied the success of 
new product development in 135 firms across Europe and North America, they 
subsequently ranked having a high-quality new-product process as the most 
important performance driver. Handling decisions quickly and efficiently were 
thereby proven in their study to have a positive effect on new product development 
activities. 
Using stage-gate systems is one way to guide and monitor your innovation 
process. These systems are both conceptual and operational models for 
successfully moving an idea to launch.  According to Cooper (1990), by following 
such an approach employees will always know what needs to be done at a given 
stage, as explicit information about goals to each stage is given and openly 
communicated. Senior people act as the gate-keepers, and decide which projects 
are allowed to enter the next stage in the innovation process. Cooper (1990) states 
that this is important, as it ensures top management’s involvement and 
commitment to innovation efforts. However, though providing efficient processes 
for decision-making, such systems have been argued to have limitations. 
Returning to the question of bureaucracy, stage-gate systems are rules-bound, thus 
increasing rigidity in the innovation efforts. Authors have therefore argued that 
stage-gate systems, though informative of the innovation process for employees, 
are unsuitable for pursuing radical innovation projects. Brun et al. (2009) address 
this issue and highlight the downsides such systems bring about to the early stages 
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in new product development projects. These stages in radical innovation projects 
are often characterized by considerable uncertainty and ambiguity, and Brun et al. 
(2009) claim that potential break-through innovation projects might be cut-off too 
early or risk missing the window of opportunity as state-gate systems are not 
properly designed to cope with ambiguity. Thus, well-established systems for 
innovation projects can, on the one side, contribute to simplicity and efficient 
decision-making, but on the other side, also lead to increased bureaucracy, from 
which radical innovation suffers.  
Whether or not stage-gate systems is the right way of organizing for innovation in 
an organization, one could argue that systems for innovation processes do at least 
provide a transparent roadmap for innovation projects to teams and individuals. 
Further, as the criteria for evaluation are set in advance, leaders in an organization 
ensure objectivity in the potential termination-stage, and one could further argue 
that this is beneficial to the innovation culture, as idea generators would “know” 
that they have been judged and treated the same way as others.  
This part of the paper has described climates for innovation, which we 
systematized according to Rao & Weintraub’s (2013) framework. The next 
section gives a brief summary, and draws lines to ambidexterity. 
2.11.4 Summing Up 
Climate is essential for innovation. Establishing teams that collaborate effectively 
on innovation projects is not an easy task without focusing on work climate, as 
people, according to literature we have presented, engage more in desired 
innovative behaviors when they perceive the work climate to be safe. The 
interpersonal climate between employees is central, and leaders should focus 
efforts on how people perceive this in the organization.  
Diversity among employees is beneficial in an organization, as there is a need for 
diverse competences and opinions. However, one must be aware of how too much 
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diversity may affect teamwork and climate negatively. Further, a climate 
perceived by employees as open and with a high level of trust increases the 
perceived psychological safety, which is important for well-functioning teamwork 
and company innovativeness. 
From an ambidexterity perspective, we have seen that ambidextrous organizations 
are able to have different cultures and climates inside their organization, allowing 
companies to utilize the different attributes required for exploration and 
exploitation. 
This concludes the literature review of ambidexterity and six building blocks for 
an innovative company culture (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). The next chapter of our 
master’s thesis is our working hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
  Working Hypotheses 
In this part of the paper, we use the theoretical background to derive working 
hypotheses (WH) for further investigation. According to Whitney and Smith 
(1904), a working hypothesis is: 
A hypothesis suggested or supported in some measure by features of 
observed facts, from which consequences may be deduced which can be 
tested by experiment and special observations, and which it is proposed 
to subject to an extended course of such investigation, with the hope that, 
even should the hypothesis thus be overthrown, such research may lead to 
a tenable theory (p. 616). 
We will present 7 WH’s, where the overall goal is to investigate relationships 
between the different constructs in the Rao and Weintraub (2013) innovation 
quotient assessment tool, and ambidexterity (He & Wong, 2004). While we 
suggest relationships between an innovative company culture and ambidexterity, 
we do not suggest causality on any WH’s. The reason is simply that our 
questionnaire does not allow us to claim cause and effect, which we elaborate 
more on in the discussion-chapter. However, it is plausible that a causal 
mechanism, if it exists, is one where the company culture is affecting the 
company’s ambidexterity (Lin & McDonough Iii, 2011; Wang & Rafiq, 2014). 
Before reading this WH-chapter, we believe it is helpful with a reminder of our 
research question for this master’s thesis: 
What are the differences in innovative cultures between ambidextrous 
organizations and non-ambidextrous organizations? 
To quickly recap the theory, we have presented the concept of ambidexterity, and 
the six building blocks of an innovative culture from the framework of Rao and 
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Weintraub (2013). Further, there are empirical evidences that ambidextrous 
companies tend to outperform non-ambidextrous companies (Birkinshaw & 
Gibson, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Sarkees & Hulland, 
2009; M. Tushman et al., 2010), and that a company with a culture for innovation 
is likely to outperform other companies in a long-term perspective (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013). We already know from the theory chapter that certain 
organizational cultures can foster ambidexterity (Lin & McDonough Iii, 2011; 
Wang & Rafiq, 2014). Thus, our aim is to assess how the different aspects of an 
innovative company culture relate to ambidexterity. To achieve this, we will do 
numerous tests on innovation culture in relation to ambidexterity. 
Innovation is important for long-term survival (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
Further, there is a need for balancing incremental innovation to ensure current 
viability, and radical innovation to ensure future viability (Levinthal & March, 
1993). While companies that are not supportive of innovation might financially 
outperform others on short-term, these advantages run the risk of fading away by 
newer and better products and services from competitors that do focus on the long-
term. Thus, substituting exploration with exploitation can only yield advantages 
in the nearby future, and risk turning an organization obsolete in the long-term. 
As the Rao and Weintraub (2013) framework only measures the innovative culture 
– and not innovation performance – this only tells whether an organization’s 
culture is supportive of innovation. However, the theory implies that it is likely 
that an innovative company culture makes a company more viable in long-run, as 
innovation is considered to be the engine of growth (Trott, 2012). While an 
innovative company culture does not necessarily promise high innovation 
performance, a company that has no culture for innovation is more or less 
guaranteed not to perform well in terms of innovation. 
The theory thus predicts that an innovative company culture – identified by a high 
overall score on the innovation quotient assessment – will lead to better long-term 
performance for a company relative to its competitors. As ambidextrous 
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organizations tend to outperform their competitors (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004), 
we propose that ambidextrous companies will score higher on the innovation 
quotient assessment than other companies. 
WH 1: The overall innovation quotient and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated.  
In the remainder of the WH-chapter, we suggest relationships between 
ambidexterity and the different building blocks. These parts are separated 
according to each building block, and the paragraphs describe how we believe the 
different factors are related to ambidexterity. We do not suggest relationships 
between elements and ambidexterity, however, as this would impose issues to 
validity (Pallant, 2010). As in the theory-chapter, we present the building blocks 
with the hard determinants first, followed by the soft determinants. Thus, in the 
next section, we discuss resources. 
3.1 Resources 
 
Figure 8 - Resources for innovation. 
We previously described resources as a bundle of tangible and intangible assets, 
and these can be essential in generating a value-creating strategy. We stated that 
some resources ultimately enable the firm to perform better and more efficient 
than its competitors, which is a source to competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
We also know – from the ambidexterity chapter – that ambidextrous companies 
has a competitive advantage over non-ambidextrous organizations. Hence, 
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ambidextrous organizations may possess resources that enable them to perform 
better than their competitors. Otherwise, it is possible that ambidextrous 
organizations have a competitive advantage simply by combining their tangible 
and intangible assets better than competitors do (J. F. Christensen, 1995; 
Hadjimanolis, 2000). Either way, it is likely that the resources – represented by 
score on the resource building block in the innovation quotient assessment – of 
ambidextrous companies are better administered compared to competing 
organizations. 
WH 2: The score on the resources building block and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
People is considered the most critical resource of an organization, as “… they 
have a powerful impact on the organization’s values and climate” (Rao & 
Weintraub, 2013, p. 30). The theory-chapter explained that exploitation has a 
tendency to take precedence over exploration (Levinthal & March, 1993). To 
address this, people have the ability to reduce organizational and physical barriers, 
which allows an organization to succeed with simultaneously exploring and 
exploiting. We therefore believe that the right people – while important for any 
organization – is a critical prerequisite for any ambidextrous organization. Hence, 
we suggest that the people-factor of resources is stronger for ambidextrous 
organizations than it is for non-ambidextrous organizations. 
WH 2 a): The people-factor of resources and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
The systems of an organization gives support to innovation initiatives. As became 
evident in the theory chapter, innovation is an uncertain process, and the more 
radical an innovation becomes, the more ambiguity is present. Hence, 
organizations need systems to organize and manage innovation, and these systems 
should be supportive of both exploring activities as well as exploiting activities. 
Of the elements that systems comprises, communication is of particular 
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importance for ambidextrous organizations. When units or people are working 
with radical innovations – exploring – while others are working on minor 
improvements – exploiting – it is important with good communication and 
coordination in order to achieve synergies between the two (Gilbert et al., 2012; 
Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010). Hence, we believe that systems do relate 
positively to ambidexterity. 
WH 2 b): The systems-factor of resources and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
Many innovations are the result of a project. In Rao and Weintraub’s (2013) 
framework, projects consists of giving an innovation enough time, money, and 
space. Thus, projects are about providing tangible assets to facilitate for a 
successful innovation. Any project needs time, money, and space to be successful, 
regardless of the company being ambidextrous or not. As we saw in the theory, 
however, intangible assets are more important for innovation than tangible assets 
are. The theory therefore implies that people and systems are resources that are 
more important for an ambidextrous organization. Hence, projects is an important 
factor for all organizations, but it should not be of greater importance for an 
ambidextrous organization, relative to one that is not. 
WH 2 c): The projects-factor of resources and ambidexterity are not 
correlated. 
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3.2 Processes 
 
Figure 9 - Processes for innovation. 
Whether one attempts to improve an existing offering or introduce something that 
is new to the world, an organization must have processes that enables an 
innovation to flourish (e.g. Cooper, 1990). Further, viewing processes as a value 
chain reveals that any process is only as strong as its weakest link (M. T. Hansen 
& Birkinshaw, 2007), which implies that each stage in a process is of great 
importance. In the theory chapter, we described a separation between processes 
for incremental and radical innovation. For instance, while stage-gate systems 
work well with incremental improvements, they are less suitable for radical 
innovation. We therefore believe that ambidextrous organizations understand that 
different types of innovations require different types of processes, and that they 
create processes in accordance to this need. We cannot rule out that non-
ambidextrous companies also have great processes that vary according to the type 
of innovation. We know from the theory chapter, however, that ambidextrous 
companies are better at simultaneously developing incremental and radical 
innovations (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). What this implies, then, is that 
ambidextrous organizations in overall should develop incremental and radical 
innovations of higher quality relative to competing firms. According to Du Preez 
and Louw (2008), the quality of a given innovation depends on the quality of the 
process used to develop and implement the innovation. Hence, it is likely that 
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ambidextrous organizations do have processes of high quality that helps them 
achieve high innovation performance. 
WH 3: The score on the processes building block and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
Ideation and innovation performance are very much dependent on each other, as 
successful innovation is possible only when an organization is generating the right 
ideas. This implies generating many ideas, in which the organization moves on 
with the good ideas, and terminates the bad ones. As we saw in the theory-chapter, 
ideas can originate from a vast set of sources (M. T. Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). 
With incremental innovation, in which there is less uncertainty (with more 
information, there is a larger need for understanding of context) and more often 
problems that are industry specific, both ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous 
firms tend to rely more on internal information sources (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). 
As radical innovation is characterized by discontinuity in technology and the 
market (Garcia & Calantone, 2002), organizations might benefit more from a 
broad range of expertise, such as with open innovation (e.g. H. W. Chesbrough, 
2003). We believe that by separating exploring and exploiting activities, like 
ambidextrous organizations do, the ones that work with exploring activities are 
more open to external sources of information. Hence, ambidextrous organizations 
ought to be better at generating ideas from a more varied range of sources, which 
should lead to better innovation performance in a long-term perspective. 
Moreover, in the theory-chapter, we described that filtering of ideas should vary 
according to type of innovation (Nagji & Tuff, 2012). If all ideas are assessed 
according to the same criteria, the organization is likely to be biased towards 
incremental or radical innovations, since these filtering criteria must favor one 
innovation type over the other. The same goes for the innovation process, in which 
linear processes fit incremental innovations better, while dynamic processes are 
more suited for radical innovations (Brun et al., 2009). Thus, organizations that 
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adapt processes and filter their ideas according to type of innovation are more 
likely to select the right ideas, and with a better balance of explore and exploit. 
WH 3 a): The ideate-factor of processes and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
Unless companies shape ideas, they will not go anywhere. As we saw in the 
theory, shaping of ideas begins once selected during the ideation phase. Similar to 
our findings from ideate, different innovation types have different requirements 
to their shaping from idea into offering. Hence, it is likely that ambidextrous 
organizations have more control regarding the process of shaping an idea into a 
product, regardless of the idea’s radicalness. 
WH 3 b): The shape-factor of processes and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
In order to unleash the inherent benefits of an innovation, organizations need to 
be able to capture it. As seen in the theory-part, innovation processes often lack 
the flexibility required to succeed. We stated in the theory, however, that 
ambidextrous organizations do in fact have the necessary flexibility to succeed 
with both incremental and radical innovation (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). This 
leads us to believe that ambidextrous companies’ advantage in flexibility makes 
them better at capturing their innovations’ true potential for success. In addition 
to the flexibility-advantages for ambidextrous organizations, much of the 
previously used logic goes for capture: because ambidextrous organizations use 
different processes for incremental and radical innovations, they should be better 
equipped to capture them, both in launching and scaling radical and incremental 
innovations. 
WH 3 c): The capture-factor of processes and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
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3.3 Success 
 
Figure 10 - Success for innovation. 
 Success is the one building block in which its name is not obvious or clear in 
meaning. Looking at the factors in the framework, success is how innovative 
external stakeholders view the firm to be, how innovative the firm views itself to 
be, and how innovative individuals working in the firm consider the firm to be. 
As with every question in the innovation quotient assessment tool, external, 
enterprise, and individual success are all self-reported perceptions by the 
employees in the firm. In the theory-chapter, we questioned whether success is 
good for innovation. For instance, we stated that industry leaders rarely introduce 
radical innovations (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000), and that distinct 
capabilities that develop over time reduces an organization’s ability to learn new 
things (Levinthal & March, 1993). However, Rao and Weintraub (2013) argue 
that success reinforces an organization’s values, behaviors, and processes. 
Moreover, we stated in the theory that ambidextrous organizations tend to 
outperform non-ambidextrous organizations (e.g. O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004), 
which makes it likely that ambidextrous organizations consider themselves to be 
successful. 
WH 4: The score on the success building block and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
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A truly innovative organization is likely to be acknowledged for its’ 
innovativeness by external stakeholders. As we have seen in the theory-part, 
ambidextrous organizations perform – measured by sales growth – considerably 
better than non-ambidextrous organizations (Fuertes-Callén & Cuéllar-Fernández, 
2014). Hence, there is a reason to believe that sales growth will reflect a better 
financial performance compared to organizations that are not ambidextrous. The 
external perception among customers and competitors, however, might not reflect 
how innovative a company really is. Thus, the external perception could be just as 
high for non-ambidextrous organizations compared to ambidextrous 
organizations. Overall, we therefore propose the following: 
WH 4 a): The external-factor of success and ambidexterity are not 
correlated. 
Innovation is an important area of focus in all ambitious enterprises. From the 
theory, it is clear that to succeed in innovation there needs to be an alignment 
between overall strategy and innovation. The problem, however, is that 
incremental and radical innovations – that demands contradictory structures and 
cultures – creates a paradox: whether to treat innovation as a long-term strategy 
or a short-term fix (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). Most organizations choose the latter 
one; focusing mainly on incremental innovations. Ambidextrous organizations 
are, as derived in theory, experts at balancing the need for short-term fix through 
exploitation and long-term strategy by exploring new opportunities of future 
revenues. Thus, ambidextrous organizations would appear better than non-
ambidextrous organizations in understanding the purpose of innovation. Further, 
we saw in the theory-chapter that discipline favors incremental innovations and 
not necessarily radical innovations (Brun et al., 2009). Hence, there has to be some 
balance – or segregation – between discipline and chaos in order to achieve 
simultaneous exploiting and exploring. Since ambidextrous organizations has 
divided exploring and exploiting activities, it is reasonable to believe that they 
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also master balancing discipline and chaos better than non-ambidextrous 
organizations. 
WH 4 b): The enterprise-factor of success and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
The most important factor in a company is probably its individuals. As 
emphasized by reviewed theory, all employees in an organization contribute to the 
collective pool of knowledge (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 2000). Therefore, it is 
important to make sure that employees are motivated to enhance the size of the 
knowledge-pool. The most effective way to motivate employees is by targeting 
their intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999). One way to reduce the intrinsic 
motivation, however, is to divide the labor into those who innovate, and those who 
do not (Kanter, 2006). This would imply that dividing exploration and exploitation 
could reduce employees’ intrinsic motivation. Hence, those exploring might be 
motivated at the expense of those exploiting, making the overall motivation suffer. 
Structural ambidextrous organizations might therefore end up having less 
motivated employees than non-ambidextrous organizations. However, contextual 
ambidextrous organizations do not necessarily divide into those who innovate and 
those who do not, in which all or most employees work with both exploring and 
exploiting activities. For a contextual ambidextrous organization, then, overall 
motivation might be higher than for competing firms, which makes it possible that 
overall motivation for all ambidextrous organizations are relatively high. Thus, 
we propose that ambidextrous organizations will score higher than non-
ambidextrous organizations on individual success. 
WH 4 c): The individuals-factor of success and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
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3.4 Values 
 
Figure 11 - Values for innovation. 
We saw in the theory-chapter that innovation performance in part is dependent on 
values for initiative, creativity, and risk-taking (Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002). 
Moreover, we have stated several times that ambidextrous organizations perform 
better than others do. Both of these statements has improved innovation 
performance as the outcome, in which it becomes evident that ambidextrous 
organizations have a high regard for organizational values. Moreover, Rao and 
Weintraub (2013) claim that decisions and priorities are driven by values, and we 
stated that values can be observed by employee behavior and managers’ allocation 
of limited resources (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). With this in 
mind, we believe that the values of ambidextrous organizations have a 
considerable focus on innovation, especially regarding balancing exploration and 
exploitation. 
WH 5: The score on the values building block and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
Being entrepreneurial becomes increasingly more difficult as the size of an 
enterprise increases (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). For one, it is 
difficult for people working in large companies to be hungry for innovation. For 
people to stay hungry – assuming that newly hired people are both motivated and 
hungry to contribute – the organizational values must be a foundation for an 
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organizational desire to explore opportunities (Khazanchi et al., 2007). Moreover, 
the previously described success trap (Levinthal & March, 1993) is a challenge in 
staying hungry, one that ambidextrous organizations might be able to counteract 
by continuously attempting to explore new opportunities. Another issue regarding 
entrepreneurial behavior in organizations is the tolerance for ambiguity in 
projects. As argued by Sætre and Brun (2013), the shaping of opportunities starts 
with an embracing of ambiguity. Because ambidextrous companies separate 
exploring- and exploiting activities, they should be better at balancing creativity 
and constraint, and therefore better at embracing ambiguity. Thus, it is likely that 
ambidextrous companies exhibit more entrepreneurialism than those that are not 
ambidextrous.  
WH 5 a): The entrepreneurial-factor of values and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
Creative behavior among organizational members is one of the most important 
values in an innovation-supportive culture (Jassawalla & Sashittal, 2002). As we 
described in the theory, creativity should be combined with some form of 
constraint, where the innovation process is characterized by cycles of explorative 
and exploitative activities (Sætre & Brun, 2013). Hence, a successful company 
with a high regard for innovation tend to promote creative behavior when working 
with radical innovation, and more constraint when developing incremental 
improvements where more information is available. Because ambidextrous 
organizations separate their exploring activities from those that are exploitative, 
they have a better foundation for giving more autonomy to people working on 
radical ideas – promoting people to explore and make mistakes – while still 
employing rules for minor improvements and implementation of incremental 
innovations. Moreover, as Kanter (1988) explained, people’s imagination 
improves when interacting with others that see the world differently. In other 
words, it is important that groups be composed of people with different views and 
experience, such that combinations of ideas can emerge. After all, many novel 
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ideas are merely a new combination of things that already exists. Further, the level 
of autonomy to people and groups vary with task. The more radical a project is, 
the more the unit benefits from exploring and failing along the way. Conversely, 
incremental improvements tend to benefit from less autonomy and more rules, as 
the company already knows a lot about the problem and the possible solutions. In 
addressing the final element of creativity, playful, much of the same is relevant. 
Playful behavior promotes creativity, which is very important in radical 
innovation (Bogers & Sproedt, 2012). All of this culminates in ambidextrous 
organizations having an advantage because they separate explorative and 
exploitative activities, in which it is easier to promote a certain level of creativity, 
which varies according to task. This is not to say that others cannot promote 
creative behavior, only that ambidextrous companies can employ relatively rigid 
systems for everyday activities without limiting the creativity necessary for radical 
innovation. 
WH 5 b): The creativity-factor of values and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
When learning, units obtain knowledge that can be useful for the organization 
(Huber, 1991). It is evident that units should share this information with others, 
what Huber (1991) describes as breadth of learning. Moreover, tight coordination 
from the top is one of the characteristics of an ambidextrous organization (O'Reilly 
& Tushman, 2004), which implies large amounts of information-sharing. When 
top management coordinates units that explore and units that exploit, they must 
constantly communicate with different units, and therefore know what different 
units are working on. Hence, top management have an opportunity to promote 
information transfer between units. In the theory, we described temporal myopia 
as a hinder to learning (Levinthal & March, 1993). When the long run suffers for 
the short run, learning and the organization’s absorptive capacity decrease. An 
ambidextrous organization must have a constant focus on the long run, and their 
constant exploration ensures that the organization’s absorptive capacity is intact 
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or improved. Therefore, it is likely that all ambidextrous organizations have an 
ability to learn well. 
WH 5 c): The learning-factor of values and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
3.5 Behaviors 
 
Figure 12 - Behaviors for innovation. 
We previously stated that innovative behavior is about doing novel things 
intelligently in order to produce final outcomes (Edmondson, 2004). The theory 
implied that everyone is capable of displaying innovative behavior, but the leaders 
set an example of to behave. In this regard, people tend to mimic others’ behavior; 
particularly that subordinates behave in a way similar to their leaders. 
Ambidextrous organizations tend to promote innovative behavior from all 
employees, and tight coordination from the top help ensure that leaders in different 
units behave in ways that fit the unit’s tasks. As an example, someone assigned as 
leader to a radical project is likely to behave in a way that supports creativity, and 
therefore may accept ideas that seem far out at an early stage. Conversely, people 
leading incremental improvement-projects should behave differently. According 
to Bessant et al. (2001), building routines and working on exploitative activities 
are a result of extended learning processes. Learning behavior is therefore 
important for both exploring activities and for exploitative activities. It does not 
mean, however, that learning behavior is the same for both of those activities. 
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Hence, ambidextrous companies should have an advantage in promoting the right 
behaviors to the right task by separating explore and exploit.  
WH 6: The score on the behaviors building block and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
An important task for leaders is to energize employees. In the theory chapter, we 
stated that a leader’s expectation of a subordinate to be innovative correlates 
positively to that subordinate’s innovative behavior (Scott & Bruce, 1994). For an 
ambidextrous organization, where exploration is clearly separated from 
exploitation, it should be clear what is expected of employees. We note, however, 
that a non-ambidextrous organization that communicates well is just as good in 
terms of expectations. On a related matter, Kanter (1988) argues that there is a 
difference in whether the firm pushes “tradition” or “change”. While this is 
optional for most firms, units that explore must pursue “change”. Thus, some parts 
of an ambidextrous organization (those that explore in particular) must push 
“change”, while this is a choice for non-ambidextrous organizations. As a final 
note on behaviors that energize, Klein and Sorra (1996) argue that a climate for a 
specific outcome will affect employees behaviors regarding that outcome; 
ambidextrous companies’ climate for innovation should affect their employees 
innovative behavior. As we noted earlier, however, the advantage of an 
ambidextrous organization mainly lies in how they must have certain behaviors in 
place, whereas a non-ambidextrous firm should display the same behaviors. 
WH 6 a): The energize-factor of behaviors and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
All organizations want employees that engage themselves in their work. The 
theory does not reveal any particular reason for an ambidextrous organization to 
have more engaged employees, but it is possible, however, that it is easier to 
accomplish a climate for initiative in an ambidextrous organization. We described 
climates for initiative according to Baer and Frese (2003), which emphasize an 
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active approach to work. Further, such a climate, including switching between 
dual work roles (e.g. striving for continuous improvements and standardization), 
requires those complementing behaviors to be expected, valued, and frequently 
displayed. People in ambidextrous organizations often switch between 
incremental and radical projects, and success in this dual work role requires people 
to show initiative. Moreover, ambidextrous organizations are more likely to create 
breakthrough innovations (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). A radical project has no 
chance to live on unless someone shows some form of initiative. Initiative, as one 
of the elements of engage, is therefore a prerequisite to succeed with radical 
innovation. For people to stay motivated when they often switch roles, 
ambidextrous companies must promote behaviors that engage. We therefore 
believe that engaging behaviors should be related to ambidexterity. 
WH 6 b): The engage-factor of behaviors and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
The final type of behavior that is described in Rao and Weintraub’s (2013) 
framework is enable. As we described in the theory, enabling behavior is to give 
means or authority to someone else to do something. Hence, it is important for top 
management to be involved in the work done in the organization. For an 
ambidextrous organization, top management must be involved in order to ensure 
sufficient top-down coordination between units, which implies that top 
management contribute with their influence when necessary. Of particular interest 
to ambidexterity is adapting behavior. Central to this element is dynamic 
capabilities and ensuring a sufficient balance between exploration and 
exploitation. Dynamic capabilities, as we described it in the theory, is abilities that 
make a firm more agile and responsive to a changing environment (Schilling, 
2013). Being able to adapt to an environment that constantly changes requires 
constant exploration. Moreover, being able to afford constant exploration requires 
constant exploitation, as one can only survive in the long run by surviving each of 
the short runs along the way (Levinthal & March, 1993). Hence, companies that 
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are excellent at adapting to changing environments – those that have dynamic 
capabilities – are in some form also ambidextrous. Put differently, ambidextrous 
organizations are much better equipped to adapt to changes, as their constant 
exploration ensures dynamic capabilities. Moreover, an ambidextrous 
organization is an organizational form designed to adapt to changing 
environments. In short, we believe that ambidextrous organizations are excellent 
in displaying enabling behaviors. 
WH 6 c): The enable-factor of behaviors and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
3.6 Climate 
 
Figure 13 - Climate for innovation. 
A climate that nurture innovation is a key element for success in new product 
development (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995). As seen in the theory, however, the 
definition of climate is somewhat divided between viewing it as a shared 
perception or as a shared set of conditions (Baer & Frese, 2003). Irrespective of 
this, it is evident from our theory-chapter that climate is essential for innovation; 
it affects learning, engagement, independent thinking, and attitude towards risk 
(Rao & Weintraub, 2013). Independent thinking and attitude towards risk are 
especially important for radical innovations, as radical innovations demand for 
higher risk-taking (C. M. Christensen et al., 2008) combined with more 
experimentation and increased organizational flexibility (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 
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1999). Moreover, ambidextrous organizations have a climate supportive of radical 
innovations, which may counteract the issue of temporal myopia (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). Thus, in order to nurture the exploratory sides of innovation, 
ambidextrous organizations ought to have a climate that supports higher risk-
taking and independent thinking. 
WH 7: The score on the climate building block and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
A climate that fosters collaboration creates an arena where a diverse set of ideas 
come together (T. Brown, 2008; M. T. Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). From the 
theory-chapter, some types of diversity – such as task-related diversity (Horwitz 
& Horwitz, 2007) – positively affects climate and innovation in teams. However, 
the degree to which team climate actually affects team innovation differ based on 
what the team is set out to achieve (Bain et al., 2001). The authors found that tasks 
that are more exploratory correlate positively with team climate factors. Thus, as 
ambidextrous organizations are better at balancing exploring and exploiting, they 
should overall be better than non-ambidextrous organizations at stimulating team 
climate so that it produces a balance of exploratory and exploitive outputs. As well 
as getting individuals together, collaboration is dependent on having a community 
that speaks a common language about innovation (Rao & Weintraub, 2013). This 
is obtainable by letting employees know and understand the organization’s 
strategic intent (Schilling, 2013), such that they can act accordingly. Hence, 
exploring and exploiting activities ought to be a reflection of the organization’s 
strategic intent. Therefore, we argue that ambidextrous organizations have a 
strategic intent that has a higher demand for both exploratory and exploitative 
behavior, compared to non-ambidextrous companies. 
WH 7 a): The collaboration-factor of climate and ambidexterity are 
positively correlated. 
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Creating a safe climate is essential to stimulate a stream of new ideas. As stated 
earlier, innovation – and especially radical innovations – demands more risk-
taking, requiring employees to challenge themselves and quickly respond under 
ambiguous conditions. Thus, in order to succeed with innovation, it is important 
to create a climate where employees feel safe in taking interpersonal risks (Baer 
& Frese, 2003). Central to a safe climate is having an environment that is 
psychologically safe (e.g. Edmondson, 1999). In order to utilize the creativity and 
entrepreneurial spirit that lies in each employee – which is essential when 
developing radical innovations – people must feel that the environment in which 
they work is psychologically safe. Being able to create radical innovations – 
excelling at exploring activities – becomes possible when an organization is able 
to create a safe work-environment. Because ambidextrous organizations are able 
to explore well, they should be better at creating safe environments. 
WH 7 b): The safety-factor of climate and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
The final factor of climate is simplicity, which helps progress in a project. The 
first element – no bureaucracy – is of particular interest to ambidextrous 
organizations. In the theory-chapter, we described the issue of balancing control 
and chaos (de Wit & Meyer, 2010), where we implied that radical innovations 
favor more chaos, and incremental innovations benefit from more control. As they 
are conflicting views, it can be difficult to achieve control and chaos 
simultaneously within the same organization. Hence, as ambidextrous 
organizations have separated exploitative and exploratory activities, it should 
allow them to have both chaos and control at the same time. Another advantage 
this separation of explore and exploit brings, we believe, is that it simplifies the 
decision-making process in an organization. For instance – as we have mentioned 
on several occasions – a stage-gate system helps decision-making on incremental 
innovations, but is less fitting on radical innovations (Brun et al., 2009). In sum, 
we argue that by separating explorative and exploitative activities – having 
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distinct processes for radical and incremental innovation – an ambidextrous 
organization has a climate that simplifies the innovation process by removing 
unnecessary obstacles. 
WH 7 c): The simplicity-factor of climate and ambidexterity are positively 
correlated. 
On the next page, table 1 summarizes all our working hypotheses. 
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3.7 Summary of Working Hypotheses 
 
 
1 The overall innovation quotient and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
2 The score on the resources building block and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
a) The people-factor of resources and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
b) The systems-factor of resources and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
c) The projects-factor of resources and ambidexterity are not correlated. 
3 The score on the processes building block and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
a) The ideate-factor of processes and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
b) The shape-factor of processes and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
c) The capture-factor of processes and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
4 The score on the success building block and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
a) The external-factor of success and ambidexterity are not correlated. 
b) The enterprise-factor of success and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
c) The individuals-factor of success and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
5 The score on the values building block and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
a) The entrepreneurial-factor of values and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
b) The creativity-factor of values and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
c) The learning-factor of values and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
6 The score on the behaviors building block and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
a) The energize-factor of behaviors and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
b) The engage-factor of behaviors and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
c) The enable-factor of behaviors and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
7 The score on the climate building block and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
a) The collaboration-factor of climate and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
b) The safety-factor of climate and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
c) The simplicity-factor of climate and ambidexterity are positively correlated. 
Table 1 - All working hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 Methodology 
This methodology chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part covers 
our literature search, while the second part covers choices to be made when 
conducting research. The final part is our research strategy, which includes survey 
development, construct development with validity and reliability test, and 
statistical methods.  
4.1 Literature Search 
The objective of our literature review process is to explore the literature on 
ambidexterity and cultures for innovation. Two articles have inspired our 
literature review, these are: “How innovative is your company’s culture?” by Rao 
and Weintraub (2013) and “The Ambidextrous Organization” by O'Reilly and 
Tushman (2004). We used these articles as a foundation for our literature review, 
searching for articles on relevant topics. Literature covers these individual topics 
extensively, but literature on the intersection between ambidexterity and 
innovation culture is scarce. 
Adapting the literature review approach of Cronin, Ryan, and Coughlan (2008), 
we divide the literature review process into searching, followed by analyzing and 
synthesizing. The following will address our approaches in these two stages.  
4.1.1 Searching 
Our literature search includes a combination of articles provided by our 
supervisors, and keyword searches in online databases. Further, articles provided 
by our academic supervisors have served as a basis for our search strategy. The 
role of our supervisors corresponds to the role of a “locator” or “significant 
informant”, as defined by Biernacki and Waldorf (1981). These are individuals 
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who have greater accessibility and knowledge about specific topics. Most of the 
distributed articles can be considered foundations for different topics within fields 
of innovation and strategy, and could therefore be included in our literature 
review, as well as inspire our exploratory literature search.  
To widen the scope of our literature review, keyword searches in online databases 
were performed. We primarily chose the Scopus database for keyword searches, 
as this database has a rich content of peer-reviewed articles on a variety of 
academic topics. Moreover, to increase diversity in article sources, we also used 
Web of Science and ABI/Inform. We did not want to search too strictly, because 
of the diversity of topics being explored. This means that we have included 
primary, secondary, theoretical and anecdotal sources according to the definition 
of Colling (2003) (as cited by Cronin et al., 2008). In terms of categories, we 
limited our search to “Social Sciences”, “Business Management and Accounting”, 
and “Psychology”, according to the categories in Scopus. Finally, only English-
written papers were considered. 
Since we wanted to follow the Rao and Weintraub (2013) framework of building 
blocks at the element level in our literature review, we had to perform extensive 
keyword searches to cover all topics. Additionally, we performed numerous 
searches for literature on ambidexterity. An example of a keyword search is 
included in table 1 below. In the example, we attempt to find literature on the 
effects of ambidexterity on performance, and similar searches were done on the 
building blocks, factors, and elements in the cultural framework.  
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# Keyword search Number of 
results 
1 Ambidexterity 434 
2 Ambidexterity AND exploration AND exploitation 145 
3 Ambidexterity AND exploration w/1 exploitation 135 
4 Ambidexterity AND exploration w/1 exploitation 
AND performance 
62 
5 Ambidexterity AND exploration w/1 exploitation 
AND performance AND empirical 
13 
Table 2 - Keyword searches in Scopus. 
4.1.2 Analyzing and Synthesizing 
We created three criteria to narrow down the results. These criteria were: first, 
The paper must address at least one of the topics we want to examine, that is; 
ambidexterity or one of the 54 elements in Rao and Weintraub (2013). Second, 
the topic can be identified in the title or abstract. Third, the paper is of an academic 
nature. 
Culture is a broad term, and the framework used encompass many topics of the 
innovation literature. Moreover, by connecting innovation culture to 
ambidexterity, we are covering very diverse topics in this master’s thesis. This 
makes old and new, as well as heavily cited and almost uncited papers relevant. 
Still, we frequently sorted on number of citations and publishing year in order to 
discover the most popular and most recent articles. Further, as the topics are 
diverse and some topics are in the early stages of development, lots of relevant 
articles do not make it to the top tier journals. Because of this, we did not filter on 
journals. 
Using the above criteria, we screened the articles to consider their relevancy for 
the topic we were searching for. Following this approach on the example from 
table 2 above, we ended up using two of those 13 papers in our literature review. 
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In addition to the literature included in this review, we excluded some papers that 
were initially reviewed. These papers include articles distributed by our academic 
supervisors that were not directly related to any of our research topics. For 
instance, on our first meeting with our supervisors, we were given a broad set of 
articles to get us started, of which some topics became unrelated to the direction 
our research went. Other articles were left out because they turned out to be 
irrelevant for our research topics. 
4.2 Considerations for a Research Strategy 
Bryman (2012) defines research strategy as “a general orientation to the conduct 
of social research” (p. 35). Quantitative and qualitative research represents two 
distinct clusters of research strategy. Quantitative research puts an emphasis on 
the collection and analysis of data, and tends to have a deductive approach to the 
relationship between theory and research (usually testing of theories). Qualitative 
research, however, emphasizes words and normally has an inductive approach to 
the relationship between theory and data (generation of theories). 
We have taken a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research in our master’s thesis. Based on what is already written and known about 
this particular domain, we have developed working hypotheses to be tested.  
Bryman (2012) explains that “an epistemological issue concerns the question of 
what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline” (p. 27). 
Positivism refers to the position which sees the natural science approach of doing 
social sciences as the correct way of doing research, and it is the epistemological 
position we have chosen. The chief ingredient in the positivist approach is to 
explain human behavior. Interpretivism, on the other hand, is a term given to a 
contrasting epistemological position, which emphasizes a focus on understanding 
human behavior. 
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“Questions of social ontology are concerned with the nature of social entities” 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 32). The position researchers take on ontology is concerned 
with whether social entities can be seen as objective entities or if they should be 
considered to be social constructions, built up from the perceptions and actions of 
human beings. Objectivism has a view that social phenomena are external facts 
which actors cannot influence; “the organization has a reality which is external to 
the individuals who inhabit it” (Bryman, 2012, p. 32). Constructivism is a position 
which implies that the social order is in constant state of change. Here, by 
choosing to send out a survey, we are taking an objective position. Deciding 
whether to use qualitative research, quantitative research, or a mixture of both is 
by no means an easy task, as becomes evident in the following paragraph. 
4.2.1 Methodological Fit 
According to Edmondson and McManus (2007), there is a need for 
methodological fit – “internal consistency among elements of a research project” 
(p. 1155) – when conducting field research. They further define field research as 
“systematic studies that rely on the collection of original data – qualitative or 
quantitative – in real organizations” (p. 1155). If the research that is to be 
undertaken builds on mature theories – well developed models and constructs – it 
is best complemented by quantitative methods, as qualitative research is likely to 
produce results that have already been identified (Edmondson & McManus, 
2007). When a researcher decides to study nascent theory – “... tentative answers 
to novel questions of how and why …” (p. 1158) – it is suggested to take a 
qualitative approach, partly because quantitative methods fail to “... conform 
sufficiently to basic assumptions of statistical inference” (p. 1172). Finally, if a 
researcher decides to study intermediate theory – positioned between mature and 
nascent theories – Edmondson and McManus (2007) suggest to use a blend of 
qualitative and quantitative data, such that external validity and construct validity 
of new measures can be established through triangulation. 
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4.2.2 Assessing the Quality of the Research 
There are several criteria from which the quality of a social research is assessed. 
Bryman (2012) emphasizes that the first issue to consider when conducting social 
research, is reliability. Reliability covers different aspects of the study’s quality, 
but the focus is on whether or not the results are repeatable if the study is 
conducted more or less exactly the same way again.  In other words, are the 
measures consistent and stable?  
Another important aspect to consider when conducting social research is 
replication; a study must be replicable (Bryman, 2012). This criteria puts high 
demands on researchers to outline in detail their procedures, otherwise replication 
is not possible. Quantitative researchers are often interested in generalizing 
findings; especially if the results obtained in a research do not match earlier 
findings in the area of interest, the more important it is for the study to be 
transparent. 
Further, the validity of a study “... is concerned with the integrity of the 
conclusions that are generated from a piece of research” (Bryman, 2012, p. 47). 
Bryman (2012) distinguishes between measurement validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and ecological validity. In essence, measurement validity 
explains the integrity of conclusions that were generated from a research. If the 
measurements are valid, they represent the concepts that they are supposed to be 
drawing on. Bryman (2012) continues by explaining internal validity as whether 
perceived cause and effect in a study actually represents a causal relationship. Put 
differently, by asking how we can be sure that it is not other reasons behind the 
apparent causal relationship, we are actually questioning the internal validity of 
the research. Moreover, researchers must consider if their results can be 
generalized to situations beyond that of the research; the external validity of the 
research. If the study applies only to the respondents in one specific context it 
cannot be generalized, and it therefore cannot be externally valid. Finally, Bryman 
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(2012) describes ecological validity as whether the findings in a study are 
applicable to people’s everyday lives. For instance, a laboratory experiment 
cannot be ecologically valid, whereas field research certainly has the potential of 
being ecologically valid. 
4.2.3 Quantitative Research Strategy 
Quantitative researchers are interested in explaining, which again means to 
examine the causes of phenomena. Why are things the way they are? When 
explaining phenomena, there are pitfalls quantitative researchers need to be aware 
of. 
There is a strong concern in most quantitative research on causality; does x cause 
y? The relationships between “dependent” and “independent” variables reflects 
the tendency to think in terms of causes and effects (Bryman, 2012). It is, however, 
difficult to be certain that the relationships between variables do in fact work the 
way researchers propose. Another important aspect to consider has to do with 
generalization. According to Bryman (2012), quantitative researchers are usually 
concerned with being able to say that his or her findings can be generalized beyond 
the particular context in which the research was conducted. Bryman (2012) argues 
that research can only be generalized to the population from which it was selected. 
Replication is another issue to consider. We want the influences of the 
researcher’s biases and values to be reduced to a minimum. If a scientist’s findings 
could not be reproduced, questions could be raised regarding the validity of her 
findings (Bryman, 2012). 
4.3 Our Research Strategy 
This section describes how our master thesis was conducted; including research 
design, survey development and translation, data collection, measurement and 
validation of constructs, aggregation, and statistical methods to be used when 
analyzing results. 
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4.3.1 Research Design 
A research design provides “... a framework for the collection and analysis of 
data” (Bryman, 2012, p. 46). It represents a structure that guides the execution of 
a research method and the analysis of data. A cross-sectional design – the design 
we have chosen – is, in the context of this thesis, the most appropriate research 
design to answer our working hypotheses. The cross-sectional design is often 
called a survey design (Bryman, 2012), and is a quantitative research strategy. As 
Bryman (2012) defines: 
Survey research comprises a cross-sectional design in relation to which 
data is collected predominantly by questionnaire or by structured 
interview on more than one case (usually quite a lot more than one) and 
at a single point in time in order to collect a body of quantitative or 
quantifiable data  in connection with two or more variables (usually many 
more than two), which are then examined to detect patterns of association 
(p. 60). 
A cross-sectional design was used, as experiments, longitudinal designs, and case 
studies did not fit our research (Bryman, 2012). Experiments require a control 
group to be compared to the research group, which is a problem in studying 
phenomena that occurs in real organizations. Regarding longitudinal designs, we 
simply did not have enough time to complete such a research. Finally, case studies 
do not fit well when comparing several organizations. When selecting a cross-
sectional design, Bryman (2012) states that a self-completion questionnaire has 
several advantages over structured interviews: they are cheaper to administer; 
quicker to administer; there are no interviewer effects; and it is more convenient 
for respondents. The disadvantages, like difficulty of asking other kinds of 
questions that initially were not in the interview-guide/questionnaire, are not as 
relevant for our research as the advantages are. 
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4.3.2 Surveys Used 
The Innovation Quotient assessment (Rao & Weintraub, 2013) is a survey that 
uses a Likert scale in order to measure how innovative people perceive their 
organization’s culture to be. By choosing a randomized sample, or, even better, 
having all employees answer the questionnaire, we can aggregate the results for 
an indication of an organizational culture’s strengths and weaknesses regarding 
innovativeness. As the theories in company culture are relatively mature, a 
quantitative assessment is suitable. Moreover, as we wish to connect two 
theoretical frameworks – ambidexterity and the innovativeness of a company 
culture – we see the need to complement the Innovation Quotient assessment with 
a measurement for ambidexterity developed by He and Wong (2004). In order to 
answer our WHs, we therefore compare results from two different quantitative 
surveys in our cross-sectional design. 
4.3.3 Survey Development and Translation 
The survey used in this master’s thesis (see appendix A) was created using a 
combination of two established surveys. The English-written survey was therefore 
already phrased correctly. However, as we have deployed the survey to 
Norwegian industry-companies, it was essential to offer the same survey written 
in Norwegian. Our task, then, was to make sure we actually asked the same 
questions in Norwegian, and that the questions had correct grammar. How to 
translate questionnaires, according to Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2009), is 
one of the most important challenges for multi-language surveys. According to 
the authors, literal translation tends to change the meaning of the question, if only 
slightly, and that this will not be detected with back-translation strategies also 
focusing on literal translation. It is therefore more important to translate the 
concept than it is to translate the direct wording of the question. The solution, then, 
is to “… focus on ensuring that each language maintains the meaning of the 
question and concepts within it, even if doing so means deviating from a literal 
translation” (Dillman et al., 2009, p. 455). 
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For our translation, we were two groups – six people in total – writing a master’s 
thesis on a similar theme, and our joint supervisor Alf Steinar Sætre working 
together to ensure the translation being as accurate as possible. Such a translation 
requires that the translators are bilingual, and preferably that the native tongue is 
that of the target language (Sousa & Rojjanasrirat, 2011), which is true for 
everyone working on the translation. Further, when the target language is the 
native tongue, nuances in the language is more accurately captured (Beaton, 
Bombardier, Guillemin, & Ferraz, 2000).  
The first step was to have two people translate the English questions into 
Norwegian, while our supervisor did the same independently of those two. When 
two different translations are done independently, we can reduce discrepancies 
from ambiguous wording in the original questions (Beaton et al., 2000). The next 
step was to have two people read through each of the translations without reading 
the English version first, where the objective was to ensure that the phrasing was 
understandable with correct Norwegian grammar. Without reading the English-
phrased questions first, we avoided being biased to the original phrasing, and 
focused on whether the questions made sense, and if their formulations were in 
good grammar. After this step, our supervisor and four students met together to 
work through the different translations and proof-readings, in order to create one 
common translation. In this step, sometimes labeled synthesis of translations 
(Beaton et al., 2000), we discussed the deviations in the translations, and by 
consensus ensured that we captured the meaning of the questions, and that the 
grammar was correct. When one translation had been created, the final two 
students read through the draft. These had not been involved in the previous steps, 
to maintain their unbiased opinion of formulations and grammar. At the same 
time, the four remaining students took the survey for themselves, as a way to 
pretest time needed to complete the survey. The final step was to meet again, now 
with all members present. This step was a repetition of the first meeting, and 
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worked as a quality control to assess equal meaning and good grammar in both 
Norwegian and English. 
4.3.4 Data Collection 
Data from the survey was collected from an innovation assessment survey of 
Norwegian companies in 2015. The sample consisted of 6 Norwegian industry 
companies, with revenues ranging from 30 to 330 MNOK (revenues for company 
E is unknown), and number of employees ranging from 30 to 1772. However, for 
the two largest companies (E and F), the surveys were only distributed to 
managers within innovative units. Questionnaires were sent to a total of 203 
people. The participating companies themselves distributed the survey internally, 
and sent out reminders until a satisfying response rate was achieved. There were 
130 attempts at the survey, and after removing answers with incomplete or 
missing data, we received a total of 87 complete and valid responses. Statistics 
concerning responses and response rates are shown in table 3 below. 
Company Employees Distribution Responses Complete responses Response rate 
A 30 30 21 15 50 % 
B 42 42 39 24 57 % 
C 42 42 16 13 31 % 
D 55 55 31 22 40 % 
E 1772 26 18 9 35 % 
F 102 8 5 4 50 % 
Total 2043 203 130 87 43 % 
Table 3 - Response rates. 
As we can see, the overall response rate was 43 % when we only count complete 
responses. It is reasonable to assume that the usable response rate corresponds to 
the companies’ overall response rate, as these comprise the majority of the 
companies. 
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4.3.5 Measurement and Validation of Constructs 
All constructs were measured with multi-item scales, and scores on these 
measures were means calculated across items. Using the final sample with only 
valid responses, we conducted several analyses to verify that the measures were 
reasonable. 
Ambidexterity 
As other researchers have done before us (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & 
Wong, 2004; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006), we conceptualize 
ambidexterity as a multidimensional construct comprised of the non-substitutable 
combination of exploration and exploitation, that is, as the multiplicative 
interaction of the two constructs. We applied the scales for exploration and 
exploitation developed by He and Wong (2004) – eight questions with five-point 
Likert scales – as these have shown consistently good reliability in several studies 
(Martini, Aloini, Dulmin, Mininno, & Neirotti, 2012). 
Factor analysis 
In order to combine the eight items from He and Wong (2004)  into the exploration 
and exploitation constructs, we performed an exploratory factor analysis, or more 
precisely; a principal component analysis, as described by Pallant (2010). The 
factor loading value is a measure of the strength between items and groups of 
intercorrelations in a set of items, and values range from -1 to 1, where 1 is the 
strongest (George & Mallery, 2003; Pallant, 2010). The results of the exploratory 
factor analysis on the ambidexterity measures are shown in table 4 below.  
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Objectives for undertaking innovation projects in the 
last 3 years (1 = not important to 5 = very important) 
Exploitation Exploration 
Cronbach's alpha (α) 0.823 0.971 
   
Introduce new generation of products 0.323 0.926 
Extend product range 0.193 0.958 
Open up new markets 0.626 0.688 
Enter new technoloy fields 0.819 0.289 
Improve existing product quality 0.430 0.831 
Improve production flexibilty 0.664 0.304 
Reduce production cost 0.966 0.212 
Improve yield or reduce material consumption 0.818 0.330 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Total variance explained: 83,77%. 
Table 4 - Exploratory factor analysis for exploration and exploitation. 
The four-item scale to measure exploration measures how the company moves 
away from existing knowledge and skills to meet the needs of emergent customers 
or markets (Benner & Tushman, 2003). The items ”introduce a new generation of 
products” and ”extend product range” loaded on one factor, but the items ”open 
up new markets” and ”enter new technology field” crossloaded to the other factor, 
actually measuring higher values for the first factor. This contradicts both 
expectations and previous studies (He & Wong, 2004). As this is inconsistent with 
previous literature, we decided to omit these two questions when designing the 
exploration factor. The two remaining items loaded on one single factor having 
an eigenvalue of 1.982, accounting for 99.1% of the variance. 
Exploitation was measured by a four-item scale in the same manner as for 
exploration, intending to capture the extent to which companies build on existing 
knowledge and skills to meet the needs of existing customers or markets (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003). While ”improve production flexibility”, “reduce production 
costs”, and ”improve yield or reduce material consumption” loaded on the other 
factor,  ”improve existing product quality” was crossloaded to the first factor, 
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actually measuring higher values for the first factor. Hence, this factor was 
removed, and the three remaining items loaded on one single factor having an 
eigenvalue of 2.252, accounting for 75.1% of the variance. 
Cronbach’s alpha, α 
After performing the factor analysis above, we tested internal reliability of the 
constructs with Cronbach’s alpha, α. This value concerns the internal consistency 
of the scale, i.e. whether or not the items are measuring the same underlying 
construct (Pallant, 2010). According to He and Wong (2004), the exploration and 
exploitation scales have acceptable internal consistency with Cronbach alphas of 
0.807 and.0.752, respectively. In our study, the Cronbach’s alpha for the two 
exploration items was 0.971, which according to George and Mallery (2003) is an 
”excellent” score for internal consistency. Note however that such high internal 
reliability is not always desirable because it indicates a more narrow scale (Briggs 
& Cheek, 1986; Clark & Watson, 1995). The three exploitation items had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.823, which is considered acceptable (George & Mallery, 
2003; Pallant, 2010). 
Calculating ambidexterity 
The final step of developing the ambidexterity construct is to multiply the 
averages of the exploration and exploitation items that were found appropriate 
above. This multiplication reflects the arguments that these constructs are both 
non-substitutable and interdependent (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Further, as 
we are not dividing our sample into ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous 
companies, we do not apply any cut-off criteria to identify ambidextrous 
companies. 
Culture for innovation 
To measure the culture for innovation in companies, we use the innovation 
quotient survey developed by Rao and Weintraub (2013). Using a five-point 
Likert scale, this survey measures an overall score, the innovation quotient, and 
O u r  R e s e a r c h  S t r a t e g y  | 151 
 
 
six building blocks that each consist of three factors. The questionnaire uses three 
items to measure each factor, totaling 54 questions. It is, however, worth noting 
that the survey instrument is not meant to look for balance (Rao & Weintraub, 
2013), which means that for example measures of reliability should not be given 
too much emphasis. The 54 elements and 18 factors are tested for statistical 
validity and executive acceptance as both a diagnostic and actionable tool with 
data ”... from 1026 executives and managers in 15 companies” (Rao & Weintraub, 
2013, p. 31). Despite the rigidity of this questionnaire, we tested the reliability of 
each factor by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha for all factors. The results from 
this analysis for both company and individual level are shown in table 5 below. 
Building 
block 
Cronbach's 
alpha (α) 
Factor Cronbach's 
alpha (α) 
Values 0.946 Entrepreneurial 0.858 
Creativity 0.763 
Learning 0.922 
Behaviors 0.960 Energize 0.913 
Engage 0.885 
Enable 0.883 
Climate 0.924 Collaboration 0.958 
Safety 0.837 
Simplicity 0.568 
Resources 0.978 People 0.878 
Systems 0.931 
Projects 0.976 
Processes 0.951 Ideate 0.964 
Shape 0.925 
Capture 0.900 
Success 0.961 External 0.933 
Enterprise 0.938 
Individual 0.805 
Table 5 - Cronbach's alpha for the culture of innovation questionnaire. 
The Cronbach’s alpha values above show that most factors and building blocks 
have excellent internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). Only two factors, 
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creativity and simplicity, have Cronbach’s alpha below the preferred criteria of 
0.8 (Pallant, 2010), but the rest of the factors demonstrate good internal reliability 
(George & Mallery, 2003; Pallant, 2010). Note, however, that very high internal 
consistency (α), i.e. values approaching 1, is not desirable, as this produces a scale 
that is narrow in content and if the scale is narrower than the construct, this would 
compromise scale validity (Briggs & Cheek, 1986; Clark & Watson, 1995). High 
intercorrelations might also mean that items are overly redundant and that the 
construct metrics are too specific (Briggs & Cheek, 1986). Hence, the fact that 
more than half of the factors and all building blocks measures excellent internal 
reliability may suggest that some of the 54 questions are unnecessary in order to 
measure innovative culture. 
Control variables 
In our empirical study, we control for possible confounding effects by including 
various relevant variables: Company size; number of employees; company age; 
employee’s average age; and financial performance. Large companies may devote 
more resources to innovation, but may lack the necessary flexibility to explore 
like smaller companies. Therefore, we control for size using both number of 
employees and total assets. Data on company sizes are found in the companies’ 
publicly available financial reports. Company age is another factor that we 
anticipate may influence exploration and exploitation, and also the age of 
individuals, which is known to influence explorative and exploitative behavior 
(Park & Kim, 2015). Further, companies with strong economic history are likely 
to invest more in innovation, as such; we include return on assets (ROA) as a 
control variable. ROA is calculated from financial data found in financial reports 
for the last three available years, 2011-2013. Descriptive information about the 
sample companies are found in table 6 below. Note that company E is a state-
owned enterprise, of which financial data is not available.  
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Company Employees 
(Log) 
Total 
assets 
(Log) 
Company 
age 
Employee 
age 
3-year 
average 
ROA 
A 1.48 4.55 17 40.43 27.52 % 
B 1.62 4.78 27 41.51 8.28 % 
C 1.62 4.86 19 40.71 -5.73 % 
D 1.74 5.10 15 44.97 3.25 % 
E 3.25 - 20 42.89 - 
F 2.03 5.45 18 42.80 6.82 % 
Average 1.61599563 5 19.5 41.9 8.33 % 
Table 6 - Characteristics of the sample companies. 
4.3.6 Aggregation 
For the analyses made on company-level, we take advantage of the fact that our 
questionnaire contains questions where individuals rate company-level 
characteristics, i.e. the average of individuals’ assessment of the company. While 
this direct consensus model sounds sensible – employees, after all,  are the ones 
who best know companies’ behaviors – it is still important to statistically validate 
the aggregation procedure by demonstrating within-company agreement and 
between-company differences (Chan, 1998). We calculated the within-company 
agreement by measuring interrater agreement, Rwg, and investigated between-
company differences by calculating intraclass correlations, ICC(2,1) and 
ICC(2,K), following the procedures of LeBreton and Senter (2008). 
Mean interrater agreement, Rwg, was 0.873 for the overall innovation quotient, 
0.777 for exploration, and 0.670 for exploitation. These values should at least 
exceed 0.60 to justify aggregation (Glick, 1985), and are thus acceptable. 
We checked effect sizes and between-company differences by calculating 
intraclass correlation coefficients ICC(2,1) and ICC(2,K) respectively. We used a 
two-way random model testing for absolute agreement. ICC(2,1), which can be 
interpreted as a measure of effect size, indicates the extent to which individual 
rating are attributable to the group level. LeBreton and Senter (2008) suggest that 
values of 0.05 are considered a small effect size, while a value of 0.25 is a large 
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effect size. The values for ICC(2,1) were 0.175 for the Innovation quotient, 0.428 
for exploration and 0.330 for exploitation.. These values indicate that, indeed, 
company affiliation influences ratings for participants in the survey. The ICC(2,K) 
values indicate the proportion of true score variance compared to total score 
variance. For example, a score of 0,70 indicates that 70% of the variance in the 
ratings are systematic, while 30% of the variance is random measurement error 
variance. We calculated ICC(2,K) at 0.733 for the Innovation quotient, 0.891 for 
exploration and 0.831 for exploitation. LeBreton and Senter (2008) suggest using 
a cut-off value of at least 0.70 to justify aggregation, indicating that the value for 
the innovation quotient is in the lower range, but most probably still acceptable 
concerning reliability and agreement, justifying aggregation. The ICC(2,1) and 
ICC(2,K) values for explore and exploit, however, are satisfactory (LeBreton & 
Senter, 2008). 
4.3.7 Statistical Methods 
In this master’s thesis, we applied various statistical methods, namely correlation- 
and regression analyses, and structural equation modelling. This section describes 
these methods and assesses the appropriateness of applying these methods. 
Correlation 
To investigate the strength and direction of the linear relationship between our 
variables, we analyzed both Pearson correlation, and partial correlations with 
control variables included. These correlation coefficients, r, ranges from -1, 
perfect negative correlation, to 1, perfect correlation, and assumes continuous 
scales, related pairs, independence of observations, normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity (Pallant, 2010). 
All of our scales, including control variables, are continuous. Further, there are no 
missing values in our dataset on company level, meaning that we have information 
on both variables from the same subjects. As questionnaires are answered 
independently, the respondents are independent observers. Normality was 
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confirmed by following the procedure of Pallant (2010). While the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov value was insignificant, i.e. larger than 0.05, which indicated that 
normality cannot be assumed (Pallant, 2010), the shapes of the histograms, normal 
Q-Q plots, detrended normal Q-Q plots and boxplots indicated that normality is a 
plausible condition for all variables. In a similar manner, scatter plots indicated 
that linearity may be plausible, but we cannot confirm this due to the small sample 
size. Despite these obvious limitations regarding normality and linearity, we argue 
that normality and linearity is plausible, and hence we will conduct correlation 
analyses. Correlation analyses were performed using IBM SPSS software. 
Regression 
We use linear regression analysis, following the procedures of Pallant (2010), 
primarily to assess which variable in a set of variables that is the best predictor of 
an outcome, which is a kind of analysis best performed through standard multiple 
regression. However, due to the small sample size, we had to limit our analyses to 
simple linear regression, with only one independent variable at a time. In order to 
perform regression analysis, assumptions about sample size, multicollinearity and 
singularity, outliers and normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence 
of residuals has to be made. Pallant (2010) recommends a minimum sample of 
size of at least 15 per independent variable; our sample is far smaller than this, 
which means that the generalisability of these results is considered very low. As 
we only perform regression analysis with one variable at a time, multicollinearity 
and singularity is not an issue. Examining the normal probability plot (P-P) of the 
regression standardized residual, the scatterplot and the normal P-P plot indicates 
that the rest of assumptions are plausible (Pallant, 2010). Regression analyses 
were performed using IBM SPSS software. 
Structural equation modelling 
In order to further validate our model and findings, we apply structural equation 
modeling (SEM) using IBM AMOS software. SEM analyses test a structural 
theory based on some phenomenon through a confirmatory approach (Byrne, 
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2001). According to Byrne (2001), there are four main advantages of SEM: First, 
the confirmatory approach is desirable when testing hypotheses, as most other 
methods are descriptive by nature. Second, SEM explicitly estimate error variance 
parameters which is ignored in for example regression analysis. Third, SEM 
allows to study both observed and unobserved (latent) variables. Finally, SEM 
allows for easy analysis of multivariate relations and estimation of indirect effects. 
We apply SEM with the aim of supporting our proposed model, based on the 
building blocks of an innovative culture and ambidexterity. Due to our small 
sample size, SEM is not possible to conduct on company level. Hence, these 
analyses are made at an individual level. We model culture as a unobserved 
variable consisting of all building blocks and it’s relationship to ambidexterity. 
For testing purposes, we model the building blocks as independent variables and 
ambidexterity as dependent variable. We also test different models to investigate 
direct effects of the building blocks to ambidexterity. 
SEM analysis output is standardized regression weights (β) and R2 which 
summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
collective set of the predictors (Lei & Wu, 2007). In addition, SEM produces a 
number of measures that together enables us to assess whether or not the proposed 
model is a good fit. As Byrne (2001) states: ”If the goodness of fit is adequate, the 
model argues for the plausibilty of postulated relations among variables; if it is 
inadequate, the tenability of such relations is rejected.” Non-significant χ-test, 
RMSEA below 0.6, and fit indicies – NFI, CFI, and GFI – above 0.90 indicate 
good model fit (Lei & Wu, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 Results 
5.1 Correlation Analysis 
Table 7 below presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for all study 
variables, with the exception of the 18 factors from the Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
framework. Correlations for these factors are included in appendix B. 
Effect sizes for correlations equals the correlation coefficients, and J. Cohen 
(1992) argues that small, medium and large effects sizes have values of 0.10, 0.30 
and 0.50 respectively. We found large effect sizes between the innovation quotient 
and ambidexterity (0.819, p < 0.05), as well as between each building block and 
ambidexterity. All of these correlations were within the range of 0.628 and 0.902, 
and all correlations except values were significant (p < 0.05). In addition, we 
found large effect sizes between all the factors and ambidexterity, except from a 
medium effect size between entrepreneurial and ambidexterity. The correlation 
between ambidexterity and 11 of the factors in the Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
framework were significant (p < 0.05), included in appendix B. These are all the 
factors in the building blocks resources and success, in addition to shape, capture, 
collaboration, energize and enable. Further, all the control variables – employees, 
assets, company age, employee age, and ROA – had only small to medium 
relationships to ambidexterity. Hence, the relationships the IQ, building blocks, 
and factors have to ambidexterity are stronger than the relationships the control 
variables have to ambidexterity. 
There was also a strong correlation between exploration and exploitation of 0.517, 
indicating that these constructs can indeed exist simultaneously, and thus supports 
the concept of ambidexterity. There were significant correlations between each 
building block and the innovation quotient, as well as between all building blocks. 
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This indicates that companies that work towards an innovative culture improves 
their overall culture, rather than one specific part of the culture.  
We also conducted partial correlation analyses to investigate the effects of our 
control variables, included in appendix C. Checking for any influences by control 
variables revealed that none of the relationships between a factor, building block, 
or the innovation quotient and ambidexterity was affected by the control variables. 
In other words, control variables did not affect the correlations. 
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)       
Table 7 - Means, standard deviations, and correlations (N = 6).  
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5.2 Regression Analysis 
We performed linear regression analyses in order to assess the working 
hypotheses. Results from these regression analyses are included in table 8. Note 
that we use significance criterion of 0.1, as J. Cohen (1992) suggests that such a 
value can be appropriate when less rigorous standard for rejection is necessary, 
for example in exploratory studies.  Due to our small sample size (N = 6), we 
cannot explicitly say that any of the hypotheses are confirmed based on our 
findings, we have clear indications that the innovation quotient, all building 
blocks, and all factors of an innovative culture are positively related to 
ambidexterity, as they all have positive regression coefficients. We explain these 
results, starting with the overall innovation quotient, before continuing with each 
building block and their respective factors. Finally, we compare the different 
building blocks, before we summarize all our findings in the end of this section. 
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5.2.1 The innovation quotient 
 
Figure 14 - IQ vs ambidexterity. 
WH 1 predicts that the overall innovation quotient and ambidexterity, as the 
multiplicative combination of exploration and exploitation, are positively related.  
The hypothesis argued for ambidexterity and innovative company culture to be 
interconnected, as both lead to long-term viability. Further, there are empirical 
evidences that ambidexterity and culture are closely connected (Lin & 
McDonough Iii, 2011; Wang & Rafiq, 2014). From our regression analysis, the 
relationship was positive (β = 8.759, p < 0.05), indicating support for WH 1. 
Hence, if a company scores high on the IQ, they should also score high on 
ambidexterity. Please note that the ambidexterity measure ranges from 1 to 25, 
while the innovative culture range from 1 to 5. Thus, a beta of 5.0 indicates a 
perfect proportional relationship. 
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5.2.2 Resources 
WH 2 predicts that the resource building block is positively related to 
ambidexterity. This is because resources ultimately enables the firm to perform 
better and more efficient than its competitors, as ambidextrous organizations do. 
Regression analysis shows that the relationship is indeed positive (β = 6.703, p < 
0.05), indicating that WH 2 can be supported (see figure 15). Note that this is the 
lowest beta on a building block level, indicating that resources seems to be of 
particular interest. 
WH 2 a)-b) predict that the people- and systems-factors of resources are positively 
related to ambidexterity. Regression analysis shows that these relationship are 
indeed positive, with β = 7.191 (p < 0.05) for people, and β = 7.322 (p < 0.05) for 
systems, indicating support for WH 2 a) and b). WH 2 c) predicts that the project-
factor of resources is not correlated to ambidexterity, but regression analysis 
found a positive relationship between projects and ambidexterity (β = 5.720, p < 
0.1), indicating that WH 2 c) is not supported. Our argument that tangible assets 
are less important than intangible assets regarding innovations, and thereby not 
being of greater importance for ambidextrous organizations, might have been 
inadequate. In our discussion-chapter, we use theory to give possible explanations 
to these results. The regression equations for people, systems, and projects are 
plotted in figure 16. 
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Figure 15 - Resources vs ambidexterity. 
 
 
Figure 16 - People, systems and projects vs ambidexterity. 
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5.2.3 Processes 
WH 3 predicts that the process building block is positively related to 
ambidexterity. This is because ambidextrous organizations have flexible 
processes to manage different innovations streams for incremental and radical 
innovations. Regression analysis shows that the relationship is indeed positive (β 
= 7.928, p < 0.05), indicating support for WH 3 (see figure 17). 
WH 3 a)-c) predicts that the ideate-, shape-, and capture-factors of processes are 
all positively related to ambidexterity. Regression analysis shows that these 
relationship are indeed positive, with β = 6.284 (p = 0.190) for ideate, β = 7.425 
(p < 0.01) for shape, and β = 6.100 (p < 0.05) for capture, indicating support for 
WH 3 a), b), and c). Note that the regression results for ideate was not significant. 
The regression equations for ideate, shape, and capture are plotted in figure 18.  
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Figure 17 - Processes vs ambidexterity. 
 
 
Figure 18 - Ideate, shape and capture vs ambidexterity. 
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5.2.4 Success 
WH 4 predicts that the success building block is positively related to 
ambidexterity. This is because ambidextrous organizations tend to outperform 
non-ambidextrous organizations on innovation, and should therefore be more 
successful. Regression analysis shows that the relationship is indeed positive (β = 
8.505, p < 0.05). This indicates support for WH 4 (see figure 19).  
WH 4 a) predicts that the external-factor of success is not related to ambidexterity. 
However, regression analysis shows a positive relationship to ambidexterity (β = 
6.816, p < 0.05), indicating that WH 4 a) is not supported. While we argued that 
external perception might not reflect how innovative an enterprise really is, we 
recognize that companies that are perceived as innovative usually are so as well. 
WH 4 b) and c) predicts that the enterprise- and individual-factors of success are 
positively correlated to ambidexterity, and regression analysis found a positive 
relationship, with β = 8.193 (p < 0.05) for enterprise, and β = 8.407 (p < 0.1) for 
individual, indicating support for WH 4 b) and c). The regression equations for 
external, enterprise, and individual are plotted in figure 20.  
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Figure 19 - Success vs ambidexterity. 
 
 
Figure 20 – External, enterprise and individual vs ambidexterity. 
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5.2.5 Values 
WH 5 predicts that the value building block is positively related to ambidexterity. 
Values are especially important for initiative, creativity, and risk-taking, and 
therefore of particular importance for exploring activities, in which ambidextrous 
organizations are superior. Regression analysis shows that the relationship is 
indeed positive (β = 8.060), indicating support for WH 5 (see figure 21), but the 
result is not significant (p = 0.182).  
WH 5 a)-c) predicts that the entrepreneurial-, creativity-, and learning-factor of 
values are all positively related to ambidexterity. Regression analysis shows that 
these relationship are indeed positive, with β = 6.107 (p = 0.354) for 
entrepreneurial, β = 10.3 (p = 0.173) for creativity, and β = 6,448 (p = 0.13) for 
learning, indicating support for WH 5 a), b), and c). Note that the regression results 
for the building block and all the factors were not significant. The regression 
equations for entrepreneurial, creativity, and learning are plotted in figure 22. 
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Figure 21 - Values vs ambidexterity. 
 
  
Figure 22 – Entrepreneurial, creativity and learning vs ambidexterity. 
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5.2.6 Behaviors 
WH 6 predicts that the behavior building block is positively related to 
ambidexterity, as ambidextrous organizations tend to promote innovative 
behavior, in such a way that they can explore and exploit simultaneously. 
Regression analysis shows that the relationship is indeed positive (β = 8.119, p < 
0.05) indicating support for WH 6 (see figure 23).  
WH 6 a), b), and c) predict that the energize-, engage-, and enable-factors of 
success are all positively related to ambidexterity. Regression analysis shows that 
these relationship are indeed positively related to ambidexterity, with β = 6.911 (p 
< 0.05) for energize, β = 6.250 (p = 0.191) for engage, and β = 8.207 (p < 0.05) 
for enable, indicating support for WH 6 a), b), and c). Note that the regression 
results for engage were not significant. The regression equations for energize, 
engage, and enable are plotted in figure 24.  
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Figure 23 - Behaviors vs ambidexterity. 
 
  
Figure 24 – Energize, engage and enable vs ambidexterity. 
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5.2.7 Climate 
WH 7 predicts that the climate building block is positively related to 
ambidexterity. This is because ambidextrous organizations have a climate that 
nurture the exploratory sides of innovation. Regression analysis shows that the 
relationship is indeed positive (β = 9.387, p < 0.1), indicating support for WH 7 
(see figure 25). Note that this is the highest beta on a building block level, 
indicating that climate seems to be of particular interest. 
WH 7 a), b), and c) predict that the collaboration-, safety-, and simplicity-factors 
of climate are all positively related to ambidexterity. Regression analysis shows 
that these relationship are indeed positively related to ambidexterity, with β = 
9.066 (p < 0.05) for collaboration, β = 9.970 (p = 0.162) for safety, and β = 6.350 
(p = 0.216) for simplicity, indicating support for WH 7 a), b), and c). Note that the 
regression results for safety and simplicity were not significant. The regression 
equations for collaboration, safety, and simplicity are plotted in figure 26. 
Regression equations for all building blocks, factors and the innovation quotient 
are included in table 8.  
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Figure 25 - Climate vs ambidexterity. 
 
  
Figure 26 – Collaboration, safety and simplicity vs ambidexterity. 
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5.3 Regression Results for Ambidexterity 
Variable 
Working 
hypotheses: 
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Innovation 
Quotient 
WH 1 Positively  -14.329 8.759 0.670 0.588 8.135 0.046 Yes 
Resources WH 2 Positively -6.746 6.703 0.737 0.671 11.206 0.029 Yes 
People WH 2 A Positively -9.652 7.191 0.761 0.701 12.707 0.023 Yes 
Systems WH 2 B Positively -9.134 7.322 0.782 0.727 14.326 0.019 Yes 
Projects WH 2 C No -2.169 5.720 0.621 0.526 6.551 0.063 No 
Processes WH 3 Positively -10.171 7.928 0.814 0.768 17.517 0.014 Yes 
Ideate WH 3 A Positively -3.761 6.284 0.383 0.229 2.483 0.190 Yes 
Shape WH 3 B Positively -8.960 7.425 0.876 0.845 28.322 0.006 Yes 
Capture WH 3 C Positively -6.220 6.100 0.765 0.706 13.007 0.023 Yes 
Success WH 4 Positively -14.422 8.505 0.750 0.687 11.972 0.026 Yes 
External WH 4 A No -9.718 6.816 0.722 0.652 10.364 0.032 No 
Enterprise WH 4 B Positively -14.613 8.193 0.763 0.704 12.887 0.023 Yes 
Individual WH 4 C Positively -11.824 8.407 0.610 0.512 6.247 0.067 Yes 
Values WH 5 Positively -13.772 8.061 0.394 0.242 2.600 0.182 Yes 
Entrepreneurial WH 5 A Positively -6.700 6.107 0.215 0.019 1.097 0.354 Yes 
Creativity WH 5 B Positively -22.547 10.300 0.407 0.259 2.744 0.173 Yes 
Learning WH 5 C Positively -8.155 6.448 0.476 0.344 3.627 0.130 Yes 
Behaviors WH 6 Positively -12.447 8.119 0.680 0.600 8.494 0.043 Yes 
Energize WH 6 A Positively -8.720 6.911 0.711 0.639 9.842 0.035 Yes 
Engage WH 6 B Positively -5.175 6.250 0.382 0.228 2.477 0.191 Yes 
Enable WH 6 C Positively -14.652 8.207 0.766 0.707 13.067 0.022 Yes 
Climate WH 7 Positively -17.131 9.387 0.572 0.465 5.349 0.082 Yes 
Collaboration WH 7 A Positively -15.337 9.066 0.792 0.740 15.266 0.017 Yes 
Safety WH 7 B Positively -20.598 9.970 0.423 0.279 2.933 0.162 Yes 
Simplicity WH 7 C Positively -6.927 6.350 0.351 0.188 2.161 0.216 Yes 
Table 8 - Regression results. 
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5.4 Structural Equation Modelling 
To further support our regression results, we performed structural equation 
modeling (SEM) at the individual level. SEM was not appropriate at company-
level due to the small sample size. After removing all incomplete answers, 
individual level responses provided a sample of N = 59, which allowed for model 
fitting analyses using AMOS. We performed several analyses in AMOS, with the 
goal of identifying culture as a latent variable consisting of the six building blocks, 
as well as direct links between the building blocks and ambidexterity. The 
following will explain these analyses. 
The basic model consisted of a latent variable, culture, that incorporated all 
building blocks in the Rao and Weintraub (2013) framework (see figure 27). 
Furthermore, culture was proposed to influence ambidexterity. All standardized 
loadings for the latent variable in the suggested model are larger than 0.70, 
indicating that they are satisfactory indicators (Lei & Wu, 2007), while the 
standardized coefficient value from the latent variable to ambidexterity is 0.60, 
indicating that an increase of 1 standard deviations in culture causes an increase 
of 0.60 standard deviations in ambidexterity. All regression weights were 
significant (p < 0.001). The R2 value indicates that 36 percent of the variance in 
ambidexterity is accounted for by the latent culture variable. Investigating the 
model fit of this model, we found that chi-square test rejected the model (Lei & 
Wu, 2007) with values of χ = 28.492 and df = 14, and with p = 0.012. However, 
other goodness of fit indexes has been constructed to compensate for the 
shortcoming of chi-square tests (Byrne, 2001; Lei & Wu, 2007). Our model got 
better results using indexes that adjust for sample size: NFI = 0.916 and CFI = 
0.955. Higher values indicate greater improvement over baseline index, and these 
results can be considered as indication of good fit (Lei & Wu, 2007). RMSEA and 
GFI, two absolute fit indicia, measure the extent to which our model is able to 
reproduce the covariation matrix. We calculated RMSEA = 0.134 and GFI = 0.904 
for our model, the RMSEA value is larger than the proposed value of 0.06 (Lei & 
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Wu, 2007) indicating inadequate fit, but GFI values close to 1 indicate good model 
fit (Byrne, 2001).  
 
Figure 27 - Basic SEM model. 
To test for direct effects of the building blocks to ambidexterity, we tested direct 
relations one at a time. We found that values was the factor that had the largest 
direct influence on ambidexterity, with explained variance of ambidexterity 
increasing to 0.42. This model has approximately the same, or slightly better, fit 
than the basic model (χ = 25.848, df = 13, p = 0.018, NFI = 0.924, CFI = 0.960, 
RMSEA = 0.131, and GFI = 0.910). This model is shown in figure 28 below. All 
relationships between the building blocks and culture, as well as between culture 
and ambidexterity were significant (p < 0.001). In this model, values has a 
standardized regression weight to ambidexterity of -0.355, but this relationship is 
not significant (p = 0.101).  
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Figure 28 – SEM model with direct relationship between values and ambidexterity. 
The model that accounted for most of the variance on the ambidexterity measure 
(0.60) was a model with direct relationships between processes, resources, 
climate, and values simultaneously (χ = 21.937, df = 10, p = 0.015, NFI = 0.935, 
CFI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.143, and GFI = 0.925). The model fit indexes indicate 
a slightly better model fit than the basic model on all parameter except RMSEA. 
This model is illustrated in figure 29. All relationships between the building 
blocks and culture were significant (p < 0.001), as well as the relationship between 
culture and ambidexterity (p < 0.01). Of the direct relationships, only the 
relationship between climate and values and ambidexterity were significant (p < 
0.1). Note that all the direct regression weights were negative. Summarizing these 
results, we have indications that our model is a moderately good fit when adjusting 
for the effect of sample size. 
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Figure 29 - SEM model with direct relationship between values, climate, resources and 
processes, and ambidexterity.
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CHAPTER 6 
 Discussion 
By now, it is evident that ambidexterity and innovative company cultures are 
closely connected. We previously proposed seven working hypotheses, which 
were tested on Norwegian industry-companies. The tendencies we see are 
supporting many of our working hypotheses. However, as promised in our 
working hypotheses-chapter, we first discuss the issue of causality before 
discussing the results. Finally, we end the discussion with implications and 
limitations to the study. 
6.1 Causality 
We previously stated that we do not claim causality to any working hypotheses in 
this paper. As we briefly explained, the nature of the questionnaire does not allow 
any claims regarding causality. Hence, we merely suggest correlations, and we do 
not claim that two events occurring together must have a cause-and-effect 
relationship. However, in the following paragraphs, we attempt to use the 
reviewed literature to examine possible causal effects. 
One may argue that the organizational innovation culture affects the 
organization’s ambidexterity. As seen in the theory, organizational diversity, 
shared visions, and strategic leadership – all of which are important parts of 
organizational culture – positively influences ambidexterity (Lin & McDonough 
Iii, 2011; Wang & Rafiq, 2014). In other words, culture is essential to allow 
ambidexterity to take place. Moreover, Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) argue 
ambidexterity to be context-driven, in which the organizational culture will affect 
the level of ambidexterity. Hence, organizational culture affects the individual 
employees’ choices regarding exploitation and exploration, in which the level of 
ambidexterity ought to be affected accordingly. 
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It may be, however, that ambidexterity affects the innovation culture of an 
organization. By dividing explorative and exploitative activities, an ambidextrous 
organizational design is effectively creating two different cultures (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004). Further, innovation performance increases when selecting an 
ambidextrous design (M. Tushman et al., 2010), and the organizational culture is 
thus likely to become more innovative. Hence, an ambidextrous organizational 
design might actually be the main driver for developing an innovative company 
culture. Furthermore, once an ambidextrous design is chosen, the changes to the 
organizational culture are likely to affect the level of ambidexterity in the 
organization. Thus, an ambidextrous design might affect the organizational 
culture, which in turn may affect the level of ambidexterity in the organization. 
We found that ambidextrous organizations are excelling in both exploring and 
exploiting activities – e.g. supporting the findings of Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004) and He and Wong (2004) – which is why they innovate better than 
competitors (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Therefore, it is very unlikely that an 
ambidextrous organization does not have an innovative culture. In other words, 
while an organization can decide to implement an ambidextrous design, it only 
becomes ambidextrous once the organizational culture becomes innovative. 
Hence, we would argue that organizational culture is a causal mechanism behind 
ambidexterity. In the following discussion, we deem it plausible that this causal 
mechanism applies. 
6.2 Framework for an Innovative Culture 
The following sub-sections discuss our results for the innovation quotient, 
building blocks, and factors in relation to ambidexterity. 
6.2.1 Innovation Quotient 
By comparing scores on the innovation quotient (IQ) with the companies’ score 
on ambidexterity, we found the two constructs to be positively correlated, 
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supporting WH 1. However, what does this tell us? Regarding our research 
question, the results imply that one of the differences between ambidextrous and 
non-ambidextrous companies is how innovative their company culture tends to 
be. Overall, the results imply that developing a more innovative company culture 
will cause an increase the company’s ambidexterity, in line with the findings of 
Wang and Rafiq (2014) and Lin and McDonough Iii (2011). We therefore  argue 
that using the framework of Rao and Weintraub (2013) to improve parts of a 
company’s culture for innovation, will also improve a company’s level of 
ambidexterity. Conversely, we cannot rule out the possibility that striving for 
ambidexterity will make a company’s culture more innovative. In sum, we argue 
that there is a positive correlation between how innovative a company culture is, 
and how ambidextrous a company culture is. 
6.2.2 Building Blocks 
All six building blocks for an innovative company culture have a positive 
correlation to ambidexterity, which shows a tendency towards support for working 
hypotheses 2-7. Of the six building blocks, climate has the largest beta, while 
resources has the lowest beta. Hence, there is a steeper slope on the regression for 
climate than there is for resources.  
However, what does this tell about the difference in ambidextrous cultures and 
non-ambidextrous cultures? It is perhaps preferred to use an example to explain: 
Let us compare a hypothetical company A to a hypothetical company B. Company 
A is an average company that scores 11 on ambidexterity (about the same as the 
lowest in our sample), while company B scores 18 on ambidexterity (about the 
same as the highest in our sample). As it is nearly impossible to score a perfect 25 
or the lowest score of 1, we consider company A to be non-ambidextrous, and 
company B to be ambidextrous. Since the beta is the lowest for resources, it means 
that this is the building block in which the difference between company A and B 
tends to be the greatest. Conversely, climate has the smallest difference between 
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company A and B. The differences between company A and B are depicted below 
in figure 31. 
 
Figure 30 - Differences between company A (ambidexterity = 11) and B (ambidexterity = 18) 
on resources and climate. 
This is not to say that ambidextrous companies are average performers at 
organizational climate. As the numbers show, the difference in slopes are small, 
and all six building blocks are substantially better for ambidextrous companies 
than they are for non-ambidextrous companies. There is, however, a tendency for 
resources being the building block in which the cultural differences are greatest 
between ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations. In the following 
paragraph, we discuss possible explanations for the large differences in resources, 
as our research question concerns differences between ambidextrous and non-
ambidextrous organizations. 
The above reasoning implies that resources is among the most important building 
blocks for ambidextrous organizations. As we have seen, the long-term 
performance of ambidextrous organizations are substantially better than for non-
ambidextrous organizations (e.g. Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 
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2004). In the long-run, temporal myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993) could 
increase the gap between ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations. 
Further, the gap in resources might increase even more due to a self-reinforcing 
cycle: When an ambidextrous organization financially outperforms competitors, 
it can afford to invest more in innovation, which yields an advantage in long-term 
growth (Trott, 2012). Moreover, successful companies attract talented people – 
the most critical resource of any organization (Rao & Weintraub, 2013) – which 
should further increase performance (Ready & Conger, 2007). Following these 
arguments, it is plausible that resources in fact is the building block with the 
greatest difference between ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations.  
Let us return to our example of company A and Company B. Using the building 
block regression lines, we compared the internal ranking of the scores for 
company A and B (see figure 31). For company A, the lowest score was on 
resources, followed by processes, behaviors, climate, success, and values. 
Company B, on the other hand, scored lowest on processes, followed by resources, 
climate, behaviors, success, and values. From this, some interesting observations 
are worth mentioning. For instance, both companies score highest on values, and 
both companies has success as the second-best building block. Moreover, as we 
found in our SEM analyses, values has the greatest direct effect in explaining 
variance in ambidexterity. Hence, there are tendencies for values being of 
particular importance for ambidextrous organizations, which is not surprising, as 
values determine behavior and therefore affect what the company can and cannot 
do (Clayton M Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). While there are some differences 
in internal ranking for the remaining four building blocks, the differences are 
small. In other words, the building blocks that were low for company A was also 
low for company B. However, should there be differences in internal ranking? In 
addition, does a preferred ranking exist? Rao and Weintraub (2013) do not suggest 
a preferred internal ranking, and we do not know if such a ranking even exists. 
Whether there are building blocks that are more important than others are, and if 
184 | D i s c u s s i o n  
 
 
 
a preferred ranking can be identified with a measure for ambidexterity, are both 
subject to further research, and not within the scope of our thesis. Because of this, 
we will not discuss internal ranking on a factor-level in the next section. 
 
Figure 31 – Internal ranking on building blocks for company A (ambidexterity = 11) and B 
(ambidexterity = 18). 
Our SEM analyses found that the unobserved variable culture is comprised of the 
six building blocks, and that culture affects ambidexterity. While the basic model 
does not provide any surprising results, the second model – with a direct link from 
values to ambidexterity – is of particular interest. While the explained variance of 
ambidexterity increases, the negative (but insignificant) regression coefficient 
from values to ambidexterity indicate that values in fact has a negative influence 
on ambidexterity, but a positive influence through culture. This finding might be 
explained by the fact that values consists of the very “innovative” factors 
creativity, entrepreneurial, and learning (Rao & Weintraub, 2013), which can be 
assumed to have strongest effect on exploration, possibly at the expense of 
exploitation, resulting in a decreased level of ambidexterity. Thus, it may be that 
values positively influences ambidexterity through the unobserved variable 
culture, while the direct effect from values to ambidexterity is negative because 
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of the effect on exploitation. This supports the argument that exploration and 
exploitation are substitutes, and not complementary constructs (Birkinshaw & 
Gupta, 2013). The same argument goes for the third SEM analysis, figure 29, 
where both climate and values had significant negative influence on 
ambidexterity. We argue that the negative direct effect from climate, particularly 
the simplicity-factor, can be explained with the same reasoning as values; climate 
is strongly associated with exploration, possibly at the expense of exploitation. As 
the direct regression lines from processes and resources to ambidexterity were 
insignificant, we do not discuss these. In sum, the SEM analyses support our 
previous findings, that ambidexterity is best explained through organizational 
culture. 
6.2.3 Factors 
As with the building blocks, all 18 factors has a positive correlation to 
ambidexterity. Thus, we see tendencies to support for all working hypotheses, 
except from WH 2c) and WH 4a). These WH’s are the ones that suggested no 
correlation between the factors (projects and external) and ambidexterity. 
Regarding the positive correlations, safety (from climate) and collaboration (from 
climate) are the factors with the highest betas. At the other end of the spectrum, 
projects (from resources) and capture (from processes) have the lowest betas. 
Using the same logic as in the example above, the latter two factors are the ones 
where the difference between ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations 
are the largest. Conversely, there is a smaller difference between company A and 
B with the former two factors. Hence, there are tendencies for projects and capture 
being the two factors in which the cultural differences between ambidextrous and 
non-ambidextrous organizations are the largest. Projects, as a part of resources, 
follows the same argumentation as with resources, where ambidextrous 
organizations are able to counteract temporal myopia and increase the difference 
with a self-reinforcing cycle. Further, the large differences between ambidextrous 
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and non-ambidextrous companies regarding capture (composed of the elements 
flexibility, launch, and scale) can be explained by the differences in radical and 
incremental innovation, where radical innovations demand more flexibility and 
more tolerance for ambiguity (Brun et al., 2009; Kanter, 2006). Ambidextrous 
organizations have the flexibility to excel with exploration, and are nine times 
more likely to succeed with radical innovations (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
Hence, ambidextrous organizations should be substantially better than non-
ambidextrous organizations at capturing radical innovations. 
The differences in betas at a factor-level are larger than they are with the building 
blocks, and it is therefore a tendency towards larger cultural differences on a 
factor-level than on a building block-level. While we found that ambidextrous 
organizations tend to be much better at all building blocks, there might be factors 
with small differences in scores. For instance, as the slope for safety is very steep, 
there can be great differences in ambidexterity without great differences in the 
factor. It may therefore be likely for two companies to have little difference in 
scores on a factor, but a large difference in ambidexterity, indicating limited effect 
of this factor on ambidexterity. 
6.3 Unsupported Working Hypotheses 
Out of our working hypotheses, two stand out from the rest, as they were not 
supported. According to Davis (1971), theories that deny assumptions are 
interesting, while theories that affirm assumptions are non-interesting. Hence, we 
will elaborate on the unsupported working hypotheses below. The two working 
hypotheses that were not supported are: 
WH 2 c): The projects-factor of resources and ambidexterity are not correlated. 
WH 4 a): The external-factor of success and ambidexterity are not correlated. 
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6.3.1 The Projects-Factor of Resources and Ambidexterity 
Regarding WH 2c), we were wrong in our prediction. While the theory did not 
directly imply that projects are particularly better for ambidextrous organizations, 
it is still possible to explain these results from a theoretical perspective. First, T. 
M. Amabile (1998) argues that a lack of financial assets results in people 
channeling creativity towards finding more resources. As the project-factor tells 
whether people have enough money, time, and space to innovate, this factor is 
considered important to achieve successful innovation, which we know that 
ambidextrous organizations are better than other companies at (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004).  
Second, we also know that tangible assets can be viewed as inputs, with intangible 
assets working as throughputs to achieve successful innovation (J. F. Christensen, 
1995; David J. Collis, 1994). Even if intangible assets are more important for 
innovation, it is difficult to innovate at all without enough tangible assets. Thus, 
as ambidextrous organizations innovate better than others, it is likely that they 
have better access to tangible assets. 
Finally, projects may have a symbolic effect in organizations, which again affects 
the corporate culture (Claver et al., 1998). For instance, if a company states that 
they allocate a large sum dedicated for innovation each year, or build a room with 
a sole purpose for innovation, it tells people something about the company’s goals. 
Those that invest in innovation will ultimately have people who know that 
creativity and good ideas are valued, which can have a powerful effect on the 
company’s ability to innovate. In sum, while we initially stated that projects ought 
to be quite similar for ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations, we 
believe our findings to be reasonable, and that it is very likely that ambidextrous 
organizations excel at projects. 
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6.3.2 The External-Factor of Success and Ambidexterity 
We predicted external success not to be correlated to ambidexterity, which was 
rejected by our results. In line with ambidextrous companies outperforming others 
on innovation (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004), it is likely that these companies are 
perceived to have an innovative brand. Returning to the theory, we stated that 
having an innovative brand can reduce the negative effects newness have on 
customers (Stock & Zacharias, 2013). Hence, an innovative brand improves 
customers’ perception of radical innovations, which should be reflected in 
financial returns on exploring activities. Companies that have an innovative brand, 
then, are more likely to be successful with radical innovations. Moreover, it is 
likely that there is a self-reinforcing cycle between ability to explore and having 
an innovative brand. By obtaining an innovative brand, organizations are more 
likely to be successful on exploring activities. This will most likely increase 
innovative performance, which further increases the innovative brand, and so on. 
Ambidextrous organizations are considered more innovative than their 
competitors, and their external recognition might take part in explaining their 
exploratory behavior. In sum, while our original hypothesis argued against a 
correlation between external recognition and ambidexterity, it is likely that the 
arguments above explains the positive relationship implied by our data. 
6.4 Implications and Future Research 
From a practical perspective, our research has some implications. The innovation 
culture framework is quite extensive, and having employees take the questionnaire 
displays both strengths and weaknesses in the culture, and makes it easier to 
identify areas of improvement. Hence, managers that want an innovative company 
culture are likely to benefit from using the framework of Rao and Weintraub 
(2013), and may even become ambidextrous in the process. We therefore believe 
that an organization can become ambidextrous without explicitly trying to achieve 
just that. Moreover, it seems that values is the building block of greatest 
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importance when striving to become ambidextrous, and it is the building block 
that is found to contribute the most in explaining ambidexterity. Thus, managers 
may benefit from a particular focus on values. Finally, the literature review in this 
paper is to our knowledge the most extensive coverage of the innovative company 
culture framework by Rao and Weintraub (2013), and it can be used to gain deeper 
insight to each building block, factor, and element. Thus, our literature review can 
explain why some parts of the culture are working well while others are not, and 
guide managers in improving the building blocks, factors, and elements of interest. 
The theory on ambidexterity’s relationship to organizational culture is scarce, and 
our study is the first – as far as we know - to investigate such a comprehensive 
framework for innovation culture in relation to ambidexterity. Of the theoretical 
implications we have found, the closeness between our two concepts is perhaps 
most interesting. The tendencies imply that ambidextrous organizations have 
much more innovative company cultures than non-ambidextrous organizations. 
Further, the different parts of the cultural framework all have positive correlations 
to ambidexterity; so much so, that it is possible that ambidextrous cultures and 
innovative cultures cannot exist without the other present. Alternatively, perhaps 
ambidexterity is in fact one form of innovative culture. Whether ambidexterity 
and culture must coexist, or if they are one and the same, it is evident that 
ambidexterity should be considered in the context of culture. 
Future research is needed to better understand the relationship between company 
cultures and ambidexterity. First, it may shed light on the direction of the 
relationship, as it is impossible for us to address the issue of causality. Second, 
future research might give more information regarding the internal ranking of 
building blocks and factors, and possibly reveal a preferred internal ranking, 
which can be a substantial contribution to the research on ambidexterity. Finally, 
future research might reveal if culture and ambidexterity are coexisting concepts, 
or if ambidexterity is one particular form of innovative company culture. 
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6.5 Limitations 
This master’s thesis is subject to several limitations. The most severe, by far, is 
the size of our sample. With only six companies in the sample, we can point to 
tendencies at best, and all observed relationships might very well be false-negative 
or false-positive results (Schulz & Grimes, 2005). Moreover, all companies in our 
sample are ambidextrous to some degree, and we therefore had to consider 
companies as more ambidextrous or less ambidextrous. There are two 
interconnected main reasons for the sample being small. One reason is SISVI 
having fewer partnering companies than expected. As a result, we attempted to 
find new companies to take the survey. However, partly because this issue became 
known late in the process, we were not able to increase the sample to a sufficient 
size. Hence, while the observed tendencies are likely to occur, we cannot claim 
any hypotheses to be confirmed. 
Another possible limitation, as with all self-reported surveys, is social desirability 
bias (Bryman, 2012). If people in the organization believe that they are innovative, 
they may tend to report positive results on all questions. Conversely, if people do 
not view the organization as particularly innovative, they might have a bias 
towards all questions. The result would be an inflation in the results, which makes 
the good companies seem better than they are, and the bad companies seem worse 
than they are. Moreover, we risk classifying an organization as ambidextrous or 
non-ambidextrous simply because people have a bias towards positive or negative 
answers in the survey.  
As for the translation of the used survey, we did not use a back-translation 
strategy, which is recommended by Beaton et al. (2000). Hence, there is a risk that 
people put different meanings to one question, which may result in us not actually 
measuring what we want to measure. Moreover, poor wording in the questionnaire 
may be a source of misunderstanding for the respondents. For example, the 
element influence (from behaviors) is described as follows: “Our leaders use 
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appropriate influence strategies to help us navigate around organizational 
obstacles” (Rao & Weintraub, 2013, p. 34), which may be difficult to understand 
for the respondents. If employees’ understanding of the question is inadequate, 
they are likely to put different meanings to the question, and therefore answer it 
with great variation. 
The literature search we have conducted is a prominent area of limitations. As we 
cover many complex topics, and are limited by time and resources, we are 
restricted to only review a few articles on each topic. We started this master’s 
thesis with a quite thorough approach in our literature search, but later this 
approach became more ad hoc when we needed articles that specifically addressed 
a particular topic. However, by this time, we had gotten a more in-depth 
understanding of the framework, and we therefore believe that we were able to 
judge the quality of the articles quite well based on our knowledge. Despite 
performing countless keyword searches, the diversity of topics makes it difficult 
to identify all relevant articles, and we therefore do acknowledge that we might 
have missed out on important articles with content of great relevance. 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) present all the elements in the framework as if they are 
merely positive for innovation, and disregard the possibility of too much, or the 
context they are affected by. Thus, if an organization experience excessiveness of 
an element, it would seem like it is good for the company’s culture according to 
the assessment tool. Further, they have chosen what they consider to be the most 
important dimensions of an innovative company culture.  However, how can one 
know for certain that these are the most important and appropriate dimensions to 
consider?  Moreover, are the different factors equally important for an innovation 
culture? Should this not be context specific? 
One of the general arguments for critique towards quantitative research could also 
be aimed at Rao & Weintraub’s (2013) framework; namely that the connection 
between the measures developed by social scientists and the concepts they are 
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supposed to be revealing are assumed and not necessarily real (Bryman, 2012). 
Moreover, as we argued in the methodology, the framework of Rao and Weintraub 
(2013) may have some redundant elements, implying that an innovative company 
culture might be captured with less than 54 questions. Moreover, if elements from 
different factors (or even different building blocks) are overlapping, we risk using 
the same measure to explain different cultural aspects. However, analyzing and 
cross-checking each element for potential overlap is beyond the scope of our 
research, as this in essence means developing a new framework for an innovative 
company culture. 
As a concept, ambidexterity is quite versatile and makes a suitable concept for 
explaining organizational dualities - such as efficiency and flexibility - and this 
could be the reason why the number of articles about this theme has grown 
exponentially the last couple of years. However, it seems that the pursuit of 
versatility – explaining several dualities with ambidexterity – have made the 
concept of ambidexterity lose its clarity, and if the academic construct of 
ambidexterity “… is everything, then perhaps it is also nothing” (Birkinshaw & 
Gupta, 2013, p. 291). It is therefore possible that we accidentally have assessed 
other dualities than exploration and exploitation. Further, the intuitive way of 
thinking of a firm as ambidextrous is that the firm has a balance between the 
dimensions exploration and exploitation. However, Birkinshaw and Gupta (2013) 
suggests that ambidexterity could be viewed as a trade-off, and not as a balance. 
In other words, the combination of exploration and exploitation decides whether 
a firm is ambidextrous or not. Hence, viewing ambidexterity as a balance of 
exploration and exploitation might give different results from viewing it as a 
combination of the two.  
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 Conclusion 
In this master’s thesis, we set out to investigate the relationships between 
innovative company cultures and ambidexterity. A comprehensive literature 
review outlined ambidexterity and the different parts of an innovative company 
culture, creating a solid theoretical foundation for our study, which can also be 
used as a reference for others. Most importantly, our findings indicate a close 
relationship between cultures for innovation and ambidexterity. Improvement to 
an innovation culture is therefore likely to strengthen the level of ambidexterity. 
Thus, the ability to simultaneously explore and exploit may therefore be rooted in 
the organizational culture, where an ambidextrous organization is a company with 
a more innovative culture than its competitors. Moreover, our findings suggest 
that resources is the building block in the framework of Rao and Weintraub (2013) 
where the difference between ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous organizations 
is the greatest, but that values tends to have the greatest effect on ambidexterity. 
The research on ambidexterity’s relationship to organizational culture is scarce, 
and our study is the first – as far as we know - to investigate such a comprehensive 
framework for innovation culture in relation to ambidexterity. While our master’s 
thesis provides tendencies for explanation on some questions, further research is 
required to increase understanding of the intersection between these concepts. In 
particular, we recommend investigating the causality issue, the relative 
importance of the building blocks, and whether ambidexterity and innovative 
culture are one and the same. 
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Appendix A: Survey 
Our survey was part of a larger survey created for the SISVI project. The questions 
relevant for our Mater thesis consisted of three blocks; background questions, the 
Rao and Weintraub (2013) framework, and He and Wong’s (2004) scale for 
ambidexterity. The questions are presented below in Norwegian, the language of 
the distributed survey. 
Background Questions 
Hva er navnet på din bedrift eller organisasjon? 
Hva er din alder? 
Kjønn? 
Utdanningsnivå? 
Hvor mange års arbeidserfaring har du tilsammen? 
I hvor mange år har du jobbet i din nåværende bedrift eller organisasjon? 
Hva er din nåværende stilling? 
I hvilken enhet eller avdeling jobber du nå? 
I hvor mange år har du vært medlem av den enheten eller avdelingen? 
Hvor mange ansatte jobber i din enhet? 
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Rao and Weintraub’s (2013) Framework 
Vennligst angi i hvilken grad du føler at hver av følgende påstander er en god 
beskrivelse av din bedrift: 
Element Question 
Sulten  Vi brenner for å utforske muligheter og for å skape nye 
ting. 
Vaghet Vi har en stor appetitt og toleranse for 
tvetydighet/vaghet når vi søker nye muligheter. 
Handling Ved å fokusere på handling unngår vi å overanalysere 
muligheter som dukker opp. 
Fantasi Vi oppfordrer til å tenke nytt og se etter løsninger fra 
ulike perspektiver. 
Frihet Arbeidsplassen vår gir oss frihet til å forfølge nye 
muligheter. 
Leken Vi liker å være spontane, og er ikke redde for å le av 
oss selv. 
Nysgjerrig Vi er flinke til å stille spørsmål i jakten på det ukjente. 
Eksperimentering Vi eksperimenterer ofte i vårt innovasjonsarbeid. 
OK å mislykkes  Vi er ikke redde for å mislykkes, og vi ser på feilslåtte 
prosjekter som en kilde til læring. 
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Inspirere  Lederne våre inspirerer oss med en visjon for fremtiden 
og mulighetene for bedriften. 
Utfordre  Lederne våre utfordrer oss ofte til å tenke og handle 
nyskapende. 
Forbilde Lederne våre er gode forbilder i sitt innovasjonsarbeid, 
til etterfølgelse for andre. 
Trener Lederne våre setter av tid til å veilede og gi 
tilbakemeldinger i vårt innovasjonsarbeid. 
Initiativ  I vår bedrift tar ansatte på alle nivåer aktivt initiativ til 
innovasjon. 
Støtte Lederne våre støtter ansatte som deltar i 
innovasjonsprosjekter, uavhengig av resultat. 
Innflytelse Våre ledere bruker sin innflytelse for å hjelpe oss med 
å komme rundt organisatoriske hindringer. 
Tilpasse Lederne våre er i stand til å gjøre endringer og skifte 
kurs når det trengs. 
Ståpåvilje Våre ledere fortsetter å forfølge muligheter, selv i 
motgang. 
Felleskap  Hele bedriften snakker samme språk når det kommer til 
innovasjon. 
Forskjeller  Vi setter pris på, respekter og utnytter forskjellene som 
eksisterer i vårt fellesskap. 
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Teamwork Vi arbeider godt sammen i team for å fange opp 
muligheter. 
Tillit Det vi gjør er hele tiden i samsvar med det vi sier at vi 
verdsetter. 
Integritet Vi stiller spørsmål ved beslutninger og handlinger som 
er i strid med våre verdier. 
Åpenhet Vi kan fritt gi uttrykk for egne meninger, selv om 
idéene er ukonvensjonelle eller kontroversielle. 
Ikke-byråkratisk Vi minimerer regler, retningslinjer og byråkrati for å 
forenkle vår arbeidsplass. 
Ansvarlig Ansatte tar ansvar for sine egne handlinger og unngår å 
skylde på andre. 
Besluttsom Våre ansatte vet nøyaktig hvordan de skal komme i 
gang med, og drive et prosjekt gjennom 
organisasjonen. 
Forkjempere Vi har engasjerte ledere som er villige til å være 
forkjempere for innovasjon. 
Eksperter  Vi har tilgang til innovasjonseksperter som kan støtte 
våre prosjekter. 
Talenter Vi har de talentene som kreves for å lykkes med våre 
innovasjonsprosjekter. 
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Ansettelse Vi har de riktige rekrutterings- og ansettelsesrutinene 
på plass for å støtte en god innovasjonskultur. 
Kommunikasjon Vi har gode samarbeidsverktøy for å støtte 
innovasjonsarbeidet. 
Ecosystem Vi er flinke til å utnytte våre relasjoner med 
leverandører for å fremme innovasjon. 
Tid  Vi gir ansatte øremerket tid til å satse på nye 
muligheter. 
Penger  Vi har øremerkede penger til å satse på nye muligheter. 
Rom Vi har egne fysiske og /eller virtuelle områder dedikert 
til å satse på nye muligheter. 
Generering Vi genererer systematisk idéer fra mange forskjellige 
kilder. 
Sile Vi siler og foredler ideer metodisk for å identifisere de 
mest lovende mulighetene. 
Prioritere Vi velger muligheter basert på en klart formulert 
risikoportefølje. 
Prototype Lovende muligheter sendes raskt til prototyping. 
Iterasjon Vi har effektive kommunikasjon og tilbakemelding 
mellom vår bedrift og våre kunder. 
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Feile smart Vi stopper raskt feilslåtte prosjekter basert på 
forhåndsbestemte kriterier. 
Fleksibel Våre prosesser er laget for å være fleksible og 
tilpassede i motsetning til byråkratiske og 
kontrollbaserte. 
Lansere Vi går raskt til markedet med de mest lovende 
mulighetene. 
Skalere Vi bevilger raskt ressurser til å skalere prosjekter som 
ser lovende ut i markedet. 
Kunder Våre kunder ser på oss som en innovativ bedrift. 
Konkurrenter Vi er mye mer innovative enn andre bedrifter i vår 
bransje. 
Finansielt Vårt innovasjonsarbeid har ført til bedre økonomiske 
resultater enn andre i vår bransje. 
Langsiktig Vi ser på innovasjon som en langsiktig strategi snarere 
enn en kortsiktig løsning. 
Disiplin Vi har en bevisst, omfattende og systematisk 
tilnærming til innovasjon. 
Ferdigheter Våre innovasjonsprosjekter har bidratt til at 
organisasjonen har utviklet nye ferdigheter som vi ikke 
hadde for tre år siden 
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Fornøyd Jeg er fornøyd med min deltakelse i våre 
innovasjonsprosjekter. 
Vekst Ved deltakelse i nye satsinger, strekker og bygger vi 
bevisst våre ansattes kompetanse. 
Belønning Vi belønner folk for å delta i potensielt risikofylte 
prosjekter, uavhengig av resultat. 
 
Survey respondents rated their organization on each element on scale from 1 to 5, 
using the following scale: 1 = Ikke i det hele tatt; 2 = I liten grad; 3 = Til en viss 
grad; 4 = I stor grad; 5 = I veldig stor grad 
  
210 | A p p e n d i x  A :  S u r v e y  
 
 
 
He and Wong’s (2004) Scale for Ambidexterity 
I løpet av de siste 3 årene, hvor viktig har følgende formål vært for igangsetting 
av innovasjonsprosjekter. 
Introdusere en ny generasjon produkter 
Utvide produktsortimentet 
Åpne nye markeder 
Gå inn i nye teknologiske fagfelt 
Forbedre kvalitet på eksisterende produkter 
Forbedre fleksibilitet i produksjonen 
Redusere produksjonskostnader 
Forbedre ytelse eller redusere materialforbruk 
 
Survey respondents rated their organization on each element on scale from 1 to 5, 
using the following scale: 1 = Ikke i det hele tatt; 2 = I liten grad; 3 = Til en viss 
grad; 4 = I stor grad; 5 = I veldig stor grad 
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Appendix B: Pearson 
correlations on factor level 
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*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Climate and resources 
Pearson Correlations (N = 6) 
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*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Pearson Correlations (N = 6) 
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*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Appendix C: Partial 
correlations 
Controlling for Employees 
Correlations (N = 6) 
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Ambidexterity 1.000           
Explore .783 1.000          
Exploit .937 .517 1.000         
Innovation 
Quotient 
.819 .650 .765 1.000        
Values .628 .618 .517 .917 1.000       
Behaviors .825 .654 .770 .966 .919 1.000      
Climate .756 .519 .756 .962 .804 .895 1.000     
Resources .858 .551 .874 .969 .846 .958 .938 1.000    
Processes .902 .728 .838 .954 .775 .897 .951 .928 1.000   
Success .866 .693 .801 .926 .814 .844 .868 .910 .927 1.000  
Employees -.592 -.918 -.303 -.545 -.508 -.460 -.465 -.384 -.648 -.630 1.000 
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Explore .747 1.000          
Exploit .987 .631 1.000         
Innovation 
Quotient 
.734 .452 .751 1.000        
Values .471 .445 .443 .886 1.000       
Behaviors .772 .659 .746 .961 .896 1.000      
Climate .674 .262 .729 .955 .745 .866 1.000     
Resources .848 .541 .861 .981 .818 .953 .929 1.000    
Processes .845 .439 .884 .941 .679 .886 .964 .966 1.000   
Success .787 .371 .825 .896 .739 .805 .836 .932 .877 1.000  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
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Controlling for Assets 
Correlations (N = 6) 
Control Variables A
m
b
id
ex
te
ri
ty
 
E
x
p
lo
re
 
E
x
p
lo
it
 
In
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
Q
u
o
ti
en
t 
V
al
u
es
 
B
eh
av
io
rs
 
C
li
m
at
e 
R
es
o
u
rc
es
 
P
ro
ce
ss
es
 
S
u
cc
es
s 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
-n
o
n
e-
a  
Ambidexterity 1.000           
Explore .783 1.000          
Exploit .937 .517 1.000         
Innovation 
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Values .628 .618 .517 .917 1.000       
Behaviors .825 .654 .770 .966 .919 1.000      
Climate .756 .519 .756 .962 .804 .895 1.000     
Resources .858 .551 .874 .969 .846 .958 .938 1.000    
Processes .902 .728 .838 .954 .775 .897 .951 .928 1.000   
Success .866 .693 .801 .926 .814 .844 .868 .910 .927 1.000  
Employees .337 .523 .307 .079 .123 .389 -.034 .204 .015 -.176 1.000 
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Values .627 .655 .508 .917 1.000       
Behaviors .799 .574 .743 1.000 .953 1.000      
Climate .816 .630 .806 .968 .815 .986 1.000     
Resources .857 .532 .871 .976 .845 .974 .966 1.000    
Processes .953 .845 .876 .956 .779 .967 .952 .945 1.000   
Success .998 .935 .912 .958 .855 1.000 .876 .981 .944 1.000  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
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Controlling for Company Age 
Correlations (N = 6) 
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Quotient 
.836 .779 .730 1.000        
Values .615 .791 .407 .880 1.000       
Behaviors .823 .743 .732 .960 .907 1.000      
Climate .745 .594 .715 .953 .736 .864 1.000     
Resources .900 .681 .879 .956 .760 .954 .923 1.000    
Processes .898 .784 .814 .967 .750 .882 .950 .945 1.000   
Success .932 .891 .795 .895 .697 .800 .829 .860 .961 1.000  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
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Controlling for Employee Age 
Correlations (N = 6) 
Control Variables A
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R
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P
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ss
es
 
S
u
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es
s 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
-n
o
n
e-
a  
Ambidexterity 1.000           
Explore .783 1.000          
Exploit .937 .517 1.000         
Innovation 
Quotient 
.819 .650 .765 1.000        
Values .628 .618 .517 .917 1.000       
Behaviors .825 .654 .770 .966 .919 1.000      
Climate .756 .519 .756 .962 .804 .895 1.000     
Resources .858 .551 .874 .969 .846 .958 .938 1.000    
Processes .902 .728 .838 .954 .775 .897 .951 .928 1.000   
Success .866 .693 .801 .926 .814 .844 .868 .910 .927 1.000  
Employees .259 -.073 .395 -.240 -.429 -.098 -.241 -.039 -.107 -.190 1.000 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
 a
g
e 
Ambidexterity 1.000           
Explore .832 1.000          
Exploit .941 .596 1.000         
Innovation 
Quotient 
.940 .654 .964 1.000        
Values .847 .652 .827 .928 1.000       
Behaviors .884 .652 .885 .976 .975 1.000      
Climate .873 .518 .954 .960 .800 .902 1.000     
Resources .900 .550 .969 .989 .918 .959 .957 1.000    
Processes .968 .726 .964 .962 .811 .896 .959 .930 1.000   
Success .965 .694 .971 .924 .826 .845 .863 .920 .929 1.000  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
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Controlling for Return on Assets 
Correlations (N = 6) 
Control Variables A
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es
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E
m
p
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s 
-n
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n
e-
a  
Ambidexterity 1.000           
Explore .783 1.000          
Exploit .937 .517 1.000         
Innovation 
Quotient 
.819 .650 .765 1.000        
Values .628 .618 .517 .917 1.000       
Behaviors .825 .654 .770 .966 .919 1.000      
Climate .756 .519 .756 .962 .804 .895 1.000     
Resources .858 .551 .874 .969 .846 .958 .938 1.000    
Processes .902 .728 .838 .954 .775 .897 .951 .928 1.000   
Success .866 .693 .801 .926 .814 .844 .868 .910 .927 1.000  
Employees .034 -.642 .126 .296 -.026 .082 .556 .203 .484 .186 1.000 
R
O
A
 
Ambidexterity 1.000           
Explore 1.000 1.000          
Exploit .941 .786 1.000         
Innovation 
Quotient 
.847 1.000 .768 1.000        
Values .629 .785 .525 .968 1.000       
Behaviors .825 .926 .769 .989 .925 1.000      
Climate .888 1.000 .832 1.000 .986 1.000 1.000     
Resources .870 .907 .873 .972 .869 .964 1.000 1.000    
Processes 1.000 1.000 .895 .970 .900 .983 .938 .968 1.000   
Success .875 1.000 .798 .928 .834 .847 .936 .906 .973 1.000  
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
 
